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I began my doctoral studies in 2010 with a scattered and wide-ranging set of interests
related to the political economy of the Middle East. At the time, I had no idea how
difficult it would be to transform those ideas into a concrete contribution to scholarly
research. I thought it would take six years; it took seven. I thought I would wake up
each morning motivated to attend class; complete a problem set; study for an exam; work
on my dissertation proposal; collect data; transcribe an interview; prepare presentation
slides; or write (and rewrite, and rewrite, and rewrite) a chapter. Some mornings, I had
no such motivation. But, in 2010, I was also unaware of how many bright, inspiring,
funny, and generous people I would meet along this journey. The actual cast of characters
is inevitably longer than the list of those acknowledged below. These individuals not
only helped me achieve the aforementioned checklist of research tasks, adding up to a
completed dissertation, but they also encouraged me to take care of myself in the process.
I could not have made it through these past seven years without them.
I began graduate school in a state of mild disbelief that I was fortunate enough to
have Mark Tessler, a luminary in the field of Middle East politics, as my advisor. How-
ever intimidating his 16-page curriculum vitae might have been, I quickly learned that
it belied a personality that was anything but. Mark is cheerful, kind, and perceptive and
I have learned so much from him. Perhaps most critically, I have learned how to ap-
proach Israel and Palestine as a careful and compassionate scholar. Our conversations
about my work would often jump from abstract concerns regarding theory development,
to how to draw inferences from my empirical analysis, to our hope or despair (regret-
tably, it was usually the latter) regarding whatever the past week’s headlines were from
the region. It seems impossible that the amount of knowledge Mark possesses about the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is contained within one person. Mark cares about my work and
he constantly pushes me to make it better. Furthermore, he cares deeply about Israeli-
Palestinian peace. From him, I have gained a deep appreciation of both the privilege and
the responsibility we bear as scholars trying to get things right. I could not have asked
for a better mentor.
Ever since teaching me introductory game theory, Bill Clark has made, and continues
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to make me, a more disciplined thinker. I often run sentences and paragraphs by a virtual
Bill in my head as I am writing them. Bill has an unparalleled ability to break down
large, ambitious theoretical arguments into their constituent pieces, no matter what the
topic may be, sometimes devastating your best-laid plans. However, as an advisor, he
also helps you put them back together again. Whenever I told Bill about the sweepingly
broad questions I wanted to answer in my research, he would ask me, first, what I already
knew. Drawing on whatever data I had cobbled together at the time, I would provide
some tentative answer. Then, he would ask me: "Well, what is the next thing you need
to know?" I always left meetings with Bill feeling like I knew what the next step in my
research should be, making the journey toward the completed dissertation just a little bit
less daunting.
Brian Min was hired by Michigan’s political science department the same semester
that I started graduate school. In part for this reason, Brian has always served as a model
for me of what a successful academic career should look like. While he has always told
me that the dissertation should be the "worst thing you ever write", his own dissertation
project, now a book, and the first seven years of his career as a professor have set the bar
extremely high. Brian is a meticulous scholar, and I often found his attention to detail
contagious. Brian once suggested to me (either in a one-on-one meeting or in a class with
my peers) that, no matter what context one works in, it was usually not valid to complain
about a lack of data because "data is everywhere". This simple statement fundamentally
changed the way I approached the empirical component of my project.
I met Anne Pitcher before I even began graduate school, and I have always been in-
spired by the genuine passion and creativity that she brings to her own work. It is another
contagious quality. Anne is also one of those people that contains a seemingly impossi-
ble amount of literature and information in her head. By Anne’s example, I have been
encouraged to dive headlong into the weeds of my cases; to be unafraid to use multiple,
creative methods to address a question; and to read widely and across disciplines. It was
also thanks to Anne and Brian that I was able to attend the 2014 American Political Sci-
ence Association (APSA) Africa Workshop in Mozambique, where I was connected to an
invaluable community of early career scholars from the United States and sub-Saharan
Africa working on issues of distributive politics.
Mark Dincecco joined my committee in 2013 when he arrived in Michigan, and I could
not be more grateful for his guidance since then. Mark has an impressive way of distilling
research down to its most important and fundamental contributions. If there are parts
of this unwieldy dissertation that come across as neat, tidy, and clearly argued, that is
probably due to Mark’s influence. Given his own training and expertise, Mark’s guidance
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has been critical in helping to frame this project as a contribution to the broader field of
political economy, despite its relatively narrow empirical focus. I have deeply appreciated
his positive energy and encouragement during these last few years of writing.
In my development as a scholar, I have also benefitted from the input of numerous
other members of the University of Michigan political science faculty. I have presented
sections of this work various times at the Comparative Politics Workshop and the Politi-
cal Economy Workshop at the University of Michigan, and the feedback I have received
there has undoubtedly improved this project. In addition, I have presented at numerous
conferences and workshops over the years – too many to name here – each time coming
away with renewed motivation and inspiration. Thank you to all of those sharp minds
who have taken the time to read or listen to my work over the years.
My research during graduate school has been generously supported by the United
States Institute of Peace Jennings Randolph Peace Scholarship; the Rackham Graduate
School at the University of Michigan; the International Institute at the University of
Michigan; the Project on Middle East Political Science at George Washington Univer-
sity; the Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies at the University of Michigan; and
the Department of Political Science at the University of Michigan. Without this financial
support, many aspects of this project would have been impossible.
My research in the Palestinian Territories has been inspired by, and benefited from, a
wide array of people. Sometimes, a simple conversation with a housemate over nargileh
was as revealing as an interview with a high-level official. My work on Palestine was
improved immeasurably thanks to the dedicated research and translation assistance of
Aya Awwad, Hala Jada, and Ali Musa. Special thanks are also due to the Palestine Eco-
nomic Policy Research Institute, which provided me with office space during my stay in
Ramallah in 2014 and whose researchers, including most notably Dr. Samir Abdullah,
offered substantive guidance and critique that undoubtedly improved my work. I am ap-
preciative of Dr. Khalil Shikaki, Walid Ladadweh, and the staff of Palestinian Center for
Policy and Survey Research for generously permitting me access to subsets of their survey
data over the years, which helped shape my thinking about the important issues facing
Palestinians at the individual level. Finally, I would like to thank all of my informants
in the West Bank and Israel who I will not identify by name here, but who were exceed-
ingly generous with their time and energy. There is almost no way to quantify what I
learned from these candid conversations. The network of contacts that I have developed
in the Palestinian Territories has been one of the most valuable outcomes of my doctoral
research, and motivates my continued commitment to my work moving forward.
In Timor-Leste, I benefited from the translation assistance of Marcelino Piedade in
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Dili and Baucau and Maun Fransisco in Maliana. I also drew on a diverse network of
individuals to gain perspectives on the country’s post-conflict transition and issues per-
taining to public finance and development, including: Hans Beck, Christine Carberry,
Darrian Collins, Steve Crout, Dicky Dooradi, Pedro Figueiredo, Alex George, Mateus
Gonçlaves, Charles Greenwald, Helen Hill, Prabir Majumdar, Tracey Morgan, Richard
and Terry Mounsey, Guteriano Neves, Samuel Porter, Nuno Rodrigues, Melody Ann Ross,
Charles Scheiner, Flavio Simõaes, Cipriana Soares, Nikunj Soni, Michelle Whalen, Eric
Wheatley, and a number of others. Further, I have been fortunate to partner with Susan
Marx and Gobie Rajalingam at The Asia Foundation to collect the survey data analyzed
in the latter part of chapter 5. They have been gracious and professional, even as much
of our coordination had to occur by email across multiple time zones. Jennifer Frentasia
provided very useful (and last-minute) translation assistance.
Graduate school would have been nearly impossible without the support of a number
of colleagues who have since become friends for life. In particular, I want to thank Logan
Casey, Jennifer Chudy, Maiko Heller, Trevor Johnston, Neveser Köker, Elizabeth Mann,
Laura Seago, Jessica Steinberg, Bonnie Washick, and Alton Worthington. The friendships
I have developed with other graduate students in the program have been vital at every
stage of this process, and I know they will continue to be in the future. There are too
many good memories to begin recounting them here. Many other dear friends, neigh-
bors, and dog park acquaintances outside of the graduate program have helped to make
southeast Michigan a truly special place for me, one which I am surprisingly sad to leave.
In addition, my friends in Washington, D.C. and elsewhere in the world have also been
an enormous source of strength, reminding me at critical moments that I have a history
and a future outside of graduate school.
I was especially lucky that my move to Michigan in 2010 coincided with my sister’s
move to the area to begin her position as Assistant Professor at Eastern Michigan Univer-
sity. She has since bought and completely remodeled a home, achieved tenure, and pro-
duced a truly delightful offspring. Being in close proximity to Katy, Brandon Groff, and
Matilda Groff has been such a gift. I thank them for pulling me away from my work for
near-weekly dinners, adventures with gardening and ducks, drawing, and make-believe
games. They have kept me grounded. I am grateful to my parents, Roy and Gail Green-
wald, for making numerous visits to Michigan over the years to visit us, and for their
constant love and support while I made my way through the doctoral program.
Finally, it was some time in the middle of graduate school that I came crashing into
Dave McWilliam’s life. He has been a model of patience and stability throughout these, at
times, tumultuous years. He has made me too many waffle breakfasts and fruit smoothies
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to count, taught me about music, joined me on various international travel escapades,
made me laugh, cleaned my car multiple times, listened to my rants, and continues to
raise a little hooligan of a dog with me. Unconditional love is a truly wonderful thing. I
cannot wait for our future.
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ABSTRACT
National self-determination movements are defined by their demand for new state
institutions. Often drawing on popular feelings of exclusion, discrimination, and real ex-
periences with violence and repression, they pledge that a new state will better serve the
community that they claim to represent. Yet, contemporary versions of these movements
face a thorny challenge: they must form in a populated territory that is already controlled
by an existing state. Using a mixed-method approach, this project develops a two-part
theory of self-rule and state capacity development among nationalist movements in such
settings.
First, I argue that incumbent state’s goals in a contested region will shape the amount
of self-rule (or autonomy) a competing nationalist movement is able to achieve. I assess
this argument through a qualitative comparison of the West Bank in the Palestinian Ter-
ritories and Timor-Leste, and through a typological analysis of a larger sample of cases
from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (N = 81). I find support for the proposi-
tion that incumbent states which seek to annex contested territory inclusive of the existing
population are unlikely to grant any governing autonomy to nationalist movements that
oppose their rule. By contrast, incumbent states which seek to annex contested terri-
tory exclusive of the existing population are more likely to permit partial autonomy for
competing nationalist movements.
The second part of the theory suggests that a national movement’s experiences dur-
ing conflict with the incumbent state can shape its development of fiscal capacity, one
of the core capacities associated with statehood. In the West Bank, I draw on elite in-
terviews; geo-referenced data on variation in Palestinian policing autonomy; an original,
panel dataset on municipal revenues in 107 West Bank towns; and local election data to
demonstrate that the association between coercive capacity and fiscal capacity is not un-
conditionally positive, and greater Palestinian control over policing only translates into
revenue growth in those areas where opposition to the ruling party, and arguably to the
Palestinian Authority (PA) itself, is strongest. These findings demonstrate that not all
state-like capacities necessarily grow together among contemporary national movements
seeking statehood. My findings in Timor-Leste do not demonstrate similar distortions.
Using data from a nationally representative survey (N = 1,243) conducted in collabora-
xv
tion with The Asia Foundation in 2016, and building on results from my own pilot test,
I find that lower state coercive presence appears to be associated with less expressed de-
pendence on government and lower tax morale. This research suggests that Timor-Leste,
a country that experienced no autonomy during the Indonesian occupation, may exhibit
a more straightforward, positive correlation between coercive and fiscal capacity devel-
opment than was observed in the West Bank, which has experienced an extended period




Since the end of World War II and the decolonization of most of sub-Saharan Africa
and Asia, nearly all of the world’s territory is governed by sovereign states. Almost by ne-
cessity, populations seeking independent statehood today must do so on territory claimed
by an existing state. In many ways, this is a different process than it was to seek and gain
independence from the supranational empires and colonial powers of the past. Most
borders between countries are accepted on our maps as solid, not dashed, lines. If any
universal right to self-determination exists, its recognition has become increasingly con-
tingent on the interests of existing states.1
Still, the daunting nature of waging a campaign for self-rule has not stopped a myr-
iad of nationalist movements from engaging in the struggle. These movements may frame
their fight in the language of self-determination, liberation, separation, secession, or inde-
pendence. What they have in common is an aim to discard the existing political authority
in favor of a new set of state institutions. Often drawing on popular feelings of exclusion,
discrimination, and real experiences with violence and repression, nationalist movement
leaders pledge that a set of new, autonomous institutions – often, a new state – will better
capture the shared interests of the community that they claim to represent. Although
varying in their structure and tactics, contemporary nationalist struggles in places such
as Aceh, the Basque Country, Eritrea, Kashmir, Kurdistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Namibia,
Northern Ireland, Palestine, Quebec, South Sudan, Timor-Leste, and Western Sahara have
been inspired by this overarching aim. Coggins (2011) counts 256 secessionist move-
1Horowitz (1985, 4-5) frames the postcolonial dilemma somewhat differently. After the decolonization
of most of Asia and Africa, he says: "No longer was colonial domination the issue. Self-determination
had been implemented only to the level of preexisting colonial boundaries. Within these boundaries, the
question was to whom the new states belonged." Unlike Horowitz, the present work makes the construction
of state institutions, not merely the distribution of the state’s spoils, the main focus of attention. These are
related, but distinct, axes of potential conflict.
1
ments that have begun since 1931, with 63 unique cases that were still ongoing in 2000.2
Existing scholarship offers rich insights into nationalist movements and new state for-
mation. Research on the former, for example, provides explanations for why nationalist
movements adopt the goals of self-determination or independence (Hale 2000; Hechter
1992; Horowitz 1985; Lawrence 2013; Walter 2006); under what conditions nationalist
conflicts may be prone to violence (Gurr & Moore 1997; Walter 2009); when rebel move-
ments, including nationalist ones, will provide order and governance in areas they control
(Arjona 2016; Mampilly 2011; Weinstein 2007); and why some movements are, eventu-
ally, able to obtain recognition as independent states (Coggins 2011; Roeder 2007). In
addition, classic and more recent contributions in political economy and sociology have
advanced our understanding of the emergence of modern states (Abramson 2017; Ol-
son 1993; Tilly 1992) and how, and to what extent, they have developed some of their
core capacities (Bates 2010; Besley & Persson 2011; Boone 2003; Dincecco 2011; Herbst
2000; Migdal 1988). The current project situates itself at the intersection of these bod-
ies of work, a relatively unpopulated space, and contends that we can learn something
about the possibilities for new state development by better understanding the conflicts
from which they emerge. Building on extant work, I suggest that certain features of self-
determination conflicts themselves, such as the experiences they produce for individu-
als and the institutions they create, will shape the potential for nationalist movements,
emerging from such conflicts, to establish new, functional political institutions.
Understanding the nature of political institutions that emerge and persist in such set-
tings – settings that I refer to below as regions of contested statehood – is important. In
these areas, individuals accumulate formative interactions with organizations that pur-
port to govern them, whether they are fully sovereign states or largely unrecognized na-
tional resistance movements. These may include experiences as weighty as fighting on
behalf of a nationalist militia or losing a family member to violence, but they also, almost
certainly, include the types of transactions that those of us fortunate enough to live in
stable, peaceful countries think of as mundane: acquiring a building permit, reporting
a crime, or paying a tax, for example. These legacies are important to document insofar
as we care about how states and organizations aspiring toward statehood affect the daily
lives of people. Further, long after the dust of conflict settles, people’s understanding of
the state – their willingness to comply with its authority, their view of the state’s respon-
2Coggins (2011) defines a secessionist movement as a "nationalist group that is attempting to separate
from an existing state in order to form a newly independent state." To be included in her dataset, the
movement must formally declare independence and intended separation from the home state; possess a
national flag; make a claim over both territory and population; and "last at least 7 (24 hour) days, include
at least 100 individuals and claim at least 100 square meters of territory."
2
sibility toward them, and their perspective on their own rights as residents or citizens –
may be informed by these complex legacies.
1.1 Motivation
In part, this project began as a search for a theoretical and conceptual home for the
Palestinian case. In that sense, it is partially inductive. I visited Israel and the Palestinian
Territories for the first time in 2011, the summer after my first year of graduate school.
I began my doctoral studies with a deep interest in the politics of the Middle East, but I
was wary of the Israeli-Palestinian context in particular. "Minefield", "morass", "caustic",
"too politicized", or "an academic backwater" were words that I heard at various times to
describe either the region itself or the study of it. As it happened, the summer of 2011
was a time when revolution and some of its early, frightful consequences were sweeping
through much of the Middle East and North Africa. The Palestinian Territories were,
relatively speaking, a model of calm. Thus, with the support of my advisor, I decided to
go to the West Bank to continue my study of the Arabic language and to start learning
how to do field research. I spent three months there, and I quickly became sucked into
the morass.
In that first visit to the West Bank, I felt a certain cognitive dissonance in observing the
way political life functioned. In some ways, interactions between the government – in this
case, the Palestinian Authority (PA) – and the population were as we might predict. The
trash got collected (sometimes), the court system functioned, people payed their taxes,
the banks were regulated, and cops directed traffic. In fact, non-political life also went on
as usual, and often in spite of, the conflict: weddings, theater performances, high school
exams, holiday celebrations, doctors appointments, barbeques, camping trips, mortgage
payments, etc. What minefield, one might ask? Yet, in other ways, the military occupation
and the conflict affected everything and everyone. If, following Bates, Greif, and Singh
(2002), states are meant to provide an environment in which individuals do not need
to engage in self-defense but instead they can pursue production and leisure – and if
they are defined by political leaders using their coercive capacity to protect citizens and
property rather than predating upon them – then it is clear to any casual observer that
Palestinians do not have a state. To imply that the PA is moving toward statehood is, at the
very least, controversial and, at worst, a dangerous fiction.
Despite this, and despite the fact that the Palestinian national struggle has been one of
the longest, as of yet unsuccessful, campaigns for independent statehood in the modern
era, a set of political institutions has emerged in the West Bank that are worth under-
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standing in their own right. The PA has been called a "nascent" or "emerging" state (Brown
2003; Khan 2004), a quasi-state (Hilal 2003), and, less charitably, a proto-police state
(Buttu 2017). It is easy to become absorbed by semantic debates. Yet, in the meantime, I
observe two general oversights that existing studies of the Israeli-Palestinian context fail
to capture. First, despite ongoing efforts to characterize the PA and its relationship to the
empirical features associated with statehood, most analyses of the Palestinian case fail to
put the PA in a broader, comparative context. There are some very good reasons to be
cautious with such comparisons, which I hope that readers will find I take seriously in
the proceeding chapters. However, it is not a stretch to suggest that extended conflicts
over statehood will likely shape the institutions that emerge from such conflicts and how
populations in such settings interact with, and relate to, these institutions. Examining
other cases for similarities and differences will help us better understand what is, and
what is not, unique about Israel and Palestine. Second, there is often an implicit assump-
tion in existing work that the PA’s capacity to act like a state is uniformly degraded by
the conflict, or by factors such as corruption, clientelism, or authoritarianism within the
national movement. In fact, I suggest that these effects may not be uniform across Pales-
tinian communities. Further, the very links between the different forms of state capacity
development may themselves be perverted from what we would expect in other settings.
As suggested above, another motivation for this study was to make a contribution
to the political economy literature. In parallel to pursuing exploratory research in the
Middle East, I became increasingly interested in how states develop the authority and
capacity to extract resources, mainly revenue, from their populations. The ability to tax
plays a central role in our understanding of what makes government successful. Public
revenues fund national defense, police forces, roads, clean water, schools, courts, public
transportation, and public spaces. Further, there are two principles – if not widely held
beliefs – that seem to be produced and reproduced in public discourse about government
revenues around the world. First, such revenue should be extracted primarily from those
who are benefiting from the state and its services, and second, to the extent possible,
it should be extracted with the consent of the population. In fact, these principles are
deceptively simple, and governments and societies that are able to successfully embody
them have achieved a remarkable feat. There are many ways in which revenues might be
extracted from those who are not benefiting from government, and of course this may be
done through force rather than consent. In any case, it seemed worthwhile to understand
tax system development at its earliest stages – when the state was being contested and
formed. Mobilizing resources for that great feat of collective action that we call the state
requires at least two principal parties to the transaction: those doing the extracting on
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behalf of the state and the holder of those resources. What this study demonstrates is
that a far greater number of actors are implicated in those transactions. This may be
especially so in settings where the formation of the state is partial or contested, or in
places with complex histories of conflict, but perhaps not. Envisioning taxation as an
exchange between two (aggregate) actors is likely too simplistic for most settings.
1.2 Terminology
Even within the field of comparative politics and the more specific branches of con-
flict studies and political economy, many of the terms I use throughout this manuscript
require further clarification. Some of them are new terms based on concepts that I have
generated for the purposes of my theory, whereas others are frequently used in the liter-
ature but may have multiple or ambiguous meanings. I clarify some of these briefly here,
and they are further elaborated in the subsequent chapters in which they appear.
First, the scope of cases that are relevant to this project could be defined in several
ways. As mentioned, the project began inductively with the Palestinian case. Unfortu-
nately, the Palestinian case is often an outlier by default. The Palestinian national move-
ment is sometimes described as an independence movement, which is relatively unprob-
lematic, although informally this term has a greater association with postcolonial move-
ments rather than more contemporary movements that are not explicit responses to colo-
nialism. While the universe of "secessionist" or "separatist" conflicts are more temporally
proximate to the Palestinian one, it is potentially problematic to refer to the Palestinians
as seeking secession or separation for two, main reasons. First, because some elements of
the Palestinian national movement have stated the aim of establishing a state in not only
the territories of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, but also across the land
that is now within what is widely recognized as Israel’s sovereign borders. This does not
represent a call for secession or separation, but rather for the replacement of one state
with another. Second, use of the term "secession" or "separation" often implies that an
existing state possesses recognized sovereignty over the would-be secessionist region. In
this case, Israel has not annexed the West Bank and Gaza Strip, thus the territories are not
considered – by the international community, nor, officially, by Israel itself – to be part of
Israel. Classifying the Israeli-Palestinian case as one of civil conflict is relatively uncon-
troversial, although it generates a universe of cases that is perhaps too broad and diverse
for useful comparison. Further, from an empirical standpoint, the number of casualties
per year in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict sometimes falls below conventional thresholds
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of violent conflict.3 Finally, paralleling some of the problems with the terms "secession"
and "separation", referring to the conflict as "civil" implies that it is domestic, or internal,
to a state, which may be disputed by those that do not recognize the Palestinian Territo-
ries as internal to Israel.
Given these complications, I define a set of cases to capture the critical features of
the two cases I analyze in this manuscript – the West Bank in the Palestinian Territories
and Timor-Leste (or, previously, "East Timor") – and the broader set of cases I turn to in
chapter 4. I define these as areas or regions of contested statehood. The unit of analysis,
therefore, is a geographically defined territory or region. It is "contested", as will be de-
scribed in chapter 4, because there are competing claims to which state or organization
exercises ultimate authority, or coercive power, in the region.
In nearly all contested territories in the contemporary era, there is an existing state
that asserts its rule. Borrowing language from Mampilly (2011), I refer to this through-
out as the "incumbent state". As with other scholars mentioned above in reference to
the Palestinian case, I struggle with terminology that adequately captures organizations
that may possess some qualities that more closely resemble a national movement while
others that more closely resemble a state. Thus, I sometimes refer to the institutions de-
veloped by the competing national movement as those of the aspiring, or emerging, state.
This is consistent with a conceptualization whereby statehood can be measured along
a continuum, including national movements aspiring toward statehood on one end and
fully sovereign, recognized states on the other. However, precisely because these move-
ments are not yet states, referring to them as movements or organizations is preferred. In
this vein, the reader will note that the following terms are often used interchangeably:
national movements seeking statehood, nationalist movements, and self-determination
movements. In addition, I sometimes interchange "movement" and "organization". This
may obscure a distinction that is substantively important, but suffice it to say, for now,
that much of the subsequent discussion will focus on movements that do, in fact, have
an organizational structure. For example, as is discussed in chapter 2, the Palestinian na-
tional movement was subsumed under a self-named "organization", yet many still refer to
the national movement to encapsulate a broader variety of parties, fronts, and collectives
that may or may not be part of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). Chapter
4 aims to generalize beyond particular country cases and thus delves into some detail on
these concepts.
The concept of "autonomy" will receive a lot of attention in the pages that follow. To
3For example, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict only enters the Correlates of War dataset of "extra-state"
wars for four years of the Second Intifada, from 2000 to 2003 (Sarkees & Wayman 2010).
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avoid any initial confusion, it is worthwhile to clarify from the outset that I use "au-
tonomy" in reference to the nationalist movement(s) mentioned above, and it connotes
autonomy from the incumbent state over governance. In particular, I define autonomy
in chapter 4 as the existence of formal institutions of self-governance in part or all of the
contested region that are controlled by, and serve, members of the national community seek-
ing statehood. Because it refers to governance, the term is roughly interchangeable with
"self-rule", hence the title of the manuscript references the latter, more familiar, term.4
1.3 Summary of Argument
Here, I briefly summarize the overarching argument of this manuscript. It connects
three main concepts: (a) the goals of the incumbent state in a contested territory; (b)
the amount of autonomous, self-rule obtained by a competing national movement in this
territory; and (c) the forms of state-like capacity developed by the national movement
and the connections between them.
First, the goals and decisions of incumbent states in contested regions will shape the
prospects for national movements to develop state-like capacity. In settings where incum-
bent states pursue inclusive annexation – in other words, where they perceive net benefits
to absorbing both the contested region and its population into the existing state – na-
tional movements are likely to gain little to no autonomy during the period of incumbent
state rule. The strategies of control associated with the goal of inclusive annexation may
include a combination of both "carrots" and "sticks", however in all cases they require a
far-reaching institutional presence into the contested territory by the incumbent state,
leaving no room for self-governance among the existing population. This causal proposi-
tion is supported by the analysis of the case of Timor-Leste in chapter 3 and the broader
cross-case analysis in chapter 4, both of which are summarized below.
A few other propositions regarding inclusive annexation emerge from the Timorese
case that are not formally tested, but are suggested for future theory building. The first is
that strategies of inclusive annexation can become prohibitively costly and thus, in some
cases, may be inherently unstable. If inclusive annexation is unsuccessful, national move-
ments in such settings are likely to move directly from virtually no governing autonomy
to complete autonomy or independence. In these cases, the predictions from the existing
state formation and state-building literature should hold for the new state. For example,
we should expect a positive correlation between the state’s coercive and fiscal capacity.
4I prefer autonomy in the empirical components of the analysis that follows only because it is somewhat
easier to grasp degrees of autonomy, in my opinion, than degrees of self-rule. That is an entirely subjective
preference.
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Different forms of state capacity should grow (and shrink) together. The positive correla-
tion between different forms of state development finds empirical support in the analysis
in chapter 5.
In cases where incumbent states pursue exclusive annexation – in other words, where
they perceive net benefits to absorbing the contested territory, but they do not perceive
net benefits to incorporating its population – nationalist movements competing with the
incumbent state are likely to obtain partial autonomy during the period of contestation.
This is supported by the results in chapters 3 and 4. Strategies of exclusive annexation do
not require as extensive a non-coercive, bureaucratic presence in the contested territory.
Further, they are often accompanied by settlement strategies to "right-people" the con-
tested region as described by Brendan O’Leary (cited in Haklai & Loizides 2015, 5). The
restrictions on the functional autonomy granted to the national movement seeking state-
hood can have far-reaching implications for various forms of capacity, not just the one
that is being functionally restricted. Partial autonomy can introduce distortions in the
relationship between different forms of state capacity, such that there is not an uncon-
ditional positive correlation between the different forms of state capacity development.
This is supported by the analysis in chapter 2 of the Palestinian case – where we observe
that an increase in coercive capacity is associated with an increase in fiscal capacity only
in those areas controlled by the opposition.
1.4 Research Design and Methods
This research draws on several visits to the Palestinian Territories and one visit to
Timor-Leste between 2011 and 2015. In Israel and the Palestinian Territories, I conducted
over 30 formal, open-ended interviews with political elites, including former cabinet of-
ficials, high-level managers, local government officials, heads of non-governmental orga-
nizations, and scholars and analysts. I also visited the Israeli State Archives, the Israeli
Central Bureau of Statistics, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, the Palestinian
Ministry of Local Government, and conducted informal meetings and email correspon-
dences with a range of individuals and organizations. I established the relationships and
data sharing agreements needed for the analysis in chapter 2. While in Timor-Leste, I
conducted a smaller number of targeted meetings, however my focus was on building
the infrastructure and contacts to collect survey data. Thus, I conducted the small pilot
survey discussed in chapter 5, and laid the groundwork for the larger survey, conducted
in partnership with The Asia Foundation in 2016. This survey data is also analyzed in
chapter 5. This project draws on multiple methodological approaches, including, most
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centrally, qualitative process tracing and econometric analysis of large-N observational
data.
The chapter structure of this dissertation does not exactly mirror the research process
itself, but the sequence is quite close. (The main exception is that chapters 3 and 4 were
primarily written after returning from Timor-Leste in 2015, while chapter 5 returns to
the subnational level of analysis within Timor-Leste, building on ideas I developed while
I was there.) This increases the transparency of the process, as the reader moves between
empirical observation and theory-building in a similar way that I did myself. For read-
ers whose brains naturally process information like mine does, this will be a boon. For
others, the structure may seem atypical and jumpy at times. For convenience, I provide a
summary of each chapter below.
Chapter 2 begins on the ground in the West Bank. Even casual observers of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict acknowledge that the institutions of the PA – the entity set up in the
mid-1990s to provide Palestinians partial self-rule in the West Bank and Gaza Strip – fail
to resemble the institutions of a fully sovereign state in a myriad of ways. This chapter
focuses on explaining one such deviation. A shared insight across much of the existing
literature holds that as a state increases its monopolization of violence within the territory
it controls, we should also observe an increase in its fiscal capacity, or its ability to extract
revenue. However, national self-determination movements seeking statehood today face
a particularly thorny challenge – they must form in populated territory that is already
controlled by an existing state. This chapter builds on the theoretical "hunch" (Mann
1994; Yom 2015) that this basic condition will affect the relationship between coercive
and fiscal capacity development among such aspiring states. In the West Bank, local
geographic variation in the central PA’s policing authority provides an opportunity to test
the proposition that an increase in an aspiring state’s coercive control will be associated
with an increase its fiscal capacity. Using a newly constructed dataset of revenues from
107 municipalities in the West Bank from 2006 to 2012, I find that greater Palestinian
control over internal policing only appears to enhance revenues in towns governed by
the opposition – in this case, Hamas – not towns governed by the ruling party, Fatah.
I discuss two possible mechanisms, ultimately suggesting that increased repression in
areas of higher PA policing authority may drive counter-mobilization by Hamas resulting
in greater fiscal capacity development. While focused on a very specific and peculiar case,
the findings in this chapter suggest that not all state-like capacities grow together among
contemporary national movements seeking statehood. Instead, consolidating policing
capacity under one party in a conflict setting, for example, can lead the opposition to
develop other forms of local capacity as a means of building its base.
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At the conclusion of chapter 2, we are left wondering what particular features of the
Israeli-Palestinian case might have generated the distortions in the relationship between
coercive and fiscal capacity development that were observed. Chapter 3 uses a "most sim-
ilar systems" comparison between the cases of the Palestinian Territories and Timor-Leste
(formerly East Timor) to argue that the incumbent state’s goals in a contested region will
influence the degree of autonomy, or self-rule, that a competing nationalist movement
can obtain. This chapter relies primarily on the method of analytic process tracing to
assess whether the observed, intermediary implications of the theorized causal relation-
ship – in this case, between incumbent state goals and nationalist movement autonomy
– are borne out within the case under analysis. This chapter, like chapter 2, draws on a
variety of primary and secondary sources, including the series of interviews that I con-
ducted while in the West Bank. Here, in chapter 3, I argue that Israel’s goals in the
West Bank were the primary driving force behind the creation of partially autonomous
Palestinian institutions in the West Bank. Specifically, because Israel sought to maintain
control of the territory while avoiding absorption of the Palestinian population, certain
features of governance were devolved to the Palestinian national movement but the use
of coercive force was constrained. I assess the counterfactual outcome that may have ob-
tained had Israel’s goals differed by analyzing another case that, despite being located
over 6,000 miles away, shares many similarities with the Palestinian one – Timor-Leste,
which was annexed and occupied by Indonesia from 1975 to 1999. Relying on primary
and secondary sources, including archived content of Indonesian newspapers, I demon-
strate that Indonesia’s goals in Timor-Leste differed considerably from those of Israel in
the West Bank. Although it pursued a violent campaign to quash resistance to its rule,
Indonesia’s investments in bureaucracy, propaganda, and its restraint on settlement ac-
tivity indicated that it sought full annexation of the territory and its population. I make
the qualitative argument that the Timorese national resistance movement – first under
the Frente Revolucionária de Timor-Leste Independente (FRETILIN), and, subsequently,
the Conselho Nacional da Resistência Maubere (CNRM) – exercised no autonomy over
governance during the occupation due in large part to Indonesia’s goals.
Chapters 2 and 3 may try the patience of readers who are seeking more general lessons
for cases outside of these small and perhaps (depending on one’s perspective) peripheral
conflicts. Chapter 4 is addressed to these readers. This chapter first asks: what are Pales-
tine and Timor-Leste cases of? I define the universe to which they belong as regions of
contested statehood, or populated areas where an incumbent state exercises disproportion-
ate control, but faces opposition from a movement or organization that seeks to establish
self-rule. Drawing on the analysis in the preceding chapters, I develop a conceptual ty-
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pology of such regions in which they are defined according to two dimensions: first, the
incumbent state’s goals in the region can be more inclusive, in which the incumbent state
leadership perceives a net benefit to annexing both the territory and its existing popu-
lation, or more exclusive, in which the incumbent state leadership only perceives a net
benefit to annexing the territory but is uncertain, or perceives a net cost, to fully incor-
porating the contested territory’s population into the state. The second dimension mea-
sures the extent of governing autonomy exercised by the nationalist movement. During
the period of active contestation with the incumbent state, the nationalist movement can
exercise no autonomy or partial autonomy, with the latter defined as the authority to fulfill
some subset, but not all, of the functions of governance, including: internal policing, tax-
ation, dispute resolution, and the distribution of some public or club goods (other than
policing, defense, or dispute resolution). Subsequently, I identify a sample of contem-
porary regions of contested statehood (n = 81) using the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict
Dataset (Version 4-2016) and code each contested region for three variables related to
incumbent state goals and three variables related to nationalist movement autonomy at
various stages of the conflict. I find that nationalist movements are less likely to gain
partial autonomy in environments where the incumbent state is pursuing inclusive an-
nexation. While there are a number of possible explanations for this observed correlation,
the findings in this chapter, in conjunction with the analyses presented in chapters 2 and
3, increase our confidence in the proposition that the objectives of the stronger party in
a conflict setting – namely, the incumbent state – will shape governance outcomes for
movements which seek national self-rule.
Chapter 5 returns to Timor-Leste to examine subnational outcomes, like chapter 2,
but this time in a setting where the nationalist movement experienced no autonomy un-
der occupation. A more precise comparison to the Palestinian case would examine the
association between state coercive and fiscal capacities across regions within the country,
mirroring the operationalization of those variables used in chapter 2. There are several
theoretical and empirical reasons that I do not pursue this path, including the lack of
imposed variation in coercive capacity in the Timorese case and the absence of any form
of fiscal decentralization that would allow us to examine variation in revenue collection
across localities. Instead, this chapter draws on original survey data to explore the micro-
level foundations of state fiscal capacity — namely, individuals’ willingness to comply
with taxation. I use novel survey data from a pilot test that I conducted in three districts
in 2015, combined with qualitative analysis, to generate several hypotheses about re-
gional variation in attitudes toward taxation, as well as variation in these attitudes at the
individual level. I test these hypotheses on a nationally representative survey of Timo-
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rese citizens (N = 1,243) conducted by The Asia Foundation in November and December
2016. I find that individuals in the region where the post-independence government has
typically displayed a less decisive monopoly on violence are consistently less likely to
support taxation in exchange for services and less likely to believe that it is the govern-
ment’s responsibility to ensure that people are prosperous. Given the caveat regarding
the differences in research design, this provides suggestive evidence that, unlike in the
case of the West Bank, the coercive and fiscal capacities of the Timorese state may exhibit
an unconditionally positive correlation across regions of the country. Consequently, in ar-
eas where the Timorese state’s coercive capacity is weaker, there are weaker foundations
for fiscal capacity development. This data also allows us to probe individual-level factors
that are associated with attitudes toward taxation. Interestingly, I find that veterans and
surviving family members who are rewarded for their participation in the national re-
sistance against Indonesia, unlike recipients of other forms of state benefits, do not have
lower tax morale than non-recipients. One possibility is that veterans have higher ini-
tial senses of civic duty or sociotropic attitudes that make them more inclined to view
tax paying in a positive light. This produces another potential line of inquiry for future
research examining the varied legacies of conflict and resistance on the fiscal capacity of
new and aspiring states.
Chapter 6 concludes by reviewing the preceding findings, as well as highlighting




Between Autonomy and Statehood: Policing, Taxing, and
Resisting in the West Bank
2.1 Introduction
States are famously defined by Weber (1919, 33) as "the form of human community
that (successfully) lays claim to the monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a par-
ticular territory." For modern states to exercise this claim, they must have the means to
extract resources from their populations (Bates 2010; Levi 1988; D. North 1981; Skocpol
1979; Tilly 1992). The ideal exchange between states and citizens looks something like
this: the state deploys its coercive power to protect property and citizens, and those ben-
efiting from this protection willingly dedicate some share of their resources toward the
state in the form of taxation. However, contemporary nationalist movements seeking to
form their own states today face a thorny challenge – they must attempt to establish this
bargain in a populated territory that is already controlled by an existing state that they
oppose. It seems likely, then, that conflict with the incumbent state will influence the
nationalist movement’s ability to perform some of the essential functions associated with
states, including the monopolization of the legitimate use of violence and the ability to
raise revenue.
This chapter begins the theory-generating process on the ground in the West Bank,
following the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA). Due to a set of agreements ne-
gotiated during the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, artificially imposed variation in the PA’s
ability to wield coercive force provides an opportunity to test a fairly robust finding in
the existing literature on states: namely, that a state’s capacity to wield force (coercive
capacity) and its ability to extract revenue domestically (fiscal capacity) develop in com-
plementary fashion. Using geo-coded data on variation in Palestinian policing authority
and a newly constructed dataset on municipal revenues, I demonstrate that an increase
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in coercive capacity is only associated with greater fiscal capacity in areas controlled by
the opposition – in this case, Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, or the Islamic Resistance
Movement (Hamas) – rather than the ruling party, Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini,
or the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah). This suggests that the exchange
of protection for revenue may be complicated in contexts where new states are being ne-
gotiated, contested, and formed. I explore a few possible mechanisms that may be driving
this result. I find preliminary support for the proposition that restrictions which limit
Palestinian coercive capacity to internal policing have resulted in greater repression by
the central government under Fatah’s rule. Paradoxically, this repression may have en-
abled the opposition to build greater fiscal capacity in areas where the ruling party has
greater coercive control. These findings demonstrate that not all state-like capacities nec-
essarily grow together among contemporary national movements seeking statehood. In
fact, consolidating policing authority under one party in a conflict setting may lead the
opposition to develop other forms of local capacity as a means of building its base.
Why study revenue generation in political organizations that aspire to be states? The
ability to raise revenue captures, in many ways, the essence of statehood. As Levi (1988, 1)
famously claims, "[t]he history of state revenue production is the history of the evolution
of the state." States, in their ideal form, represent a set of relatively stable arrangements
between political leaders and their populations. This equilibrium rests on a fundamen-
tal consensus about how institutions should operate. Assessing the ability of the state
to mobilize revenue is one way of evaluating the strength of this consensus. Following
Lieberman (2003), I conceive of a country’s tax system – even down to the small-scale
fiscal exchanges that occur at the local level – as intimately tied to how the country’s po-
litical community is defined. However, this chapter also has a more ambitious theoretical
aim, which is to identify with some precision the conditions under which the exchange of
revenue for a non-excludable good (such as policing or "law and order") functions. This
requires broadening the scope of candidate organizations to include not just consolidated
states, but also multifaceted entities such as the PA – often described as a "pseudo-" or
"quasi-" state – and Hamas – which is both a political party and an extra-systemic militant
organization. Thus, this work follows in the spirit of recent subnational research which
interrogates the limits of existing theories to understand whether and how both states and
non-state actors in conflict zones engage in this exchange (see, e.g., Arjona 2014; Flores-
Macías 2014; Mampilly 2011; Rodríguez-Franco 2016; Shapiro, Steele, & Vargas 2014;
Weinstein 2007).
A road map of this chapter follows. Section 2.2 revisits core insights from the founda-
tional literature on state formation and the origins of state capacity. I argue that this body
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of work remains critical for our understanding of where, how, and to what extent contem-
porary states develop capacity, but it cannot provide us with a nuanced understanding of
within-country outcomes. Research on postcolonial state development gets us chronolog-
ically and, in some ways, theoretically closer to contemporary cases of aspiring statehood,
but it does not fully address how complex and persistent legacies of conflict can shape in-
stitutions of self-rule among what might be called post-postcolonial national movements
aspiring toward statehood. Further, much of this literature converges on the prediction
that the coercive and fiscal capacities of the state should be positively correlated; I argue
that this deserves further scrutiny in settings of contested statehood and newly formed
states. In section 2.3, I summarize, as briefly as possible, the most relevant historical con-
text for understanding the two interventions of interest to this study: first, the creation
of a Palestinian authority in the West Bank whose coercive capacity varied by region; sec-
ond, the set of local and national elections held between 2004 and 2006 that gave Hamas
formal political representation for the first time and triggered a fiscal "shock" to the PA
at both the central and local levels. This context is critical to understanding the empir-
ical analysis that follows. Section 2.4 draws on these qualitative details of the case and
insights from the state-building literature to present three hypotheses regarding the re-
lationship between Palestinian coercive and fiscal capacity. In section 2.5, I show that
an increase in Palestinian policing capacity does not unconditionally enhance revenue
collection. I use a newly constructed dataset containing revenue data for 107 West Bank
municipalities from 2006 to 2012 – a period following rare municipal council elections
in which both the ruling party, Fatah, and their main opposition, Hamas, competed – to
demonstrate that greater authority over policing only improved revenue performance for
those towns controlled by Hamas, whereas it had no significant, revenue-enhancing effect
for those controlled by the ruling party, Fatah.
Following Hamas’s victory in the 2006 national elections and their subsequent takeover
of the Gaza Strip, the movement faced increased fiscal isolation, enhancing the need for
local revenue collection. Yet, even if Hamas faced clear incentives to improve revenue
collection, two questions remain. First, how was it able to successfully do so? Second,
why were these gains concentrated in areas where the central PA – controlled by Hamas’s
rival – wielded more coercive authority? In section 2.6, I suggest two alternative mech-
anisms. First, qualitative reports suggest that those areas where Fatah controlled a rela-
tively stronger police force but where Hamas had more local support experienced greater
repression following the latter’s electoral victory and subsequent takeover of Gaza. I
hypothesize that repression may have driven counter-mobilization by Hamas and its sup-
porters in these areas, leading us to observe greater revenue collection. Second, Hamas
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may have exerted greater tax effort in high-capacity areas where it knew it had strong
popular support, because these areas are strategically more important if the movement
ultimately seeks to capture central PA institutions. I argue that Hamas’s dogmatic stance
against the Oslo Accords and the PA itself makes the first proposition more plausible. I
also address possible sources of selection for the two independent variables in my anal-
ysis – namely the variation in PA coercive capacity and the variation in party support
at the local level – that may otherwise bias my results. Section 2.7 takes a step back
to consider how these findings might be usefully applied to other settings of "contested
statehood". There are many ways in which the eccentricities of the Israeli-Palestinian
context may have generated the results we observe. I contend that the PA’s restricted, or
partial, form of autonomy from Israel is the most important scope condition for under-
standing why Palestinian coercive and fiscal capacity are not unconditionally positively
correlated. This serves as a preview of chapters 3 and 4, which, in stages, abstract away
from the Palestinian case to produce and substantiate generalizable claims about the re-
lationship between incumbent state goals and the extent of autonomy – or self-rule –
achieved by competing national movements.
The subsequent analysis has important implications for the sequencing of state-building
in Palestine and other would-be states. The PA, loved or loathed, is central to present
and future efforts to address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Any future sovereign state –
whether the PA itself, Israel, or some future Palestinian or binational state – will surely
build upon, or grapple with, its institutional legacies. Even if it is ultimately a failed ex-
periment in Palestinian state-building, the PA’s enormous institutional footprint is, and
will continue to be, important. One of the implications of this study is that as long as
Palestinian state control over policing is variable and uneven, the fiscal relationships be-
tween Palestinians and their government will remain distorted. This can have noticeable
effects for Palestinians living in municipalities with low fiscal capacity, where local rev-
enue collection may not be sufficient to provide the same level of public services as in
neighboring towns. Further, while it is well known that the political economies of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip have dramatically diverged, this chapter shows that patterns
of authority are generating divergence in "state"-society relations within the West Bank
itself. Finally, this research suggests that increasing state control over internal policing
without parallel control over borders and national defense may simply enable coercive
capacity to be used toward repression rather than protection of property and the preser-
vation of law and order.
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2.2 The Coercive and Fiscal Capacities of States
This project is situated at the intersection of three broad bodies of literature in com-
parative politics and comparative political economy. The first is a set of work which
offers formal and informal theories, based on an underlying logic of rational actors, of
the formation of states and state capacity development. The second is the robust literature
on the complex challenges facing state-builders in post-colonial contexts. Finally, a related
and rapidly developing body of research is building theories about governance within not
states, but rebel movements. These are all relevant to our understanding of aspiring states,
such as the Palestinian Authority, which are located somewhere along the continuum be-
tween national movement aspiring toward statehood and fully sovereign state.
2.2.1 Classic Literature on State Formation
Historical and sociological accounts of the development of states in early modern Eu-
rope underpin some of the most influential theories on state formation (Bates 2010; Ol-
son 1993; Tilly 1992). States, according to this work, emerged as a vehicle for monarchs,
political leaders, and warlords to control territory. Leaders found that consolidating and
monopolizing coercive control made it easier to defend and expand their holdings. While
this could be done using fortifications around urban areas, the defense of less populated
areas required the mobilization of armies. Because leaders required revenue and labor
to finance their ambitions to defend against external threats and wage wars, they sought
ways to extract from the local populations living in the territory. The earliest, most crit-
ical benefit that was provided to populations in exchange for these extracted resources
was protection of life and property. According to Tilly (1992)[16], states in Europe were
created "[a]lmost inadvertently" as part of rulers’ need to stay in power, which required
defense and control of increasingly productive and valuable territory and, thus, almost
continual war. Fiscal capacity was just one outgrowth of historical warfare. Because
leaders had already dedicated effort to build centralized armies and invested in capital
to engage in defensive and offensive battles, the provision of protection was a relatively
inexpensive byproduct that leaders could offer to the population within the territory. In
exchange for defending those living within the state’s territory, leaders or warlords were
able to extract resources – i.e. revenue and labor – from this population with relative ease.
As Olson (1993) argues, leaders with moderately long time horizons found it in their best
interest to settle down as "stationary" rather than "roving" bandits to develop reliable
relationships of extraction and protection with local populations and capital-holders.
When considering its explanandum, this literature stands out as a bit of an anomaly
17
because, instead of explaining variation in how states are formed, it largely recounts how
and why political relations in so many disparate contexts converged on the unit that we
now know so well: the nation-state.1. Even explanations of variation in the effectiveness,
robustness, or strength of states is still embedded in a history that arrives at the familiar,
relatively high-capacity, sovereign states that we know today and which are the dominant
unit of political authority. This literature is largely unconcerned with whether models
of political organization other than violence-monopolizing states might yet manage to
persist in a global order dominated by states and, if so, what they might look like.
Thus, either explicitly or implicitly, much of the classic work on state formation seeks
to answer the question of how and why we arrived at a particular model of political au-
thority, not whether the capacities of nation-states themselves may differ. In other words,
these theories are most useful for understanding where state authority came from in the
first place, but not necessarily why it will vary in interesting ways within states. The
state formation research enterprise has been extremely fruitful, of course, and lay the
groundwork for the next stage of inquiry, as Tilly (1992) himself acknowledges. While he
produces and substantiates a theory of convergence on the national state in Europe, he is
not unconcerned with contemporary struggles for statehood in other parts of the world.
In his words:
"[T]he fact that European states formed in a certain way, then imposed their
power on the rest of the world, guarantees that non-European experience will
be different. But if we pinpoint the durable characteristics of the system Eu-
ropeans first built, and identify the principles of variation within European
experience, we will be better placed to specify what is distinctive about con-
temporary states, under what historically-imposed constraints they are oper-
ating, and what relationships among characteristics of states are likely to hold
in our own time," (16).
In fact, most state formation theorists did not attempt to make universal claims about
a unidirectional, path-dependent process whereby greater centralized control over the
means of violence inherently and unconditionally allowed political leaders to develop
extractive capacity. Observers of states recognized that pure coercive control did not au-
tomatically generate fiscal capacity. Hence, subsequent work focused on the characteris-
tics of political institutions – i.e. constraints on the executive, representative institutions,
and a centralized bureaucracy – and how they relate to fiscal capacity development. For
1Some of the early post-colonial state formation stories also focused on convergence (see, e.g., Zolberg
1966, )
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an increase in state coercive control to lead to greater compliance with taxation, and
thus greater fiscal capacity, it seemed necessary that such coercive control was used pri-
marily to benefit, rather than threaten, the population. First, Levi (1988) points us to
the importance of cultivating "quasi-voluntary compliance" with extraction for European
state-builders. Other state-building scholars highlighted the role of representative insti-
tutions, such as parliaments, or others that sought to limit the executive (Bates & Lien
1985; Dincecco 2011; D. C. North & Weingast 1989). Such institutions ensure that popu-
lations can observe and oversee how revenues are spent, and that state coercion does not
become disproportionately confiscatory or repressive.
Still, while these contributions managed to introduce variables that conditioned or
otherwise affected the expected relationship between coercive and fiscal capacity, the
question became one of institutional design. Under certain conditions, an increase in co-
ercive control may also lead to an increase in the fiscal capacity of states; but, given the
presence of the requisite institutions or incentives, then overall state capacity should still
grow as expected. And while this literature is attentive to historical legacies, it is mostly
concerned with how conflict produced stable institutional equilibria rather than how in-
stitutions that persisted during prolonged periods of conflict might have had their own
consequences for capacity development.
2.2.2 State Capacity Development in Post-Colonial and non-European Contexts
More recent examinations of state capacity development in the post-colonial (or, more
broadly, non-European) world generate some insights that we might find more useful in
understanding contemporary movements for statehood. Namely, that states may vary in
how effective they are at wielding power and extracting. They may be more or less likely
to broadcast their authority, and more or less vulnerable to threats, depending on factors
like geography, population distributions, relationships between state and local elites, or
how political elites have historically responded to contention (Herbst 2000; Slater 2010;
Soifer 2015). Historical legacies matter for state capacity development. In addition, we
might even observe subnational variation in state capacity, depending on how central po-
litical leaders in the metropole choose to interact with local political organization on the
ground (Boone 2003; Migdal 1988). In the end, despite these empirically rich accounts,
the theoretical insights in this literature still predominantly suggest we consider state ca-
pacity as an aggregate concept. In areas where the state is good at doing some things, it is
good at doing all things; similarly, in areas where the state exhibits low capacity in some
functions, it exhibits low capacity in all functions.
The approaches adopted in this literature – often detailed within-country studies that
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pay close attention to historical processes – are appropriate for understanding whether
and how state capacity develops in contemporary settings of contested statehood. Fur-
ther, studies which take into account intra-elite dynamics have important implications
for how we understand the sequence of often overlapping state-building projects in the
region of focus in the current study: the West Bank. (Elite cooptation and confrontation
has been an important part of all state-builders in the region, from Zionist settlement
and institutional development prior to the creation of Israel, to Jordanian annexation,
to Palestinian-led state-building efforts emanating from both the Palestinian Authority
and its detractors.) Yet, to some extent, a different macro-historical situation dictates dif-
ferent theories and questions than have been addressed by extant literature. The global
state system is different than the system of colonies and empires, and if new states are to
emerge from it, the process by which they emerge is sure to be quite different from the
process by which post-colonial states emerged.
2.2.3 Rebel Governance
Because cases like Palestine are best thought of as located somewhere between na-
tional self-determination movement and sovereign state, our understanding of the inter-
actions between Palestinian political leaders, institutions, and the population is informed
by the growing body of work on governance patterns within rebel movements. This work
examines interactions between rebel movements and civilian populations in conflict set-
tings, and, while careful not to impose a teleology, often notes the ways in which these
may approximate state-citizen dynamics (Arjona 2016; Mampilly 2011; Metelits 2009;
Staniland 2012; Weinstein 2007). Much of this work is based on a small number of de-
tailed case studies – including examples such as the Shining Path in Peru, the National
Resistance Army in Uganda, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in northern
Sri Lanka, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) – with qualitatively
and empirically rich accounts that are both hypothesis-testing and, because the field is
relatively new, theory-building. Like the present study, the "rebel governance" literature
often focuses on lower levels of variation – either geographic or temporal – in a particular
rebel movement’s structure or governance strategy, for example.
In conflict zones, an assortment of violent organizations may interact with the civilian
population – from the existing state to a variety of challengers. The rebel governance
literature has filled a particularly important gap in our understanding of comparative
institutions by characterizing those spaces where existing, sovereign states do not exer-
cise anything close to the Weberian monopoly on violence. Weinstein (2007) presents
a theory of rebel group behavior where an organization’s initial endowments – whether
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economic or social – are highly consequential for its strategies vis-a-vis recruitment, the
use of violence, and governance strategies. By governance, though, Weinstein (2007) is
mostly focused on how participatory or inclusive – i.e. how democratic – the movement
is, and the extent to which civilians are engaged. His findings are not unlike what a
classic scholar of state-building might expect to observe: namely, that movements or or-
ganizations with access to external resources, or resources which do not require civilian
labor or support, will be less likely to promote inclusive institutions (Weinstein 2007,
196). Mampilly (2011) assesses the drivers of "effective governance" under rebel admin-
istrations, with effectiveness defined based on the fulfillment of three criteria: a capable
police force, the existence of dispute resolution mechanisms, and the provision of public
goods. Once again, though, despite extremely well-researched, empirically grounded ac-
counts of three cases, "effective governance", like state capacity in the literature discussed
above, is a multidimensional yet, aggregate, concept. It is meaningful to observe and
compare it across countries. Further, we do not observe counterintuitive findings where
a movement’s governance is highly effective in one area, but not effective in another. To
abstract considerably from Mampilly (2011)’s rich analysis, the LTTE represents the most
effective movement, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) in the Democratic Re-
public of Congo represents the least effective, and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army
(SPLM/A) in modern-day South Sudan was somewhere in between.
The present work is partially inspired by the bold turn made in the scholarship on
rebel governance which directs us away from state-based analysis and teleological or
path-dependent assumptions about state formation. However, it is also the intention of
this paper to push one step further, theoretically, in disaggregating normatively-tinged,
aggregate concepts of "strong" states or "effective" governance systems to suggest that
there is a way to analyze the capacity of such organizations in a disaggregated manner,
and doing so might produce some surprises.
2.3 The Palestinian Context: Restricted Autonomy and Varied Capac-
ity
The empirical analysis that follows is situated after the creation of the PA. The PA was
formed out of a series of agreements known as the Oslo Accords, signed by Israel and the
PLO between 1993 and 1995. The Oslo Accords represented a watershed moment in the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the changes they entailed for governance in the West Bank
were dramatic. With the creation of the PA, Palestinians obtained a form of self-rule in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip for the first time, including the establishment of a popularly
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elected national legislature and executive. However, the second major agreement in the
Oslo Accords – the Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip ("Oslo II") in
September 1995 – codified a number of functional restrictions on the PA and introduced
geographic variation in its coercive capacity across the West Bank. Among the numerous
functional restrictions, the Interim Agreement prohibited the PA from developing any
institutions of national defense. In terms of geographic variation, the Interim Agreement
divided the West Bank into three zones across which the PA’s ability to station and deploy
its police forces varied. This artificially introduced variation in coercive capacity is one of
the two main interventions, or "treatments", analyzed in the empirical section below. The
second intervention is the set of elections held between 2004 and 2006, that gave Hamas
formal political representation for the first time at the local level and triggered a fiscal
"shock" to the PA.
While I do not pretend to offer a complete history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
this section will provide salient context for the empirical analysis that follows and for
the more detailed qualitative analysis in chapter 3. The main focus in this section is,
first, to provide readers with a sense of what forms of authority preceded the PA in the
West Bank and why the geographic variation in coercive capacity across the West Bank
was introduced.2 Second, I aim to clarify why Hamas chose to compete in the 2004-2005
municipal elections in the West Bank and Gaza, and why Hamas performed better in
some West Bank towns while Fatah, the ruling party, performed better in others.
Subsection 2.3.1 provides some necessary historical context on the politics of the re-
gion leading up to the 1967 war. Subsection 2.3.2 briefly summarizes the period between
1967, when Israel gained control of the territories and the occupation began, until just
before the Oslo Accords. This period will be the focus of a more detailed discussion in
chapter 3. Subsection 2.3.3 discusses the first intervention – the creation of the PA. Sub-
section 2.3.4 provides some necessary information on local governance in the Territories.
The final subsection, 2.3.5, summarizes the set of local and national elections held be-
tween 2004 and 2006. This context informs the hypotheses that follow in the next section
of this chapter.
2At this point, the reader may feel that they are lacking additional context on how the peculiar constel-
lation of institutions comprising the PA came into being. Chapter 3 should satisfy this need by returning
to the period before the PA’s creation, arguing that Israel’s goal of exclusive annexation in the West Bank was
a highly consequential factor in driving the creation of a Palestinian authority whose autonomy from Israel
was functionally restricted.
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2.3.1 The West Bank Before 1967
Prior to falling under Israeli control, the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza
Strip – collectively referred to as the Palestinian Territories – were ruled by a series of na-
tional and supranational state authorities dating back to the Ottoman Empire. At the con-
clusion of World War I, the British defeated the crumbling Ottoman Empire and seized
control of the territory that comprises modern-day Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Jordan, and the
Palestinian Territories. Following the Sykes-Picot agreement between Great Britain and
France and the conclusion of postwar negotiations, the land that now comprises Israel
and the Palestinian Territories was assigned to the British Mandate for Palestine. Who
would ultimately exercise sovereignty over these territories became increasingly ambigu-
ous during the period of British rule. While voluntary and involuntary Jewish emigrants
arrived in Palestine in the early 20th century – many fleeing pogroms and discrimination
in Russia and eastern Europe – the British had made an awkward, and apparently con-
flicting, set of commitments. First, they had promised an independent, Arab state in the
region to Sharif Hussein of Mecca – a promise which was understood to include Pales-
tine – and, second, they had committed to support Zionists seeking to establish a Jewish
homeland in Palestine.
Palestinian nationalism was on the rise in the 1920s and early 1930s, and tensions es-
calated between the Jewish and Muslim Arab communities in British Mandate Palestine.
Tessler (2009, 235) describes the riots that occurred in 1929, ending in the death of over
100 Jews, over 100 Palestinian Arabs, and the injury of hundreds more, as "shattering
whatever illusions the British and others may have had about peaceful coexistence and
initiating an era of direct Arab-Zionist conflict that has yet to come to an end." As the
presence of Jewish emigrants and settlers became further entrenched under the watch
of the British, the Arab Revolt beginning in 1936 saw increased violence against Zionist
and British Mandate institutions. The Second World War and the stark, unprecedented
tragedy of the Holocaust – with its loss of nearly six million Jews across Europe – mobi-
lized greater support behind the idea of a Jewish homeland (Tessler 2009, 255).
It is in this context that a partition plan for the territories – one which featured a
Jewish homeland and an Arab state – was put forward by the United Nations Special
Committee on Palestine in 1947. The plan was accepted by the Zionist delegation, but
rejected by the Arab delegation. A slightly modified version of the plan was endorsed by
the General Assembly in November 1947, unleashing civil war in Mandate Palestine. Is-
rael declared its independence in May 1948 as the British Mandate officially expired, and
a coalition of Arab states intervened. Thousands were killed on both the Israeli and Arab
sides, but the Haganah, the precursor to the Israeli Defense Forces, emerged victorious.
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1948 is celebrated by Israel as the triumphant year of its independence. Following the
tragedies of World War II, the War of Independence concluded in the much anticipated
creation of a state for the Jewish people. Yet, the war exacted large costs, including, no-
tably, the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Arab-Palestinians from the territory
of the newly recognized Jewish state. Many of these refugees settled in the neighboring
territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which fell under the control of Jordan and
Egypt, respectively. Tessler (2009, p. 280) estimates that 420,000 Palestinian refugees
from the 1947-9 violence ended up in the West Bank. Before the creation of Israel, ten-
sions between Jewish settlers and the Arab-Palestinian population had already been high.
This continued after Israel’s founding; even after the 1949 armistice agreements, the new
country’s relationship with the Palestinian population and neighboring Arab states – no-
tably, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan – was tenuous.
After the 1948-9 war, the West Bank and the eastern half of the city of Jerusalem were
annexed and ruled by the Hashemite monarchy of Jordan. Brand (1995, 47) describes
Jordanian annexation: "[King] ‘Abdallah’s extension of Jordanian citizenship to all West
Bank Palestinians...as well as to the 70,000 who went directly to the East Bank laid the
formal political basis for the ‘unity of the two banks’." Palestinians soon made up two-
thirds of the constituents of the Hashemite kingdom (Abu-Odeh 1999, 265). West Bank
Palestinians were permitted to vote in local and parliamentary elections in Jordan, but
Palestinian nationalist currents were effectively suppressed due to strong alliances be-
tween King Abdullah’s regime and local, more conservative Palestinian notables in the
West Bank (Mishal 1980; G. E. Robinson 1997). While Jordan’s official rule in the West
Bank only lasted 17 years, it left an important mark, especially since the Israeli authori-
ties, when they gained control of the territories, left much of the legal framework from the
Jordanian period intact, and even replicated some Jordanian strategies to control elites.
In the meantime, the PLO was officially established in 1964, first under the auspices
of the Arab League, but later emerging as the official organization advocating for "lib-
eration" of Palestine under the leadership of Yasser Arafat and his Fatah party.3 This
transformation of the Palestinian image that started to occur toward the end of Jordanian
rule in the West Bank is aptly summarized by Khalidi (2007, 141):
"The ascendancy in the 1950s and 1960s of the leaders of Fateh [sic], along
with the rise of other competing militant groups, represented a thoroughgoing
generational change and a striking alteration in the image presented by those
3Jordan officially renounced its claims to the West Bank in 1988, halting payments to its remaining civil
servants in the territory and its development programs, removing any ambiguity about the PLO’s role as
the Palestinians’ primary representative in advocating for self-determination.
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who represented the Palestinians. It involved a shift from the domination
of Palestinian politics by sober men in their fifties and sixties wearing suits
and red tarbushes...to the leadership of militants in their twenties and thirties
wearing short-sleeved shirts and military fatigues."
Frictions exploded into violence in 1967, the year in which governance of the West
Bank was transformed in a dramatic way. After intelligence reports that Egypt was amass-
ing troops in the Sinai Peninsula and escalating tensions with Syria in the north, Israel
engaged in preemptive military strikes on June 5, targeting Egyptian airfields and push-
ing ground troops into Gaza, Sinai, East Jerusalem, and the West Bank (Tessler 2009,
397). At the conclusion of the swift conflict, thousands of lives had been lost on all sides,
and the state of Israel was in possession of significantly more territory than before. Over
the course of the "Six Day War", Israel captured the West Bank and East Jerusalem from
Jordan, the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, and the Golan Heights from Syria
(see Map 2.1). Along with the conquest of territory, Israel acquired over one million new
people under its rule: roughly 600,000 residents of the West Bank, many of whom were
refugees or first-generation descendants from the 1947-8 war, 350,000 residents of the
Gaza Strip, and an estimated 65,000 residents of East Jerusalem (Perlmann 2012).4
2.3.2 1967 until 1993: The First Decades of Israeli Occupation
Starting in June 1967, the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem would form
an increasingly central part of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Soon after the war, Israel
moved to expand the municipal boundaries of Jerusalem, effectively annexing the eastern
half of the city and explicitly signaling its intention to reunite the ancient capital and
secure the holy sites on the Temple Mount (or Haram ash-Sharif) as part of the Jewish
state. Israel’s military maintained control of the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and, initially, the
Sinai Peninsula, before the latter’s return to Egypt as part of a separate peace deal reached
between Israel and Egypt in 1979. Thus, the status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
became one of open-ended military occupation.
The West Bank presented a particularly challenging dilemma – on one hand, religious
and cultural attachments to the territory ran fairly deep in Israeli society. Further, the
territory’s fertile Jordan Valley and the inner hills and mountains provided both strategic
and economic benefits. Yet, demographically speaking, full absorption of the territory
threatened to dilute the Jewish identity of the Israeli state, not to mention that guerrilla
4The Sinai Peninsula was relatively sparsely populated – Tessler (2009, 399) estimates 45,000 to 50,000
in 1967 – and was returned to Egypt following the 1979 Camp David Accords and associated peace treaty.
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attacks against Israel were already emanating from PLO bases in nearby Jordan. Until
1977, left-wing parties – which had united to form the Labor Party in 1968 – dominated
the Israeli government and thus were largely responsible for Israel’s strategy vis-a-vis its
newly captured territories. "Permanent" annexation of the West Bank was suggested by
the right-wing minority, but not embraced by the government at the time.
Map 2.1: Israel and the Territories Captured in 1967 (Gorenberg 2006)
Despite this, the establishment of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza be-
gan almost immediately after 1967, and served an initial purpose in maintaining Israel’s
short-term hold on the land. The military installed the first settlements in the Jordan Val-
ley in the West Bank with security considerations in mind. In addition, though, some of
the earliest politically and religiously motivated settlements began springing up around
the West Bank (Tessler 2009, 466-7).
1977 saw a dramatic shift in the Israeli state’s approach to the territories, with the
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right-wing Likud party winning a plurality of seats in the May elections and forming a
coalition of right-wing and religious parties. Settlement of the West Bank evolved from
small-scale strategic and religious establishments to a state-directed strategy of alter-
ing the demographic landscape and increasing Jewish Israeli claims on the territory. On
Likud’s strategy in the West Bank, Lustick (1993, 10-11) recounts that:
...[T]he Likud plunged into a rapid, wide-ranging, and expensive effort to an-
nex the territories without formally changing their legal status. By the end of
this period approximately half of all West Bank and Gaza land had been trans-
ferred to Israeli government or Jewish control through expropriations, requi-
sitions, legal redefinitions of public and private land, zoning regulations, and
purchasing programs. While the government virtually prevented investment
by Arab inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza in industry or agriculture, it
spent billions of dollars on Jewish settlements and the infrastructure to sup-
port them, concentrating on those areas, heavily populated by Arabs, that had
previously been avoided by Labor government-supported settlement efforts."
Indeed the growth in settlement construction during this period and into the 1980s re-
flected the new government’s efforts to change the status quo in the territories. In 1977,
when the Likud came to power, Prime Minister Menachem Begin made the demographic
transformation of the West Bank one of his priorities. While there were just over 1,000
settlers in 1972 (Foundation for Middle East Peace 2012), there were over 20,000 by the
end of 1982, with much of this growth occurring after the conservative 1977 govern-
ment came into power (Tessler 2009, 548). The Begin government also expanded the geo-
graphic reach of settlements into areas abutting those inhabited by Palestinians, (Tessler
2009, 548-9), thus making security and resource distribution to these populations more
complex.
While Palestinians experienced some economic benefits in the early years of occu-
pation, including easier access to jobs in Israel and thus limited socioeconomic mobility
(Migdal 1980, 47), ongoing military rule, settlement growth, and eventual economic stag-
nation fueled frustrations with the lack of progress toward a Palestinian state. Amidst
this environment, the first Intifada, or uprising, broke out in 1987. Estimates suggest
around 1,200 Palestinians were killed, while the Palestinian side maintained a largely
unarmed resistance strategy.5 The Intifada demonstrated the costs of continued occu-
pation to Israel’s leadership, while international powers made a renewed push to bring
5See Pearlman (2011). This was achieved through a grass-roots local leadership in the territories and
reinforced by the PLO leadership, based in exile in Tunisia at the time.
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about a resolution to Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians and its neighbors in Jordan,
Syria, and Lebanon. The multilateral Madrid Conference was launched in 1991. Pressure
on the Palestinian side also pushed Yasser Arafat, then-chairman of the PLO and leader
of Fatah, its largest faction, to negotiations. Following the Madrid Conference, a secret
bilateral negotiation track began between Israeli and Palestinian leadership in Oslo, Nor-
way.
2.3.3 1993-1995: The Creation of the Palestinian Authority
In 1993, the Declaration of Principles, the first part of the Oslo Accords ("Oslo I"),
was signed between Israel and the PLO. The symbolism of this moment was consecrated
by a handshake between Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and PLO Chairman Yasser
Arafat on the White House lawn. Oslo I called, for the first time, for the creation of
an interim, self-governing authority for Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. The Interim Agreement ("Oslo II") followed in 1995, stipulating more details about
the authority itself. Oslo II contains 31 articles and 7 annexes detailing myriad aspects
of the roles and responsibilities of the Israeli military and civil administration and the
new Palestinian Authority. The supposedly "interim" period of five years commenced
in 1994, when the first Palestinian Authority offices were set up in Jericho, in the West
Bank, and Gaza. During this five year period, negotiations between Israel and the PLO
were to continue to seek solutions on the "final status" issues of the conflict, including
whether the PA was to transform into a sovereign entity with recognized borders and
peaceful relations with Israel. These supposedly transitional arrangements agreed to in
the Oslo Accords remain the status quo at the time of writing, over 23 years after the PA
was triumphantly established.
Contemporary sovereign states often exercise, or attempt to exercise, a monopoly over
a set of functions within the territory they control, namely: coercion, taxation, and the
provision of a selection of other public goods (i.e. regulation, a system of courts or dispute
resolution, a national currency, and sometimes goods such as roads, schools, and other
infrastructure). The functional jurisdiction of the PA was formally restricted in a number
of ways. Most relevant to the current study, Oslo II explicitly barred the PA from devel-
oping any institutions of national defense, such as an army or a navy. The responsibilities
of the newly created Palestinian police force are detailed throughout, while Article 12 of
the Interim Agreement stresses:
Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility for defense against external
threats, including the responsibility for protecting the Egyptian and Jordanian
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borders, and for defense against external threats from the sea and from the air,
as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis and Settlements, for
the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order, and will
have all the powers to take the steps necessary to meet this responsibility.
(Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1995)
Further, Article 14 notes:
Except for the Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces, no other armed
forces shall be established or operate in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
(Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1995)
Thus, the de jure and de facto coercive capacity of the Palestinian Authority was restricted
to matters of internal policing.
Second, the PA’s policing authority varied within those zones over which it had juris-
diction. The growth of Israeli settlements – outcomes of a policy which had been in full
swing for over 15 years when the Oslo Accords were signed – had created a scattering
of both Israeli and Palestinian towns and cities across territory. Due to Israel’s claims on
the settler population, the land they inhabited, and land for future development, some
Palestinian towns in the West Bank were permitted to fall primarily under the de jure
authority of the new PA, while others were located in areas where the PA’s authority in
security and policing is shared with, and effectively subordinated to, the Israeli military.
In fact, Oslo II divided the West Bank into three zones, decreasing in Palestinian control
over affairs of policing and security. This division is summarized briefly below, described
in more detail in Appendix A, and visible in Map 2.2:
• "Area A", which was to fall under full Palestinian civil and security jurisdiction;
• "Area B", which was to fall under full Palestinian civil jurisdiction but for which
security-related authority was to be shared by Israel and the Palestinian Authority;
and
• "Area C" which was to fall under full Israeli civil and security-related jurisdiction
until additional land transfers could take place.
Area A contained all of the largest Palestinian cities, including the cities of Jenin, Tulka-
rem, Qalqilya, Nablus, Jericho, Ramallah, Bethlehem, and Hebron (although the latter
was placed under a special arrangement in 1997) in addition to some smaller towns. Area
B contained many of the surrounding towns and hamlets. Finally, Area C was sparsely
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populated, but contained the fertile Jordan valley and most of the existing Israeli settle-
ments and land designated for settlement expansion.6
Importantly, these divisions were non-random. As suggested, they had much to do
with the location of major Palestinian population centers, existing and planned Israeli
settlements, and strategic resources. However, to support the identification strategy used
below, I posit that there was some randomness for small- and medium-sized Palestinian
towns as to whether these towns fell mostly into Area A or Area B. Variables that may have
accounted for selection into Area A and Area B are discussed in more detail in section 2.6.
While the negotiations that led to the drawing of these maps were opaque, there is
qualitative evidence suggesting that Israel’s priorities in the negotiations were to achieve
an interim agreement that would allow them to ’test the waters’ with Palestinian self-rule
in piecemeal steps. Consistent with Israel’s priority of protecting its settler population
and key military and natural resource areas, maintaining discretion over security was key
for Israel’s negotiators. However, to achieve its goals, concessions to Palestinian popula-
tions had to be made. Shimon Peres, one of the architects of the first part of the Oslo
Accords, described his view leading up to the negotiations. Of a much more limited plan
for Palestinian autonomy, first proposed by Menachem Begin in 1978, Peres admitted:
"I felt there was no real prospect of implementing the Palestinian autonomy
plan...I believed that genuine implementation would mean in practice negoti-
ating the handover of the entire West Bank and Gaza to Palestinian rule, for
which we were not ready. Instead, I supported the idea of an interim agree-
ment. If we could not agree on a map at this stage, at least we could reach an
agreement on a timetable, in the hope that time itself would alter the circum-
stances so that we would eventually agree with the Palestinians on a common
map," (Peres 1995, 277-8).
The Israeli side – if not publicly – privately felt strongly that the interim agreement
was merely a trust-building measure. There was no necessary, logical extension of Pales-
tinian authority beyond what was agreed upon unless certain security conditions were
met that could make such a concession politically feasible. The extent and speed of fu-
ture redeployments of Israeli forces out of the West Bank was something over which Israel
itself would maintain full control (Peres 1995, 289).
6International and local organizations have conducted extensive research on the effect of the restrictions
on Area C – whose land and resources are essentially off-limits for Palestinian development – on the Pales-
tinian economy. See, for example, Kadman (2013); World Bank (2013). This is an area of enormous policy
importance, however because no major Palestinian population centers are located in Area C, it is not an
area of focus for the current study.
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Map 2.2: Map of the West Bank, including municipal boundaries, Areas A/B/C.
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Identifying the factors that generated the exact borders of Areas A, B, and C in the
West Bank is not an easy task. The creation of these zones was the result of closed-door
negotiations, and the participants were not the same ones who were involved in the Dec-
laration of Principles (or "Oslo I"). A senior member of the Israeli negotiating team at
Oslo was emphatic to note to me that he was not involved in the subsequent "Oslo II"
negotiations (Phone interview with Author, December 15, 2016). From his perspective,
the military was "too involved in the second negotiations to compensate" for their mini-
mized role in the first Oslo process. Additional, qualitative evidence suggests that Israel,
and in particular, the Israeli military establishment, had a disproportionate influence on
the starting point and trajectory of the negotiations that led to the creation of Areas A, B,
and C. A senior member of the Palestinian delegation who was present for the drawing
of the Oslo II maps lamented that the Palestinians were at a serious disadvantage during
these negotiations, as they had "no maps, no satellite images" and no political institutions
yet that could have provided such data, (Interview with Author, Ramallah, December 13,
2016). While they requested this data from third parties, they were reportedly refused
access and, thus, had to rely on the maps that the Israeli delegation brought with them
to the negotiations. A senior member of the United States delegation did not respond to
repeated requests for an interview.
From the Palestinian perspective, Oslo was seen as a first step toward eventual, full
autonomy in the West Bank. The accords, at least nominally, represented a transitional
arrangement: in the months and years that followed, Israel was to slowly transfer more
land from Area C (areas of full Israeli control) to Area B, and even Area A, in exchange
for security cooperation and a reduction in violence from the Palestinian side. In the Wye
River Memorandum of 1998, Israel agreed to redeploy its military in phases under these
conditions, however only a small amount of land was transferred before the agreement
fell through. The second Intifada broke out in 2000 in part due to the stagnation of the
supposedly temporary arrangement that was embodied in the Oslo Accords. In a 2005
meeting of the redeployment coordination committee, the Palestinian delegation head,
Ismael Jabr, noted the importance of Area B in particular: "We want our jurisdiction in
Area B...We want the police stations to be re-opened." (Al Jazeera Palestine Papers 2005).
While much attention has appropriately focused on larger status issues in the conflict
– i.e. the fate of the city of Jerusalem, the future of Israeli settlements in the West Bank,
and Palestinian access to the vast amounts of land in "Area C" of the West Bank – it is clear
that the distinctions regarding policing and security even within zones of nominal PA
rule (Areas A and B) has been an important constraint on Palestinian state development.
Entrances to Area A – the areas where the PA has greater coercive authority – are clearly
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Figure 2.1: Entrance to Area A.
demarcated (see Figure 2.1) and, except during unusual circumstances, are not visited
by either Israeli civilians or military personnel. The ability of Fatah, the ruling party in
the West Bank, to project statehood has depended critically on what is able to achieve in
these high-capacity areas.
Finally, and importantly, while the Palestinian authority over security varied across
the three zones of the West Bank described above, the political structure was centralized.
Khan (2004) describes executive centralization as a key feature of PA rule, and one that
contributed to corruption and "maladministration" within the PA. He notes "this archi-
tecture was essential for the ’security-first’ route that Israel insisted on, and nothing else
was on offer to the Palestinians in their attempt to construct a two-state solution," (13-14).
This has meant that Palestinian control over the internal coercive apparatus has been con-
centrated in the hands of Yasser Arafat’s Fatah party. In January 2005, two months after
the death of the popular Palestinian resistance leader, his nominated successor, Mah-
moud Abbas, won a resounding victory in presidential elections that extended one-party
rule in the PA for years to come.
2.3.4 Background on Local Governance
The Palestinian population in the West Bank had some very limited experience with
what might be referred to as "self-rule" at the local level prior to the creation of the PA.
33
In fact, the Oslo Accords effectively superimposed a central government with limited and
variable autonomy on top of a pre-existing municipal governance structure. Thus, even
following the creation of the central PA government, municipalities maintained their sig-
nificance as an area of meaningful political mobilization and control for factions within
the national movement.
Historically, local governments in the West Bank had functioned with varied levels
of oversight and discretion under Ottoman, British, Jordanian, and finally direct Israeli
authority.7 The PLO was not formed until 1964, thus municipal councils did not feature
a strong Palestinian nationalist voice during most of the Jordanian period – most mayors
and council members were reliably conservative and loyal to the Hashemite monarchy in
Jordan. This approach toward West Bank elites was replicated through all levels of the
Jordanian government. As G. E. Robinson (1997, 10) states, "[i]t was precisely those no-
tables who had tacitly renounced their national Palestinian aspirations who were chosen
for positions in the Jordanian state."
After capturing the West Bank in 1967, Israel found itself in a position of overseeing
Palestinian municipal councils. Israel initially sought to maintain allegiances with the
traditional, pro-Jordanian rulers until 1976 (Ma’oz 1984). Because Israeli bureaucratic
presence in areas of civil governance was limited, Palestinian municipal institutions in
the West Bank began to fill some of the gaps. Municipalities were responsible for provid-
ing basic services, however – speaking to the centrality of land and territory in the conflict
– their role in zoning, planning and development was quite limited (Shahwan 2003). As
the Palestinian nationalist movement gained ground in the Territories, municipal govern-
ments became a base upon which the Palestinian resistance movement could coalesce. In
1976, Israel permitted local elections in the West Bank, and many Palestinian nationalist
candidates affiliated with the PLO swept into victory, advocating resistance against the
Israeli occupation and continued struggle for national self-determination (Ma’oz 1984;
Tessler 2009). This empowerment of local nationalist leaders did not last long, how-
ever. One of the mayors elected in 1976 recalls that municipal budgets fell under serious
scrutiny from the Israeli military authorities, and portions of the budget were even kept
in the municipal council members’ houses to avoid complying with orders to keep the
funds in Israeli bank accounts (Interview with Author, northern West Bank, 3 December
2014). Finally, several of these elected mayors were targeted with assassination attempts
7For more information on local government during the Ottoman, British and Jordanian periods, see
Shahwan (2003), Ma’oz (1984, pp. 20-61), and G. E. Robinson (1997, pp. 1-18). For context on local
economic and political configurations between local elites in the mid- to late-Ottoman period, see Doumani
(1995). She provides a particularly illuminating description of Ottoman strategies for tax collection on
pages 17-18.
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by the Jewish Underground in 1980. By 1982, all elected mayors were replaced by ap-
pointed leaders amid a climate of increasing Israeli repression of Palestinian nationalists.
In 1984, Israel’s High Court of Justice upheld a decision by the military administration
to ban local elections in the West Bank. Benvenisti (1986, 41) describes the decision:
"The court accepted the [Israeli military] authorities’ position that municipal elections in
the West Bank were a framework for national struggle and an instrument for the PLO to
undertake subversive activities."
There are other indications that Israel’s ability to completely coopt or repress local-
level Palestinian leadership was limited. For example, it is worth noting that Israel pur-
sued a slightly different strategy to maintain compliance in the smaller towns. Only 25
towns in the West Bank were recognized as municipalities by Israel during this time. Is-
rael attempted to divide the rural Palestinian population from the urban nationalists with
the creation of the "Village Leagues" in the early 1980s, yet these puppet leaderships were
largely seen as a failure. Tessler (2009) writes: "In practice...the village leagues were un-
able to strike roots; aside from gaining the support of some members of their immediate
families and clans, the leagues could not claim any substantial constituency," (p. 552).
Many villages and towns were upgraded to municipalities after the creation of the PA.
Experiments such as the Village Leagues and the 1972 and 1976 municipal elections
show that Israel was willing to pilot strategies in which the Palestinians were granted
some degree of local self-governance, and these experiments, while risky, were at the time
seen as preferable to direct rule by the Israeli civil apparatus at the local level. Israel’s
policies in the territories – its settlement policies, its construction of roads and infrastruc-
ture, and the restrictions it put in place to limit Palestinian access to Israeli labor markets
– meant that Palestinian areas became geographically and, over time, increasingly eco-
nomically isolated from Israeli areas. Practically, this meant that the systems of local
governance of the Palestinian- and Israeli-populated areas also functioned as relatively
distinct from one another.
In the end, while Israel did devolve some self-governing authority to local actors in
the Palestinian Territories, the Israeli Civil Administration (CIVAD) under the Ministry
of Defense still had most de facto, final authority over resources and governance, and the
upper echelons of CIVAD were comprised of Israeli individuals. Israeli policy toward
localities in the West Bank and Gaza can be described in general terms as the selective
empowerment of Palestinian elites who were willing to work within the system. Popular
grievances associated with this process fed into the First Intifada.
During the Intifada, Palestinian-led municipal governments were in an awkward po-
sition. During this time, Palestinian municipalities were continuing to provide basic ser-
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vices to their constituents, but with increased difficulty. This was partially due to eco-
nomic stagnation in the 1980s (Shahwan 1992) and, of course, partially due to the upris-
ing, through which parallel, grass-roots organizations of Palestinian leaders were directly
challenging Israeli authority. In describing the role of the Beit Sahour municipality dur-
ing the Intifada protests, one senior activist notes: "The municipality at that time was
playing many different roles. [On] one hand, they are part of the community; [on] the
other, they are the liaison for the [Israeli] occupation," (Interview with Author, Beit Sa-
hour, 6 December 2014). Thus, in many ways, the Palestinian staff of these municipal
governments depended on the Israeli military administration for their jobs and survival,
yet also sought to avoid alienating a grass-roots, Palestinian resistance movement that
amassed widespread public support.
With the creation of the PA in 1994, municipal governments experienced a relatively
radical shift – they were subsumed under a central Palestinian government for the first
time. Fatah, the PA’s founding party, was faced with the task of exercising authority at the
national level that was functionally and geographically restricted, as described above. As
the new PA defined municipal boundaries in the mid-1990s following the Oslo Accords,
some towns were based on old boundaries that had existed under Jordanian and British
rule, whereas other new units were created. Importantly, the PA sought to project its au-
thority over the entirety of the West Bank, so the definition of municipal units was com-
prehensive, and many towns, so defined, contained a combination of Areas A, B and/or C
(See Figure 2.2). In an interview with a general director in a municipality in the Tulkarem
district, he described when the PA came in 1994 and his town transformed from a village
council to a municipality. He described that the members of the former village council
had been seen as collaborators with the Israeli occupation, so the new, central Palestinian
government insisted on making changes. (Interview with Author, Tulkarem governorate,
16 November 2014). Municipal councils were not freely elected until the 2004-2005 elec-
tions. In the meantime, municipalities operated more freely than they had under direct
Israeli occupation, but they also chafed somewhat under their new central government.
2.3.5 Fragmentation of the National Movement and 2004-2006 Elections
Fatah was the founding party of the Palestinian national movement. It was formed
very soon after the PLO itself was established, and, under Yasser Arafat, it soon becom-
ing the leading faction within the organization. However, it has not been without its
challengers. While secular, leftist parties including the Popular Front for the Liberation
of Palestine (PFLP) have moderately strong grass-roots representation in the West Bank,
Fatah’s most significant challenge has come from the Islamist party, Hamas.
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Hamas was established during the First Intifada as a branch of the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood. Although it organized its own activities and, at times, competing message,
in practice it largely worked in a complementary fashion to the PLO resistance efforts at
the time of the Intifada (Pearlman 2011; Roy 2013). However, the Oslo Accords sharply
divided Hamas from Palestinian nationalists who supported the formation of the PA as a
path toward independence. The Islamist factions, including both Hamas and Palestinian
Islamic Jihad, rejected the compromise reached with Israel. According to Tessler (2009),
"The Islamist movement, particularly Hamas, was the most important coun-
terweight to the Palestinian Authority. Hamas and Islamic Jihad opposed
Fatah and the PA on ideological grounds, not for authoritarianism but for par-
ticipating in a peace process they considered futile as well as illegitimate,"
(792).
And, Tessler (2009) goes on to describe, while they didn’t form a formidable threat to
the new PA and President Arafat in the early years following Oslo, they did develop a
strong grass-roots presence in the Territories during this time. In the early years of the
PA, groups that opposed Oslo, including Hamas, turned to civil society and associations
to promote their message (Jamal 2009, 53). With the concentration of formal author-
ity in Fatah’s hands following Oslo, rejectionist groups worked to maintain connections
with the Palestinian street. Further, even at the end of the First Intifada, Hamas’s mil-
itant wing, the Qassam Brigades, carried out suicide attacks inside Israel to avenge the
massacre of 29 Palestinians by a Jewish settler in Hebron (Roy 2013, 35-6). After the
transition to Palestinian self-rule began, it was the Palestinian Authority, not Israel, that
began cracking down on Hamas activists in the West Bank and Gaza to reduce such acts
of violence (Roy 2013, 36).
Hamas’s entry into the Second Intifada, which lasted from 2000 to 2005 and was
more violent than the first, signified the growing disillusionment with the peace process
promoted by Fatah and increasing divisions within the Palestinian national movement
(Pearlman 2011). The first local elections under Palestinian self-rule were held between
December 2004 and December 2005, at a time when Hamas was becoming increasingly
popular in the West Bank. Pro-Hamas party lists made strong gains in a number of mu-
nicipalities.8 The subsequent parliamentary elections across the West Bank and Gaza
Strip in 2006 allowed the movement to claim 74 out of 132 of seats in the Palestinian
Legislative Council. This surprised many international observers. Since the US and other
8See section 2.5 below for how these election results were coded. Municipal council seats are awarded
proportionally to party lists, but it is not always clear which lists were Fatah sympathizers, which were
Hamas sympathizers, and which were neither. More details are provided below.
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members of the so-called Quartet of Middle East donors – the US, EU, Russia and United
Nations – considered Hamas a terrorist group, their election victory caused a halt in for-
eign aid to the PA until Hamas relinquished the use of violence, accepted previous peace
agreements, and formally recognized Israel (Human Rights Watch 2008). Subsequently,
fighting between Fatah and Hamas escalated and Hamas managed to seize control of the
Gaza Strip in June 2007. Hamas has governed Gaza since then in the context of strict
Israeli control of the entry of materials and persons in and out of the Strip.
Following Hamas’s victory in the election and takeover of Gaza, reports of repression
and human rights abuses mounted, accusing Hamas of targeting Fatah supporters in Gaza
and Fatah doing the same to Hamas supporters in the West Bank (Human Rights Watch
2008). My analysis below comes in the wake of the rise of Hamas and this historic split
between PA political institutions in the West Bank and Gaza. The divisions within the
national movement had been evident for some time since Oslo, but the series of local and
national elections between 2004 and 2006, and the subsequent split in governance of the
West Bank and Gaza in 2007, made them dramatically more visible.
2.4 Hypotheses
As described above, the central government’s coercive authority varies as a result of
the Oslo Accords. Whereas the Israeli military occasionally violates the security arrange-
ments agreed to at Oslo by entering into Area A towns, the Palestinian Authority has less
ability to act in such a way as to alter the balance of power in their favor. For example,
even if the PA deployed its police to a site in Area B or C without obtaining the requi-
site permission from Israel in advance, the Israeli military could respond to this act by
deploying its disproportionately stronger military resources. Due to its superior military
strength and equipment when compared to the Palestinian police and security apparatus,
demonstrations of force by Israel in Palestinian areas can definitively undermine the PA’s
seeming "monopoly" on violence.
Thus, the restrictions on Palestinian coercive deployments in Areas B and C can be
conceptualized as de jure and de facto limitation on the coercive capacity of the aspiring
Palestinian state. This variation in coercive capacity provides an opportunity to test one
of the claims supported by existing literature: namely, that increased state control over
the means violence will make it easier for the state to extract revenue from its popula-
tion. Following from this literature, the first hypothesis below predicts that increased
Palestinian control over the means of coercion will result in greater popular willingness
to contribute to revenue mobilization efforts:
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H1. The PA will demonstrate greater fiscal capacity in those areas where it has greater
coercive capacity, ceteris paribus.
The 2004-2005 local elections also provide an opportunity to examine how partisanship
is related to fiscal capacity. As described below, there are reasons to suspect that the
party in power at the local level may interact with the coercive capacity of the central
government to shape revenue collection.
As noted, the 2004-2005 elections resulted in some municipal councils being domi-
nated by Hamas and others by Fatah. Historically, municipal councils have been an in-
termittent venue for Palestinian nationalist mobilization. Especially following the 1976
elections, they were monitored by Israel and, at times, council members and mayors were
direct targets of Israeli repression. However, precisely because they were functioning in
an environment of surveillance – where, for example, their access to outside funds from
the Palestinian diaspora or other Arab countries was heavily scrutinized – municipal in-
stitutions were forced to be relatively entrepreneurial and self-sufficient. This means that
municipalities became a legitimate arena for political competition, a legacy that would
carry over into the post-Oslo period, when the creation of the central PA effectively re-
moved municipal councils from direct Israeli supervision. The historic and strategic
importance of these municipal institutions helps explain why Hamas chose to compete
against Fatah for the first time in local elections. Both sought strong representation on
municipal councils and in mayorships, because municipalities remain one of the most
promising avenues for forging connections with the Palestinian public and solidifying
grass-roots support.
Why would partisanship shape the link between coercive and fiscal capacity? First,
we can think of Levi (1988)’s "quasi-voluntary compliance" by taxpayers as the implicit
mechanism underlying the proposition in the existing literature that the coercive and
fiscal capacities of the state will be positively correlated. After observing an effective state
coercive apparatus in action, individuals will be more willing – or, to put it in less fully
"voluntary" terms, face a greater incentive – to comply with revenue collection. This is
quasi-voluntary in the sense that individuals may be moved to contribute more to the state
coercive apparatus because they are deriving benefits from it in the form of protection
or national defense, or individuals may be compelled to contribute out of fear that the
same coercive apparatus could be turned against them if they do not. In Levi (1988)’s
research, we learn that effective state-citizen relationships take advantage of this mixture
of volition and fear. Either way, the mechanism relies on a coherent conception of the state
39
as both provider of coercion and extractor of revenue, a coherence that we might expect to
endure in settings where the same political party or set of political leaders fulfills both
functions.
Thus, in applying this to the Palestinian context, areas governed by Fatah at the lo-
cal level may be better able to leverage greater Palestinian authority over policing at the
central level and generate greater fiscal capacity. This leads to the following, interactive
hypothesis:
H2a. Coercive capacity and revenue collection will show a stronger positive associa-
tion in Fatah-dominated areas as compared to Hamas-dominated areas, ceteris paribus.
Yet, there are also reasons that we might expect exactly the opposite. Following its victory
in the 2006 national legislative elections, Hamas, as a political movement, faced a sharp
reduction in funding. Transfers to the PA from foreign donors and from Israel were re-
duced, and there is evidence to suggest that these losses were passed onto Hamas. As
noted by a mayor of a northern West Bank town who won on a Hamas list: "In 2005,
they had a project to build a school, and it was 90 percent completed, but then [the
United States Agency for International Development] USAID realized the elected munic-
ipal council was mainly made up of Hamas members. This shouldn’t [affect] municipal
projects, but they stopped the funding for the school," (Interview with Author, 16 Novem-
ber 2014). Thus, beginning in 2006, Hamas may have been forced to rely on taxation of
its West Bank constituents to a greater extent than Fatah.
While Hamas exhibited a greater demand for local revenue during the post-2006 pe-
riod, why would taxpayers necessarily supply it? Here, I hypothesize that Hamas’s ability
to transform its demand for more revenue into greater actual revenue collection might
have depended on the coercive environment.
The qualitative analysis above suggests that the development of the Palestinian co-
ercive apparatus has been quite different from the processes by which states generated
monopolies on violence in the past. The Oslo Accords layered national-level, coercive
institutions on top of existing, and strategically important, municipal institutions. Fur-
ther, since the PA has no de jure or de facto authority over national defense or external
security, the entire coercive apparatus is focused on internal policing. In the context of a
fragmented national movement and given the inward-facing nature of the Palestinian co-
ercive apparatus, the temptation to use coercive authority to repress one’s rivals is strong.
Indeed, evidence suggests that, especially following the 2006 elections and subsequent
2007 coup in Gaza, each party began to use its security and police forces to crack down
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on the other (Human Rights Watch 2008). Thus, Fatah activists were repressed in Gaza,
while Hamas activists and affiliates were imprisoned in the West Bank. As documented
in a report by Human Rights Watch:
"After Hamas’s violent takeover of the Gaza Strip in June 2007, Fatah and the
Palestinian Authority feared a similar fate might befall the West Bank. They
took immediate steps to crack down on Hamas members and institutions, with
the political and financial support of Israel, the United States and European
Union, which likewise wanted to see Hamas’s influence in Palestinian politics
reduced or eliminated," (Human Rights Watch 2008).
While Israel also sees Hamas as its enemy, it can largely outsource repression of Hamas
to Fatah-dominated police and security services. Israel’s use of the PA to outsource its
repression of Palestinian threats in the West Bank is well-documented. Hilal and Khan
(2004, 84) describes this dynamic that was built into PA institutions from the time of
their construction:
"[T]he initial focus of externally assisted institutional capacity-building in the
[PA] was in the areas of policing, surveillance, and the maintenance of internal
order. The [PA] had to prove its ‘capacity’ in these areas in order to make
progress toward statehood. This meant essentially proving that it was able
and willing to use repression on a sufficient scale to satisfy Israel that it could
transfer to it the job of policing the Palestinians in the occupied territories.
A number of competing security forces were set up within the [PA] structure,
each answerable directly to the President."
The centralization of PA security forces under then-President Yasser Arafat continued af-
ter Arafat’s death under his successor, Mahmoud Abbas. The security of Israel’s settler
population in the West Bank has consistently relied on one-party – if not one-man – con-
trol over the armed wings of the Palestinian pseudo-state. Hamas, both a fierce rival of
Fatah and an enemy of Israel, is a natural target for surveillance and police repression.
Thus, one can infer that the threat of repression for Hamas supporters is higher in ar-
eas where Fatah has greater control over policing – namely, the high-capacity ("Area A")
towns.
While the effects of repression on a movement have been found to vary across contexts
or over time, some literature in the field suggests that repression can lead to greater mo-
bilization by popular movements, and this mobilization can take forms other than protest
(Davenport 2005; Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998). Thus, there are reasons to expect that re-
pression by the Fatah-dominated PA – real and threatened – will lead to an increase in the
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mobilization efforts of Hamas. In addition to rallying political support, the repression, or
threatened repression, of Hamas supporters in the West Bank may also lead constituents
to more actively comply with Hamas’s revenue-generating policies. This would increase
revenue generation in Hamas-dominated towns facing repression, producing the follow-
ing, rival hypothesis to H2a:
H2b. Coercive capacity and revenue collection will show a stronger positive asso-
ciation in Hamas-dominated towns as compared to Fatah-dominated towns, ceteris
paribus.
To summarize, H1 predicts an unconditional, positive relationship between policing ca-
pacity and fiscal capacity, in keeping with the traditional literature on the development
of state capacity; H2a hypothesizes that the positive relationship between policing capac-
ity and fiscal capacity will be significantly stronger in Fatah-run municipalities; and H2b
hypothesizes that the positive relationship between policing capacity and fiscal capac-
ity will be significantly stronger in Hamas-run municipalities. While H2a and H2b are
mutually exclusive, neither is mutually exclusive with H1.
2.5 Data and Empirical Analysis
Below, I describe my data and the research design I use to ascertain how variation
in coercive capacity and the ruling party at the local level affect municipal revenues.
My main quantitative analysis uses ordinary least squares (OLS) regression on a newly
constructed dataset of municipal revenues, policing capacity, the local ruling party, and
other control variables.
2.5.1 Fiscal Capacity
I proxy for the PA’s fiscal capacity with municipal revenues per capita. Detailed
data on municipal revenues come from the PA Ministry of Local Government, includ-
ing total revenues and revenues by source, for 107 municipalities in the West Bank from
2006 through 2012. I manually extracted the revenue data from approximately 749
detailed, yet inconsistently formatted, budget workbook files in Arabic – one file for
each municipality-year – and entered these data into a clean and consistently formatted
dataset in English.
Why examine municipal, rather than central government, revenues? There are a few
challenges to assessing how variation in the PA’s policing capacity might affect its ability
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to raise revenue. First, variation in the size or capacity of a state’s police force would be
expected to affect the state’s demand for revenue. Specifically, the PA may exert greater
tax effort in areas where revenues are explicitly needed to finance the police force. This
alternative mechanism may generate a correlation between coercive and fiscal capacity,
but tax effort would likely be responding to existing budgetary needs rather than greater
mobilization efforts or greater subsequent compliance. Second, the Palestinian police and
security apparatus is funded through taxation and donor contributions to the central PA
budget. Tax revenues at the central government level are additionally complicated by the
fact that Israel actually collects a large share of the PA’s taxes – including import taxes
and value-added tax on imported items – and then transfers the revenues to the Pales-
tinians. The PA does collect income, sales, and property tax itself, however it would be
difficult to pinpoint the geographic "incidence" of these taxes. For example, a Palestinian
resident who lives in an Area B town may nonetheless work and pay consumption taxes
in Ramallah. Data to connect income or sales tax payments to an individual’s place of
residence is not currently available, which would be critical for testing the hypotheses
above. Property taxes would be an interesting alternative, however property tax collec-
tion was being phased into municipalities during the time period covered here and many
municipalities did not yet feature this source of revenue.
For these reasons, I use data on municipal government budgets. Regardless of the
central government’s authority over policing, Palestinian municipalities are responsible
for providing the same set of goods and services across the West Bank and face the same
budgetary needs. Thus, the variation in policing authority does not affect the demand
for revenue from the municipality’s perspective. Further, focusing on municipal-level
outcomes allows us to examine the effect of the party in power – i.e. Hamas or Fatah – on
revenues for otherwise similar towns in the West Bank.
Municipal governments in the West Bank engage in activities such as street mainte-
nance; solid waste collection and disposal; water and electricity supply (although much
of this is transitioning to private providers, as discussed below); town planning and road
rehabilitation; providing small contributions to schools, libraries, and health centers;
maintaining sewage and drainage systems; maintaining cemeteries; maintaining fruits
and vegetable markets; and the like. Municipalities generate revenues from a variety
of sources, including user fees for some of the services mentioned; fees for licenses and
permits; and taxes that are transferred from the central government. I restrict my at-
tention to revenues collected through permit fees, service provision fees, and fines, all
of which are directly collected by the municipality itself. Thus, this measure does not
include taxes – such as property and agricultural land taxes – that are collected by the
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central government and transferred to the municipalities. Further, I exclude fees col-
lected for electricity and water provision. These are often quite a large source of revenue
for municipalities, however only some municipalities collect these fees themselves; over
the time period contained in the dataset, an increasing share of towns were relinquishing
this service to semi-private utility companies.9 To ensure I am comparing comparable
sources of revenue across towns, I restrict my attention to other service fees (i.e. waste
collection, sewage treatment, slaughterhouse, meat/vegetable market fees, etc.), permit
and licensing fees, and fines, all of which were possible forms of revenue collection for
all West Bank municipalities over the time period analyzed.
I remove three municipalities that are outliers from the sample. Nablus and Hebron,
the two largest cities in the West Bank, are dropped. While the median population in
2007 for the rest of the sample is 7,475, these two cities have populations that exceed
100,000.10 I also remove Ramallah, the de facto capital of the PA. Due to the town’s
saturation with aid agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Ramallah is
an outlier in its level of economic development. For example, the share of the population
employed in the private sector – which includes NGOs – is over 50 percent in Ramallah
while the mean for the rest of the sample is just over 8 percent. This means that Ramallah
features a much larger tax base than other Palestinian towns and cities. Thus, the reduced
sample includes 104 municipalities.
I use Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) annual population projections to
compute revenues per capita mobilized by each municipality for each year (rpc).11 The
units are New Israeli Shekels (NIS), which is the currency used in Israel and the Pales-
tinian Territories after 1967. Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of mean total revenues per
capita for the 104-town sample, as well as mean revenues per capita for each of the com-
ponent parts – service fees, permit fees, and fines. Towns ranged from generating an av-
erage of 2.53 NIS/capita (0.68 USD, 2010 dollars) to 179.18 NIS/capita (48.04 USD, 2010
9There are other reasons to exclude electricity revenues to the extent that we view fiscal capacity as
capturing the ease with which governments are achieving compliance with their revenue-generating efforts.
Electricity and water fees are increasingly being collected via pre-paid metering in the West Bank. Because
access to the service depends on payment in advance, non-compliance is more difficult. Perhaps more
importantly, the financing of electricity provision in the West Bank is quite complicated, however nearly
all of the electricity in the West Bank is supplied by Israel. Palestinian consumers are aware that much of
the revenue collected for electricity provision is eventually transferred to Israel. Thus, there is little room
for Palestinians to imagine that compliance with fee payment, in this case, directly benefits either Fatah or
Hamas, or the state-building project more broadly.
10Further, Nablus and Hebron both fall mostly within the high-capacity zone. If they also raise more
revenue per capita simply due to the more complex and efficient fiscal institutions we might expect to see
in larger cities, then they may bias my estimates of the effect of coercive capacity in a positive direction.
11The PCBS population projections begin in 2007, so I impute 2006 by assuming the same locality-
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Figure 2.2:
Density plots of average revenue per capita and component parts (services,
permits, and fines).
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dollars) over the seven-year period, with a sample average of 46.22 NIS/capita (12.39
USD, 2008 dollars). For context, GDP per capita in the West Bank and Gaza Strip ranged
from 2,557 to 2,935 dollars/capita (2010 USD) between 2006 and 2012 (The World Bank
n.d.).
These revenues only represent a fraction of the total revenues to which municipalities
have access. As mentioned, municipalities also had access to transfers from the central
government – including property taxes for select municipalities and vehicle licensing
and registration fees. Further, some municipalities who had not yet moved to priva-
tize electricity and water provision also generate substantial revenues from usage fees
for those utilities. In 2008, the World Bank estimated that central government current
transfers comprised approximately 13 percent of aggregate municipal budgets and fees
from electricity and water approximately 50 percent (World Bank 2010, 75). Note that
these are observations from a single year, thus year-to-year fluctuations in central gov-
ernment transfers, which anecdotal evidence suggests are sometimes dramatic, are not
reported. The fees that we examine in the analysis below do not comprise the majority of
municipal revenues on their own; however, for the reasons mentioned above, they are the
best collection of revenues to capture relatively direct and unmediated forms of exchange
between municipal governments and their populations.
2.5.2 Coercive Capacity
The first independent variable of interest is the coercive capacity of the central Pales-
tinian government. In "Area A", as described above, the Palestinian police have full au-
thority. In "Area B", however, they are required under the terms of the Oslo Accords to
coordinate policing activity more closely with Israel. While over 60 percent of the terri-
tory of the West Bank falls in "Area C", where the Israeli military has complete authority,
there are no major Palestinian population centers with municipal governments in this
area. Thus, the distinction between Areas A and B is the focus of the analysis below.
As shown in Map 2.2, municipality borders do not neatly line up with the delineation
of areas of more (Area A) and less (Area B) coercive capacity. My primary measure of the
coercive capacity associated with a municipality is a dichotomous measure, coerce, cap-
turing whether most of the municipality’s "built-up" or populated area falls within Area
A (coerce = 1) or Area B (coerce = 0). This measure is constructed from Palestinian Min-
istry of Local Government geo-referenced data (Palestinian Authority 2015) on building
cover. Geo-referenced boundaries of Areas A and B were obtained from the Israeli hu-
man rights organization, B’Tselem. I first constructed a continuous measure of the share
of a town’s built-up areas that are in the high-capacity region (see Map 2.2 to view the
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built-up areas in Area A); thus, higher values denote more coercive capacity. I find that,
although a few towns are split more evenly, the distribution tends to be fairly bimodal
(see Figure 2.3), with almost no density around the midpoint. Therefore, I primarily use
the dichotomous measure in my analysis below, since it seems to capture the substantive
distinction of importance for how much coercive capacity the central government pos-
sesses in a given town. Using the continuous measure (coerce_share) alters the statistical
significance, but not the direction or approximate magnitude, of some of the estimated












Figure 2.3: Continuous measure of share of municipality in "Area A" (coerce_share).
The Ministry of Local Government’s data on built-up areas is unavailable for 16 towns
in my dataset. Thus, I used a secondary data source on the share of populated areas in each
town that are in the high-capacity ("Area A") zone to code coerce for those observations
which would otherwise be missing. We might expect the area in which the population
resides to closely align with that population’s experiences with coercive institutions, and
thus a measure based on populated areas, rather than building cover, might be preferable.
However the exact boundaries of the populated areas are approximate. They are taken
from a map designed by B’Tselem whose data I was only able to access via the organiza-
tion’s website. In Figure 2.4 below, I show examples of the B’Tselem data on populated
areas for four municipalities. The darkest shade of brown represents a Palestinian pop-
ulated area. The next darkest shade of brown indicates a high-capacity area ("Area A"),
while the next darkest shade (a yellowish color) indicates a low-capacity area ("Area B").
Finally, the lightest shade of yellow indicates Area C. In the examples provided, Rawabi
and Bal’a would be coded as falling mostly in Area A (coerce = 1), while Atara and Deir
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Figure 2.4: Examples of Area A and Area B municipalities using BT’Selem map.
al-Ghusun are coded as falling mostly in Area B (coerce = 0). While these codings are a
bit more approximate, they do highlight how seemingly arbitrary some of these divisions
were for small towns located right next to each other that are minimally different from
each other.
2.5.3 Dominant Party
The variable f atah captures which party is governing in each locality, coded as ’0’ if a
Hamas list gained a plurality of seats in the 2004-5 municipal council elections or ’1’ if a
Fatah list gained a plurality of seats. Fatah is the main founding party of the PLO and has
governed the West Bank since the PA was established in 1994. Hamas, an Islamist party,
is Fatah’s main rival and has governed the Gaza Strip since 2007. Municipal mayors are
selected by a majority vote from council members; if no candidate obtains a majority,
then a run-off is held between the two candidates with the most number of votes on the
council.
I use a dichotomous measure here instead of a continuous measure of seat share for the
following reason. The local elections took place over four rounds between December 23,
2004 and December 15, 2005. In the first two rounds, councils were elected according to
a block voting (or "plurality-at-large") system that resulted in a winner-take-all outcomes
for Hamas, Fatah, or independent party lists. In August 2005, in between the second and
third rounds of the elections, President Abbas signed a new local elections law which
switched the system to closed-list proportional representation. Thus, for the final two
rounds of the local elections, there is variation in the number of seats obtained by the
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"winning" party. To obtain consistent coding, I use a dichotomous measure.
Much of the coding of the f atah variable was done by a Palestinian research assistant,
who reviewed archived news stories available online to determine which party earned
a plurality of seats. This was not a trivial task – especially for the last two rounds of
the elections – since party list names were not constant across municipalities, thus local
knowledge was critical. In our coding of municipal election results, a number of mu-
nicipalities featured majority coalitions of local politicians with no clear connections to
either party, or councils where Fatah- and Hamas-affiliated lists controlled equal num-
bers of seats. Towns falling into either of these categories were dropped in those analyses
in which this variable is used. For the 83 towns that were coded, 43 councils were domi-
nated by Hamas lists while 40 were dominated by Fatah lists.
2.5.4 Control Variables
Other than the effects of the functional restrictions on sovereignty that the Oslo Ac-
cords imposed, there are a number of reasons that Area A municipalities might mobilize
more revenue than their Area B counterparts. In several of the estimations below, I in-
clude control variables to proxy for the underlying level of economic development and
the size of the local government, both capturing sets of variables that would be expected
to affect revenue collection. Unfortunately, the control variables described below are only
available at the municipal level for a single year (2007 or 2008). The Palestinian Cen-
tral Bureau of Statistics does not have the capacity to update these data annually. This
raises concerns that they are endogenous, especially since my revenue data includes ob-
servations from 2006 and 2007. However, because municipal revenues and spending are
relatively small compared to total local production, it is unlikely that revenue collection
in one year would drive changes in the underlying level of economic development in the
following years. While we do not know for sure, one might guess that these measures
would be fairly static over the course of the seven-year period covered by my dataset.
The following control variables are used in several specifications below. First, emp
measures the share of the population employed in the private or nongovernmental sector,
and est measures the number of business establishments in operation per 1,000 residents.
These statistics on employed persons comes from the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statis-
tics (PCBS) 2009 governorate yearbooks, and the population of each town is taken from
PCBS projections.12 Unfortunately, these measures are not available for the ten towns in
12The numerator for emp and est is taken from tables in the PCBS yearbooks titled "Number of Establish-
ments in Operation and Employed Persons in the Private Sector, Non Governmental Organization Sector
and Government Companies." I interpret "Government Companies" to include publicly owned companies,
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the Jerusalem governorate, so specifications including these control variables will drop
those observations.
Housing density might also affect the ease of tax collection: ohpc is a measure of occu-
pied housing units per capita in 2007, and is also taken from the PCBS yearbooks. Higher
values of ohpc indicate a population that is spread out more sparsely across housing units,
while lower values indicate residential units are more densely populated. Higher values
of ohpc, therefore, could be a result of a wealthier population where fewer individuals re-
side in each house, while lower values suggest that housing units may include extended
family members, for example. Munemp is a measure of municipal employees per 1,000
residents, with the number of municipal employees per town taken from World Bank
(2010). Finally, we also include the natural logarithm of a town’s distance to the near-
est Israeli settlement or military outpost (log(dist)) in our battery of controls. Using data
from the the Palestinian Ministry of Local Government GIS portal, I calculate the geodesic
distance between each municipality and the nearest Israeli settlement or military base to
construct log(dist).
Tables 2.1 and 2.2 provide descriptive statistics for the dependent variable (rpc), rev-
enues per capita averaged over the seven-year period, and all righthand-side variables
used in the subsequent analysis.
Variable Levels n %
coerce low 64 61.5
high 40 38.5
fatah Hamas 43 51.8
Fatah 40 48.2
Table 2.1: Descriptive Statistics: Discrete Variables
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
rpc 104 46.22 33.98 2.53 179.18
coerce_share 88 0.35 0.45 0.00 1.00
emp 93 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.35
est 93 34.39 13.10 9.60 79.20
ohpc 103 0.18 0.02 0.14 0.22
dist 101 1,384.22 1,426.31 0.00 5,852.33
Table 2.2: Descriptive Statistics: Continuous Variables
but not governmental offices or ministries.
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2.5.5 Coercive Capacity and Revenue Generation
H1 predicts that coercive capacity will be associated with unconditionally higher rev-
enue. Since the coercive capacity of each municipality was designated during the Oslo
process in 1994-1995, if H1 is correct, we should observe higher revenue in the high-
capacity towns than low-capacity towns when observing a cross-sectional average of rev-
enues per capita over the full 2006 to 2012 period – the years for which we have data
on the dependent variable. Greater de jure control over internal policing should gener-
ate consistently higher revenues. A simple comparison of average municipal revenues
per capita over the seven-year period shows that high-capacity municipalities raise an
average of 51.53 NIS/person (approximately $14.66 USD, 2008 dollars), while the low-
capacity towns raise an average of 42.89 NIS/person (approximately $12.20 USD, 2008
dollars). However, a Welch two-sample t-test shows the difference to be statistically in-
significant (p = 0.22).
Because the level of economic development is higher in high-capacity towns, it is not
expected that a statistically significant relationship between coercive capacity and rev-
enues is being obscured by omitted variables related to the level of development. Indeed,
average values of all of the control variables related to development – employment in the
private sector (emp), number of business establishments per 1,000 residents (est), occu-
pied housing units per capita (ohpc), and number of municipal employees per 1,000 resi-
dents (munemp) – are higher for high-capacity towns than low-capacity towns. Nonethe-
less, I estimate a cross-sectional OLS regression of the form:
rpci = β0 + β1coercei + Xiγ +ui (2.1)
where rpci is average revenues per capita in town i and X is the matrix of time-invariant
economic development control variables described above. These results are not shown,
however the estimate of β1, while positive, is statistically insignificant for all specifica-
tions in which the employment measure (emp) is included. The coefficient on emp is
positive and statistically significant, indicating that the employment status of the popu-
lation, and thus the size of the underlying tax base, is a stronger predictor of municipal
revenues than the central government’s authority over policing. This test provides little
to no support for H1, challenging the application of the insight from the classic state for-
mation literature that coercive and fiscal capacity are necessarily strongly correlated. The
PA’s coercive capacity, which is limited to internal policing, has not resulted in uncondi-
tionally higher fiscal capacity in the long term.




















Figure 2.5: Revenue growth by level of coercive capacity.
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2.5, we plot revenues per capita by year for low- and high-capacity towns, with a locally
weighted linear regression (loess) line drawn through each subsample. This shows that
the high-capacity towns do start to separate from low-capacity towns over time. After
2008, revenues per capita in the high-capacity towns appear to be significantly higher
than those in the low-capacity towns.
To exploit both temporal and cross-sectional variation in revenues, I estimate the fol-
lowing dynamic models:
rpcit = β0 + β1rpci(t−1) + β2coercei +uit (2.2)
rpcit = β0 + β1rpci(t−1) + β2coercei + Xiγ +uit (2.3)
where rpcit is revenues per capita in town i in year t and rpci(t−1) is revenue per capita
lagged by one year. Note that I cannot use unit-fixed effects due to the time-invariant na-
ture of the key independent variable of interest. Column 1 of Table 2.3 reports the results
from the reduced-form model (equation 2.2) without the economic control variables. Col-
umn 2 includes both lagged revenues per capita and the time-invariant controls. Because
the control measures proxy for the underlying level of development in the locality, much
of their potential effect on revenue may be captured in the lagged dependent variable
itself. (Indeed, in the specifications below we see that β̂1 decreases substantially in the
specifications that include the control variables.)
Coercive capacity now shows a positive and significant association with revenues per
capita in both specifications. Moving to a high-capacity zone (from Area B to Area A) is
associated with a marginal increase in revenues per capita by between 4.0 and 5.5 NIS per
capita from the previous year’s value. This is about $1 or $1.50 per person per year. For
a municipality with a population of 12,310 – the mean municipal population projection
for 2013 – this translates into an additional $18,465 per year.
Thus, there is suggestion that coercive capacity plays a role in revenue growth over
time.13 While the cross-sectional evidence did not provide unconditional support for H1,
there is reason to believe that the relationship between coercive capacity and revenues
varies over the span of the seven-year period captured in this sample. One plausible
source of such variation would be the change in party in power at the local level in a
number of these towns after the 2004-2005 elections. This change became even more
meaningful following Hamas’s victory in 2006. Thus, next, we move onto the relationship
between the party in power at the local level and revenues.




Panel regressions of revenue per capita (rpc) on coercive capacity, party in
power, and controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
H1 H1 H2a/H2b H2a/H2b
Intercept 6.626+ -37.92∗∗ 5.463 -39.85∗∗
(3.810) (11.96) (4.031) (12.33)
rpc_lag1 0.885∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗ 0.901∗∗∗ 0.595∗∗∗
(0.0843) (0.151) (0.0831) (0.151)
coerce 5.515∗∗ 4.028∗∗ 5.741∗∗ 5.635∗∗∗
(1.893) (1.336) (1.918) (1.695)
f atah -3.063+ 2.207 -1.863
(1.616) (1.864) (1.631)












N 525 327 423 327
adj. R2 0.754 0.783 0.755 0.784
Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, +p < 0.1
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2.5.6 Coercive Capacity, Party in Power, and Revenue Generation
While we do not have hypotheses about the unconditional relationship between f atah
and rpc, a brief description of this relationship follows. First, it is worth noting that
average revenue per capita is higher in Fatah-dominated towns (51.97 NIS/person) than
Hamas-dominated towns (40.17 NIS/person), a difference that is weakly significant (p =
0.09). As with the analysis above, I also estimate a cross-sectional OLS regression with
the usual controls (results not shown), and find that the positive relationship between
Fatah control and revenues becomes statistically insignificant for those specifications in
which the number of municipal employees per 1,000 residents (munemp) is included.
This suggests that the association between Fatah control and revenues may be driven
by higher municipal payrolls in Fatah-dominated towns. Interestingly, in the dynamic
model including the lagged dependent variable and controls (see Table 2.3, column 2), the
coefficient on f atah is negative and is weakly significant at the 10% level. This suggests
that, while Fatah- and Hamas-run municipalities are performing comparably over the full
seven-year period – with Fatah-run municipalities perhaps doing even slightly better, on
average – there may be a decline in Fatah performance over time. Overall, though, we
cannot say that the party in power has a conclusive, unconditional effect on revenues per
capita.
To test the rival propositions embodied in H2a and H2b, I estimate a model which
interacts coerce and f atah. Thus, columns 3 and 4 of Table 2.3 estimates the following
models:
rpcit = β0 + β1rpci(t−1) + β2coerce+ β3f atah+ β4(coerce ∗ f atah) +uit (2.4)
rpcit = β0 + β1rpci(t−1) + β2coerce+ β3f atah+ β4(coerce ∗ f atah) + Xiγ +uit (2.5)
The results demonstrate that policing capacity is only associated with greater revenue
collection for Hamas-dominated towns. On the other hand, capacity does not have a sta-
tistically distinguishable effect on revenues for those towns in which Fatah won the local
elections. This observation holds for both specifications, with and without Xi, the suite
of control variables. Among towns where Hamas won a majority of seats, the estimated
marginal effect of coercive capacity is positive and significant (see Figure 2.6).
If a town ruled by Hamas were hypothetically re-assigned from an area of low Pales-
tinian policing capacity to an area of high capacity, we would expect it to raise nearly 6
NIS ($1.70 USD, 2008 dollars) per capita more, or just over $20,000 more for a town with
the mean 2013 population level. It is worth noting that the sign of the effect is the same,
but it fails to reach statistical significance when the continuous measure of coercive ca-
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Figure 2.6:
Marginal effect of coercive capacity on revenues per capita given party plu-
rality (0 =Hamas;1 = Fatah)
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pacity (coerce_share) is used. Because the distribution of towns was fairly dichotomous,
this suggests that the results are best interpreted as applying to those towns that are clus-
tered toward each end of the spectrum.
These results provides initial support for H2b – the positive relationship between
coercive capacity and revenue observed in the dynamic specification in columns 1 and 2
of Table 2.3 is driven exclusively by those towns governed by Hamas. As we saw above,
high-capacity towns separate from low-capacity towns around 2008, which was the first
fiscal year after Israel and the Quartet froze aid and tax transfers to the PA. Thus, towns
may have faced a particularly strong imperative to increase their self-generated revenue at
this point, especially those governed by Hamas, which was the target of the international
freeze.
2.6 Discussion
It is clear that after the 2006 elections, the subsequent political crisis in Gaza, and the
freezing of international aid, Hamas had additional incentive to generate its own revenue.
However, the findings above suggest that not all Hamas-governed towns in the West Bank
were able to do so equally; Hamas generated significantly more revenue in those areas
where the PA exerts more authority over policing. In practice, this translates to areas
where their domestic rivals – Fatah – had more control over the police force. Why would
this be the case? Here, I suggest that the increased threat of repression faced by Hamas in
high-capacity areas may drive greater compliance with fiscal extraction by the movement
in those areas. In other words, repression functions to mediate the relationship between
coercive capacity and party in power as explanatory variables and fiscal capacity as an
outcome. I also discuss an alternative mechanism whereby Hamas may be engaging in
greater tax effort in high-capacity areas as part of a long-term strategy for building its
capacity in areas that are most likely to be part of a future Palestinian state. I suggest that
this is less likely, due to Hamas’s rejection of the Oslo Accords and the zones of high and
low capacity that it created. In subsection , I discuss potential sources of selection bias or
confoundedness that may bias the observed relationship between coercive capacity, party
in power, and fiscal capacity, and how I have addressed them.
For Hamas municipal council members and mayors elected into office in 2004 and
2005, the key, distinguishing feature of high-capacity areas was repression. As described
by Signoles (2010) in a review of local governance in the Territories:
"The ’hunt’ for Hamas mayors and municipal council members was stepped
up after the Islamists’ victory in the 2006 legislative elections and, even fur-
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ther, after Hamas’ military ’coup’ in the Gaza Strip in June 2007," (31).
While the initial targeting of local Hamas politicians was done by Israel, later phases
of surveillance and repression after the 2007 split were carried out by the PA itself, as
documented in Human Rights Watch (2008). More systematic reporting of repressive
incidents is contained in the reports by the Palestinian Center for Human Rights (2007,
2008). A preliminary review and coding of incidents of "Excessive Use of Force by Law
Enforcement Officials", "Arrests, Torture and Other Forms of Cruel and Inhuman Treat-
ment," and "Violations of the Right to Peaceful Assembly" in the 2007 and 2008 annual
reports shows that 65 percent of all incidents (17/26) occurred in Area A while 23 per-
cent (6/26) occurred in Area B (see Table 2.4). It was not possible to determine the precise
location of three of the 26 incidents. Because 2007-2008 represents the peak of the crack-
down following Hamas’s electoral wins and takeover of Gaza, some of the descriptions of
incidents contained in the PCHR reports actually notes that Hamas activists and mem-
bers were the targets of the repressive act.
Building on the vast literature on the complex effects of repression, I suggest here that
it is possible that increased repression at the hands of Fatah may have, counterintuitively,
led Hamas to develop stronger local capacity. Repression can encourage a movement or
group to substitute other forms of mobilization instead of the one that is being repressed
(Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998). In this case, I suggest that compliance by Hamas support-
ers with the movement’s efforts to raise revenue is an alternative form of mobilization.
Paying taxes to Hamas is much less likely to be penalized than other forms of public sup-
port for the movement, especially since this fiscal exchange is occurring within the formal
institutional framework of the PA.
As is perhaps unsurprising in an environment of occupation and statelessness, Pales-
tinian compliance with taxation has a history of being contingent, and selectively with-
held as part of protest or collective action. For example, during the First Intifada, tax
resistance was used in some communities to confront the Israeli occupation, most no-
tably in the town of Beit Sahour, a Palestinian city in the Bethlehem area. The connection
between taxation and self-determination – a variant of the link between taxation and
representation that is so familiar to historians of the United States – seems to have been
present in the minds of Palestinians. In transitioning to self-rule after the creation of the
PA, this legacy was not lost on the new authorities. On the day that the newly created PA
took over partial responsibility for taxation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in December
1994, Atef Alawneh, then-Director General of the Palestinian Ministry of Finance, gave a
speech, stating:










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of taxes under occupation was a national struggle worthy of praise...Now it is
180 degrees different. Now delay in paying means a delay in building the
Palestinian state," (Greenberg 1994).
Director General Alawneh was aware of the challenge of enforcing tax payment in a
setting where the aspiring state did not exercise de facto sovereignty. In fact, since its
founding, PA tax enforcement has focused chiefly on large taxpayers, not individuals and
families, perhaps in an effort to forbear from aggravating an already quite burdened pop-
ulation whose support they depend on for survival (Holland 2016). This leaves room for
us to consider popular compliance with the small-scale payments analyzed in the empir-
ical section above as indeed contingent on political support for the governing authorities.
The party in power – namely, Fatah or Hamas – and their approach to the state-building
and resistance project may shape the population’s propensity to comply.
It is also possible that Hamas exerted a larger tax effort in high-capacity areas in par-
ticular. These are areas where, should Hamas win a national election and manage to take
power, they would have greater policing capacity according to the agreement reached in
Oslo. However, Hamas’s opposition to the Oslo process and the resulting restrictions on
the Palestinian Authority complicates this argument. Since Hamas has never accepted
the legitimacy of the Oslo Accords, why would the movement adapt its own strategies to
the way that the accords themselves have defined areas of Palestinian coercive authority?
It is still plausible that Hamas’s leadership has a pragmatic approach, and views "Area A"
towns as the most likely to be included in any future Palestinian state. Thus, as an alter-
native mechanism, Hamas’s greater efforts to extract revenue from constituents in these
areas may represent a strategic move by the movement rather than the effect of repression
on popular mobilization and compliance. However, because of the movement’s historic
stance of rejecting Oslo, I suggest that this is less likely to be the explanation for Hamas’s
higher fiscal capacity in Area A.
If Hamas’s greater revenues per capita is a sign of the movement building stronger
connections with its popular base in areas of higher policing capacity, the next logical
test would be to see if Hamas-run municipalities are also spending more in these areas,
or whether revenues are being redirected elsewhere. Analysis of panel-level expenditure
data is not included within the scope of the current study, but World Bank (2010) in-
cludes total expenditures in 2007 and 2008 for 78 municipalities. Among this restricted
sample, a Welch two-sample t-test demonstrates that Area A (high-capacity) towns spend
more: average expenditures across the two years were 271.64 NIS/capita in Area A towns
compared to 166.67 NIS/capita in Area B towns, a statistically significant difference (t=-
2.24, p=0.03). However, there is no significant difference across towns governed by Fatah
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versus Hamas, nor does an ordinary least-squares regression (results not shown) demon-
strate an interactive effect between coercive capacity and party in power as was observed
for revenue. While this analysis is limited to two years of data, it suggests that greater
spending in high-capacity towns results from factors other than the party in power. In-
terestingly, it also suggests that Hamas is not spending more "on the books" as compared
to Fatah, leaving room for the possibility that Hamas’s revenues were redirected to un-
documented expenses, including the organization’s militant activities.
World Bank (2010) also includes data on the number of municipal employees for each
municipality in 2008. Again, this is quite limited in its usefulness because it is only
observed for one year, however the correlation between municipal revenues per capita
in 2007 and municipal employment in 2008 is much higher for Fatah-led towns in my
sample (0.42) than for Hamas-led towns (0.01). In fact, there is almost no correlation
between the number of municipal employees per capita in 2008 and revenues generated
in the preceding year in Hamas-dominated towns. This suggests that Fatah was more
likely to use municipal revenues to inflate their payroll – and perhaps less likely to spend
on services – than Hamas.
2.6.1 Addressing Potential Selection Bias
Two processes of selection could be affecting the results we observe: First, the selec-
tion of towns into high- or low-capacity areas, and second, the process that led Fatah or
Hamas to win the elections in each town. The creation of Areas A, B, and C which de-
fine the PA’s authority over policing was not a random process. Similarly, whether Fatah
or Hamas gained more representation on a municipal council in 2005 was not random.
There is a risk that variables that influenced these selection processes are also going to
drive fiscal outcomes. Further, if the bias is leading to an overestimation of the effect of
coercive capacity on revenues or the effect of party in power on revenues, this bias would
be compounded in the interactive model.
The qualitative analysis in section 2.3 above suggests that the location of existing
Palestinian population centers was one major factor driving the division of the West
Bank. Towns with larger Palestinian populations were more likely to end up in the high-
capacity zone (Area A). While data on locality population size from the time is scant, I
perform a simple difference in means test below, matching high- and low-capacity towns
based on the town’s population in 1997 (pop97). This is the closest data I could obtain to
a town’s population size when the arrangements for Areas A, B and C were determined.14
14The Interim Agreement ("Oslo II") was negotiated and signed between 1994 and 1995. 1997 was the
first year the new Palestinian Authority was able to take a census. There is no evidence of significant sorting
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The biserial correlation between coerce and a town’s population in 1997 is 0.53, implying
that population size likely did play a role in determining whether a locality fell primarily
into a high- or low-capacity zone.
We might imagine that towns with a greater population size at the time of selection
will not only generate more revenue, but will also be likely to generate more revenues
per capita. For example, if there are increasing returns to scale in developing extractive
capacity, larger towns would be able to extract more on a per capita basis. Interestingly,
then, this would lead to an overestimation of the effect of coerce on rpc, but in the cross-
sectional analysis we saw no significant effect. Further, it is worth recalling that the two
largest cities in the West Bank – Hebron and Nablus – as well as the city of Ramallah (the
de facto capital of the PA) were dropped. Finally, I perform a rudimentary matching ex-
ercise, whereby high-capacity towns in my sample are matched with low-capacity towns,
allowing replacement. I consider treated units matched if the population size is within
20 of the population size of the control unit. The estimated average treatment effect on
the treated (ATT) according to this analysis is 8.51 NIS per capita, however the effect is
statistically insignificant (p = 0.22). This suggests, at least, that a locality’s population
size did not downwardly bias our tests of the unconditional effect of capacity on revenue
generation (H1). Although this addresses concerns with the cross-sectional analysis, it is
still theoretically possible that a town’s initial population size has biased the estimates on
the dynamic specifications. However, for that to be the case, a town’s initial population
would have to affect both coerce (or f atah) and the year-to-year change in revenues per
capita over the 2006 to 2012 period. It is not clear why this would be the case.
Distance to existing and planned Israeli settlements likely influenced where the PA
was permitted to have policing capacity. Unfortunately, I do not have data on the loca-
tion of existing and planned settlements from the period immediately preceding the Oslo
Accords. The only data available is on the location of settlements as of 2014, thus they do
not reflect the distribution of settlements or planned settlements that Israeli negotiators
had in mind in the 1990s and they cannot perfectly substitute for a pre-treatment vari-
able. This contemporary measure of distance to the settlements is included as a control
variable in the regressions above (Table 2.3, columns 2 & 4). Distance from settlements
is not a statistically significant predictor of revenue collection. Interestingly, the biserial
correlation between a town’s level of policing capacity and distance to the nearest current
settlement or outpost (dist) is only 0.15. This may mean that Israeli settlement placement
of the population after Oslo II based on the area designations – in fact, most people did not understand or
realize the significance that Areas A, B and C would have for long-run outcomes – so I use a town’s 1997
population as a rough proxy for the size of Palestinian towns at the moment of selection.
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did not play a large role in determining whether a town was designated Area A or B, or
that Israeli settlements and outposts were built and expanded in unpredictable ways after
Israel and the PLO concluded their agreement in 1994.
Of course, a town’s distance to Israeli settlements in 2014 is not a very informative
proxy for the strategic considerations that Israeli negotiators envisioned in 1994. In ad-
dition to the temporal problem, these data measure distance "as the crow flies," not as
traveled along roads, which would probably be more relevant for Israel’s security-related
concerns. Further, they do not capture distance between Palestinian towns and sites of
religious or cultural significance that, in addition to existing and planned settlements,
would have been important to Israeli negotiators. Yet it still remains unclear how dis-
tance to the settlements would have positively biased the estimate of the coefficient of
interest in the preceding regressions: namely, the estimated effect of an increase in co-
ercive capacity in Hamas-governed localities. For example, if towns located closer to
existing or planned Israeli settlements were given a lower degree of coercive authority,
as we might expect, this selection process would only be a threat to inference if it caused
such low-capacity towns later governed by Hamas, but not those governed by Fatah, to
experience lower revenue collection due to their proximity to Israeli settlements. It is not
clear why this would be the case.
Third, Jerusalem itself can be considered a key strategic and religious, or symbolic,
interest for Israel. The area around Jerusalem would have been particularly sensitive for
Israelis and caused most areas bordering the city to be designated as "Area B", or low-
capacity, zones for the new PA. These areas are also largely cut off from Jerusalem by
the separation barrier, so their level of development has largely stagnated since the early
2000s. Thus, low fiscal capacity in these areas would be hard to attribute directly to the
level of PA policing capacity, and probably has more to do with their proximity to the
wall. As noted above, the economic control variables emp and est are not available for
towns in the Jerusalem district, so these observations are omitted from the specifications
that include control variables in the analysis above (Table 2.3, columns 2 & 4). How-
ever, running the other specifications (columns 1 & 3) without the Jerusalem-area towns
produces substantively and statistically similar results.
Finally, although data from the pre-Oslo period is scarce, I use a sample of 11 towns,
roughly matched by population size, to demonstrate that revenue collection prior to the
assignment of coercive authority was comparable across those towns that did, eventually,
become "high" versus "low" capacity, respectively (see Appendix B). It is important to note
that the treatment which led to variation in policing capacity also created the PA itself.
Thus, in many ways, comparing pre- and post-treatment municipal data is "comparing
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apples and oranges" since, prior to 1994, the West Bank was ruled directly by the Israeli
Civil Administration and military apparatus and the budgetary demands of municipal-
ities probably differed considerably. Nonetheless, this should bolster our confidence in
the fact that other factors that may have accounted for the creation of Areas A, B and C
were not fundamentally related to revenue.
The final selection process to consider is how towns came to support Fatah or Hamas
in the 2004-2005 elections. First, it is important to note that underlying support for Fatah
or Hamas did not affect the selection of coerce that occurred at Oslo – in fact, at this time,
Hamas had not emerged as a major threat to Israel. More importantly, factors that caused
a town to support Fatah or Hamas in the 2004-2005 elections could have also affected
revenues per capita or revenue growth, thus biasing estimated coefficients on the f atah
variable. Variables that led a town to support Hamas and led to greater revenue growth
are particularly problematic, since they would have led us to underestimate the effect of
f atah (i.e. overestimate the effect of Hamas).
Of course, the local victories experienced by Hamas in these elections – and, further,
in the 2006 national elections – came as quite a surprise to both seasoned international
observers of the Territories and to Fatah itself. Thus, it is hard to pinpoint what, exactly,
led certain towns to support Hamas in those historic elections. Preliminary, anecdotal
evidence suggests that economic exclusion and perceptions of corruption played a role
in alienating voters from Fatah; if this is the case, our economic control variables should
be capturing some of this effect. Importantly, if more economically depressed areas were
likely to vote for Hamas, we would expect such areas to generate less public revenue, not
more. Unfortunately, data on public perceptions of corruption is only available at the
governorate (i.e. district) level.15 If higher average perceptions of corruption in a mu-
nicipality drove support for Hamas and also drove greater fiscal capacity, conditional on
the level of coercive capacity, this would be consistent with the larger story that Hamas
was able to mobilize its base, or, at the very least, build organizational capacity in those
areas where its support was strongest and where it faced the threat of repression from
a Fatah-led police force. Subsequent analysis of how popular perceptions fed into ini-
tial support for Hamas and, potentially, the organization’s ability to build local capacity
would further refine the argument being presented here.
A final threat to inference may come from certain towns simply being early bastions
of support for Hamas. Additional research is needed to ascertain the identity of these
15With only 11 governorates in the West Bank, an estimate of the effect of perceptions of corruption on
support for Hamas would likely be underpowered at conventional levels of statistical significance, however
a simple correlation could be estimated.
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towns, since this is clearly a sensitive topic to discuss with informants. In any case, it isn’t
immediately clear how historic bases of Hamas support in the West Bank would have also
been equipped to perform better fiscally.
2.7 Conclusion
This study has implications for other regions of contested statehood, or areas featuring
both an existing, expansionary state and a national self-determination, independence,
resistance, or liberation movement. Understandably, these are also usually sites of recent
or ongoing conflict. My assumption is that the transition from national movement to
sovereign state is a process. This process can be characterized by abrupt progress, but
is often messy, violent, non-linear, and, quite possibly, frozen at various stages along the
way. It seems quite possible, then, that these trajectories might distort the process of
capacity development among national movements that emerge in such settings.
How can fiscal capacity – a concept that relies inherently on quasi-voluntary exchange
between citizen and state (Levi 1988) – develop in settings of incomplete state coercive
control? In this study, I find that greater Palestinian authority over policing does not in-
herently translate into stronger fiscal relationships between state and citizen and, thus,
greater fiscal capacity. Instead, I suggest that the use of coercive capacity to repress inter-
nal rivals may be driving divergence in fiscal capacity across opposition party- and ruling
party-held areas. This has important implications for both those who are interested in
the specific dynamics of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and Palestinian state formation,
in addition to those interested in other areas of contested statehood or asymmetric rule.
While the early state-building theories described a political leader or organization that
was able to wield coercion to defend against both external and internal threats, coercive
capacity that develops among non-sovereign organizations in conflict settings may look
quite different. When internal policing is the dominant – or only – form of coercion that
aspiring state-builders are able to wield, the result may be greater fragmentation, rather
than consolidation, of the political community.
What specific aspects of the Israeli-Palestinian context led to these restrictions on
coercive capacity development? In the subsequent two chapters, I suggest that, while
the West Bank is a unique case in many ways, the partial form of autonomy over self-
governance that Palestinians possess is, in general terms, more common than we might
think. In particular, I define partial autonomy as any setting where an organization ex-
ercises limited self-rule, but its ability to carry out certain functions of governance are
restricted. In chapters 3 and 4, nationalist movement autonomy becomes the dependent
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variable. Through a small-N qualitative comparison and a large-N descriptive analysis, I
find support for the proposition that an incumbent state’s goals in a contested region play
a significant role in shaping how much autonomous self-rule the competing nationalist
movement will obtain.
The quest for self-determination or independent statehood is perhaps more daunt-
ing than it was in the past. Still, Palestinian nationalists are not alone in attempting to
build a state in the midst of ongoing conflict. Although varying in their structure and
tactics, many contemporary nationalist struggles have been inspired by the overarching
aim to form a new state. Whether or not independent statehood is a "right" of national
communities, it is critical to understand how institutional legacies from conflict and oc-
cupation influence the capacity of aspiring states. These organizations, even if they have
not attained juridical sovereignty, still perform the functions of governance – such as the
exchange of goods or protection for revenue – that are so universal they are seemingly
mundane. Yet, in contested territories, it is not an exaggeration to state that the quotidian
transactions between civilians, states, and rebels may be matters of life and death.
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CHAPTER III
Imagining Another Path: A Qualitative Comparison of
Palestine and Timor-Leste
3.1 Introduction
The creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in 1994 was a turning point in the con-
flict over statehood in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. At the time, it was celebrated as an
historic achievement by Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini, or the Palestinian National
Liberation Movement (Fatah), the largest faction of the Palestinian Liberation Organiza-
tion (PLO), and its allies. However, the Oslo Accords – the set of agreements signed
between Israel and the PLO which established the PA – preceded a series of troubling
developments, including the fragmentation of the Palestinian national movement, the
continuation of violent attacks by Palestinian factions against Israeli targets, the failure
to reign in the growth of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, and, ultimately,
the breakdown of the peace process, culminating in the Second Intifada. There has been
much, relatively data-free, speculation about what direction the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict would have taken had the semi-autonomous PA never been created. Yet the preced-
ing chapter identified one legacy that appears to have resulted directly from the estab-
lishment of the PA. One of the basic, functional capacities associated with states – the
ability to raise revenue – has developed unevenly across the West Bank. Revenue growth
has been particularly strong in areas where opposition to the ruling party, and arguably
to the PA itself, is strongest. These findings suggest reconsidering a fairly robust finding
in the existing state-building literature that the state’s control over the means of violence
and its ability to extract revenue should grow, and shrink, together. Further, it suggests
that our analysis of governance and institutions in conflict zones would benefit from an
understanding of state capacity which disaggregates the various functions of the state, or
would-be state, and examines the complex and conditional relationships between them.
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There are many ways in which the specific features of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
condition the relationships that develop between Palestinian residents and their govern-
ment. The previous chapter suggested, but did not test, the proposition that constraints
on the PA’s autonomy – most importantly, the constraints that required its coercive in-
stitutions to be inward-facing – distorted the association between coercive and fiscal ca-
pacity development in the West Bank. This chapter and the one that follows it will, in
stages, abstract away from the Palestinian case in order to develop more general proposi-
tions about what generates these types of constraints on institutions in the first place. In
the current chapter, the level of analysis shifts from subnational units within a contested
territory to a comparison across two such territories. I propose that Israel’s overarching
goals in the West Bank were particularly important in generating partially autonomous
Palestinian institutions. The purpose of this chapter is to use qualitative comparison to
assess how things could have gone differently. Using counterfactual analysis, I compare
the West Bank to a case that shares many similarities with it despite being located over
6,000 miles away: Timor-Leste, another small nation that was occupied by the military
of a larger, neighboring state – in this case, Indonesia – and which featured an organized
national resistance movement seeking independence. The primary method employed is
process tracing, whereby I rely on primary and secondary sources to interrogate the claim
that the goals of the incumbent state in a contested region shape the amount of self-governing
autonomy that a competing nationalist movement can obtain. My analysis reveals that In-
donesia, unlike Israel, expended effort toward the comprehensive annexation of both the
territory of East Timor – now known as the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste – and
its population. I find support for the theory that the different goals adopted by Israel
and Indonesia produced different strategies of control, resulting in variation across the
two cases in the amount of autonomy that the national movement was able to achieve.
While Palestinian nationalists assumed control over institutions that were restricted in
their de jure and de facto autonomy from Israel, the Timorese national movement, by con-
trast, moved from virtually no governing autonomy during the Indonesian occupation to,
eventually, full independence.
In many ways, the constraints on Palestinian state autonomy in the West Bank are
unique, and one struggles to find an example of a similar case in which the geographic
and functional reach of governing institutions has been restricted in such a formal way
within the territory and amongst the population that the aspiring state claims as its own.
However, this should not prevent us from determining what insights from the Israeli-
Palestinian context may be applicable to other settings, as long as operative conditions
in the West Bank are carefully translated into more general concepts. Despite promi-
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nent geographic and cultural differences, I elaborate below on why a joint analysis of the
cases of Palestine and Timor-Leste is fruitful in the tradition of a "most similar systems"
design. Inevitably, sources of variation across the two cases exist which could represent
confounding or omitted variables, preventing us from reaching definitive, causal con-
clusions. However, a close read of the Israeli-Palestinian and the Indonesian-Timorese
conflicts increases our confidence in the proposition that a causal relationship exists be-
tween incumbent state goals and autonomy outcomes for those movements aspiring to-
ward statehood.
As a preview, chapter 4 will integrate these observations into a generalizable frame-
work, defining and coding variables related to incumbent state annexation strategies and
national movement autonomy for a larger sample of settings of contested statehood. In
chapter 4, we observe that incumbent state goals are indeed correlated with the amount
of autonomy gained by the national movement contesting their rule in a wider set of
cases, lending further plausibility to the causal argument made with respect to Palestine
and Timor-Leste. Subsequently, in chapter 5, I will return to Timor-Leste to ask how tax
morale – the micro-level foundation of state fiscal capacity – varies across individuals
and regions. I find that support for taxation and expectations of government are lowest
in a region where the Timorese state has struggled to exercise a monopoly on violence.
This suggests that coercive and fiscal capacity development may exhibit an unconditional,
positive correlation in the Timorese case, unlike in the West Bank. However, necessary
adaptations to the research design and hypotheses tested in Timor-Leste require that com-
parisons to the Palestinian case be treated as suggestive rather than confirmatory.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. While chapter 2 provided readers with a
somewhat detailed historical overview of governance in the West Bank and the conflict,
section 3.2 in this chapter draws on a variety of sources to make the analytic argument
that Israel’s overarching goal of controlling, or annexing, the territory of the West Bank
without incorporating its existing population helps to explain the creation of a Palestinian
authority with functional restrictions on its ability to govern. Most notably, these restric-
tions included a constraint on the deployment of coercion which stipulated it must be
directed against internal, rather than external, threats. In section 3.3, I provide justifi-
cation for the selection of my comparative case: Timor-Leste. Section 3.4 engages in an
in-depth analysis of the Timorese resistance to Indonesian rule from 1975 through 1999
and the transition to independence. In this case, the incumbent state, while also conduct-
ing a brutal campaign of violence, initially sought full annexation of both the territory
and the population of East Timor, resulting in virtually no autonomy for the national
movement resisting their rule. This was followed by a sudden change, whereby Indone-
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sia agreed to a referendum that resulted in Timor-Leste’s full independence. Section 3.5
considers some possible alternative explanations for the different levels of autonomy ob-
tained by the nationalist movement in these two cases, including the role of: incumbent
state regime type, pre-existing governance structures, the existence of other separatist
threats to the incumbent state, and factors related to urbanization and terrain. Finally,
section 3.6 concludes by segueing into the broader framework that follows in the next
chapter, which aims to evaluate the proposition developed here on a wider set of cases.
3.2 The West Bank
The PA that was formally inaugurated in the summer of 1994 represented a new cen-
tral government structure through which Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip
could practice limited self-rule. In this section, I jointly consider two questions: Why
did Palestinians gain any degree of autonomy over governance at all? Further, given that
some autonomy was gained, why was it partial and restricted?
Following the signing in May 1994 of one of the successor agreements to the Decla-
ration on Principles ("Oslo I"), the PA established initial operations in Gaza City and in
Jericho in the West Bank. In August, an additional agreement called the "Preparatory
Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities in the West Bank" was signed between Israel and
the PLO. This agreement stipulated some of the preliminary functions for which the
newly created PA would assume responsibility, namely: education and culture, health,
social welfare, tourism, and direct taxation (Aruri 1995; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs
1994). Notably, no authority over security and policing was granted to the PA in this
earlier agreement (Aruri 1995). Thereafter, a subsequent round of negotiations produced
the long and detailed Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, informally
known as "Oslo II".
While Oslo II further detailed the PA’s control over many facets of civil governance,
it contained both functional and geographic restrictions on the PA’s use of force. Func-
tionally, defense against external threats and defense of borders was the sole prerogative
of Israel; the PA was barred from developing an army, navy, or any externally-facing co-
ercive institutions. Geographic restrictions, covered in detail in the previous chapter,
limited the stationing and deployment of Palestinian police and security forces. The pre-
vious chapter suggested that functional constraints on the PA’s autonomy – constraints
which limited their coercive institutions to providing internal policing rather than ex-
ternal defense – introduced incentives for coercion to be directed toward repression of
rivals rather than protection. Repression, in turn, was found to be a possible mechanism
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explaining the conditional relationship between coercive and fiscal capacity development
that was observed in Palestinian municipalities.
For the purposes of this chapter and the one that follows, the above-mentioned con-
straints introduced by the Oslo Accords are used to motivate a conceptual definition of
partial autonomy, or a setting where a nationalist movement is able to engage in limited self-
rule that is functionally restricted. This section adopts the approach of qualitative process
tracing, supported by quantitative data where possible, to argue that Israel’s goals in the
West Bank between 1967 and 1994 were what drove the creation of governing institu-
tions with partial, functional autonomy from Israel. Namely, the commitment to avoid
annexation of the Palestinian population led Israel to outsource civilian governance to
the Palestinians while still maintaining the capability to deter violent threats. This strat-
egy became manifest in the devolution of most of the distributive and regulatory facets of
civilian governance to the PA, whose authority in these spheres was uniformly recognized
across areas of the West Bank with significant Palestinian populations, combined with de
jure restrictions in the PA’s ability to wield coercive force.
3.2.1 Israel’s Goals in the West Bank
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, roughly 600,000 Palestinian residents of the
West Bank soon found themselves under Israeli rule following the latter’s victory in the
1967 ("Six-Day") war. It has been well documented by Tessler (2009), Gorenberg (2006),
and others that Israel’s top military and intelligence establishment did not expect to go
to war in June 1967. After intelligence reports about Egypt amassing troops in the Sinai
and escalating tensions with Syria in the north, Israel struck first on June 5, targeting
Egyptian airfields and pushing ground troops into Gaza, Sinai, and East Jerusalem and
the West Bank (Tessler 2009, 397). At the conclusion of the swift conflict, thousands of
lives had been lost on both sides, and the state of Israel was in possession of significantly
more territory than before.
Israel adopted somewhat different approaches to control and governance in each of
its newly acquired territories. In part, this was due to differences in the territories them-
selves and the nature of their populations; however, the varied strategies used are also
suggestive of the different historical, religious, and strategic attachments that Israel and
the Israeli population had to each place. East Jerusalem was fully claimed by the Is-
raeli state. In 1980, Israel formalized its annexation of East Jerusalem in the Israeli Basic
Law, a move that was not recognized by most of the international community. The sta-
tus of Jerusalem invokes passionate arguments on all sides – for Israel, at the time, the
"reunification" of Jerusalem had enormous cultural and religious significance, since the
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eastern half of the city contained some of Judaism’s holiest sites on the Temple Mount
(referred to in Arabic as Haram ash-Sharif ). In the wake of the war, Tessler (2009, 411)
notes that Israelis across the political spectrum were in "agreement that the city would
remain united under Israeli rule, with the entire city serving as the capital of the Jewish
state." He also describes Israel’s "deliberate effort to divide East Jerusalem from the rest
of the West Bank, of which it had been an integral part prior to the June [1967] War,"
including the creation of new municipal boundaries that encapsulated the city into Is-
rael’s jurisdiction and the construction of "Jewish neighborhoods in former Arab areas"
to create both a symbolic and physical barrier between the city and the rest of the West
Bank (466). An Islamic waqf, established and funded by the Jordanian king, continues
to control and maintain the Musim holy sites on Haram ash-Sharif, including the al-Aqsa
mosque and the gold-plated Dome of the Rock. The status of Jerusalem, a city considered
holy by all three monotheistic religions, continues to be one of the most hotly contested
issues in the ongoing conflict. However, there was, and continues to be, little ambigu-
ity in Israeli society, or among Israeli political leaders, about the city’s status as Israel’s
capital.
The Golan plateau promised primarily strategic, rather than symbolic, value to Israel,
due to its elevation (Harris 1978). Further, much of the area’s population left or fled
during the 1967 war. Unlike the West Bank and Gaza, the first census after the war
showed "total desertion of all parts of the Golan with the exception of the Druze villages,"
(Harris 1978). This paved the way for Israel’s de facto annexation of the Golan, cemented
in Israeli law in 1981 but not internationally recognized. As for the Sinai Peninsula, it
also presented high strategic value however, as mentioned, it was returned to Egypt as
part of a later peace deal.
The position of Israeli society on what should be done with the West Bank and Gaza
Strip was not as uniform and, thus, far more complex. The West Bank, in particular, com-
bined symbolic and strategic value with demographic challenges. The policies adopted
by Israel from 1967 until the time the PA was created varied depending on factors such
as the ideological preferences of the ruling coalition, levels of violence, and economic
conditions in Israel and the territories. The period under analysis can be usefully divided
into three segments, each of which is defined by key events that shaped Israel’s strategy,
in particular: 1967 to 1977; 1977 to 1987; and 1987 to 1994. Each of these periods is
discussed below.
Attributing a single goal, or set of goals, to an entire state apparatus comprised of
many individuals and political currents is inherently reductive. Yet, it is still possible to
define a minimal set of criteria that captures the range of Israeli goals during the period
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leading up to the Oslo Accords. At a minimum, I argue, Israel’s leaders were focused on
maintaining control of much of the territory of the West Bank. In addition, the option of
fully incorporating the Palestinian population of the West Bank into the Israeli state – e.g.
by offering them citizenship – was never seriously considered. Subsequently, this outlook
informed Israel’s policy toward negotiations with the Palestinians, eventually producing
the PA with its restricted, or partial, form of autonomy.
There are two relevant criticisms of this argument one could make. The first is that I
have inaccurately characterized Israel’s goals, and, in fact, either (a) Israel was prepared
to concede most or all of the West Bank’s territory if the safety and sovereignty of Israel,
within the borders of the state that had existed since 1949, could be guaranteed; or (b)
Israel was prepared to annex the West Bank inclusive of the Palestinian population that
lived there. Below, I engage with each of these plausible alternative characterizations of
Israel’s goals. The second criticism is that a factor other than Israel’s goals was more im-
portant in producing the partially autonomous PA institutions. Some of these alternative
hypotheses are discussed in section 3.5.
1967-1977
For the first decade of occupation, the left-leaning Labor party (the Mapai party until
1968) and its subsequent Alignment coalition, headed the Israeli government. As men-
tioned in chapter 2, while the war itself and Israel’s swift victory were a surprise, the
earliest Israeli settlements in the West Bank began almost immediately after the cease-
fire was signed. Although advanced by the left-wing government, the establishment of
new West Bank settlements drew on an influential strategy known as the "Allon Plan",
authored by Labor leader and erstwhile territorial maximalist (Gorenberg 2006) Yigal
Allon, by which Israel would establish a "permanent defensive perimeter" in the Jordan
Valley, while areas heavily populated by Palestinians would eventually be given to Jor-
dan as part of a final peace deal, (Tessler 2009, 466-468). In addition, some politically
and religiously motivated settlements began springing up around the West Bank (Tessler
2009, 466-7). During this period, right-wing currents within Israeli society sought a more
direct and unconditional absorption of the West Bank, in particular, into the state of Is-
rael. Gorenberg (2006) depicts how the reunification of Jerusalem, but also the opening
up of areas such as Hebron and Nablus in the West Bank – historic towns which had been
cut off to Israelis since the end of the War of Independence – had symbolic, religious,
and cultural significance to irredentist segments of the religious Zionist wing. Thus, at
times, this meant that the political leadership under the Alignment coalition was in con-
flict with influential segments of its own population. For example, Tessler (2009)[467]
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describes the government’s initial hesitancy in approving the early religious-Zionist set-
tlement of Kiryat Arba in the West Bank city of Hebron. Bottom-up demands to settle –
and therefore effectively annex – the West Bank were not consistent with the approach of
the Labor-led government. The left-leaning government pursued an approach that saw
eventual territorial compromise and the creation of an Arab, or Palestinian, state in parts
of the West Bank.
Official government positions from 1967 until 1977, therefore, leave room to consider
the first rival interpretation of Israel’s goals in the West Bank. At least during this initial
decade of occupation, it appeared that Israel would consider conceding most or all of the
West Bank’s territory if the safety and sovereignty of Israel could be guaranteed, within
the pre-1967 borders or some slightly modified version of them. However, even in 1969,
(Tessler 2009, 467-8) notes the important caveat that the winning Labor Alignment coali-
tion "did declare that it would not accept a complete return to the armistice lines used
before the June War; asserting that changes were dictated by security considerations, it
called for a negotiated peace settlement based on limited though not inconsequential
modifications of the pre-1967 boundaries." Most likely, these modifications were to in-
clude some parts of the Jordan Valley that had already been settled.
Another important consideration is that the day-to-day policies of administering the
occupied territories and maintaining some sense of order advanced on the ground re-
gardless of the government’s position that compromise with the Palestinians would be
the eventual outcome. Thus, another way to assess the priorities of the Israeli govern-
ment – perhaps, most especially, its military apparatus – in those months following their
1967 victory is to revisit the first administrative and legal policies put into place in the
newly occupied territories. Early governance decisions related to the territory were ac-
complished through military decree. As Shahwan (2003) describes: "The process of re-
structuring the administrative system started in the very early days of the occupation
with the issuance of a series of military orders to this effect. Orders No. 1 and 3 issued
on June 7, 1967 transferred the legal and administrative powers vested in the Jordanian
Government in the West Bank to the Israeli military governor," (45-6). Early orders were
also issued during the first year of occupation pertaining to the judicial system, tax col-
lection, control over water and electricity, and the establishment of the Israeli Shekel as
the operative currency. Many of these military orders involved transferring authorities
that previously fell to local leaders under Jordanian and Egyptian rule (in the West Bank
and Gaza, respectively) to the Israeli military governor. Importantly, the military gover-
nor’s authority fell within the chain of command of the Israeli Ministry of Defense, and
thus governance decisions were not made in consultation with Palestinians.
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Pearlman (2011) summarizes military rule during this time:
"...Israel upheld military rule through a combination of carrots and sticks. It
denied Palestinians the rights of citizens but allowed them to work and travel
in Israel. It co-opted traditional elites and new collaborators and prohibited
nationalist expression. The army, and after 1981 the Civil Administration that
it established to administer the territories, governed Palestinian life through
some twelve hundred military orders that served as law under occupation.
Israel punished political activism with such measures as house demolitions,
imprisonment, curfew, travel restrictions, and ’administrative detention’ with-
out charge or trial. From 1967 to 1978, it deported more than one thousand
Palestinians [citing (Khouri 1978; Lesch 1979)," (95-6).
While a comprehensive analysis of the content of all 1,200 military orders is beyond the
scope of this project, many of the military orders pertaining to taxation were collected
and translated from Arabic to English with the help of a Palestinian research assistant.1
In the early years, for example, Military Order No. 113 (1967) transferred the authori-
ties related to "public monies" to the area military commander. Appeals to income tax
payment were consolidated under a special appeals committee with members appointed
by the Israeli military governor according to Military Order No. 406-A (1970). An initial
reading of a number of the early military orders indicates that many of the distributive
functions of government were left to the still intact Palestinian municipal councils, while
many of the regulatory and coercive aspects of state authority were consolidated in the Is-
raeli military and civil administrations. This suggests that the state’s primary goals were
to maintain control of territory – initially in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip – and
counter potential threats to the Israeli population there.
1977-1987
1977 saw the right-wing Likud coalition come to power for the first time. At this time,
settlement of the West Bank became a more explicit, state-directed strategy to increase
Jewish Israeli claims on the territory. Earlier, as leader of the far-right Herut party, Men-
achem Begin frequently referenced Biblical claims to the West Bank and Gaza. These
were combined with efforts which, according to a sympathetic scholar:
"sought to deepen the legitimacy of the status quo post bellum...[relying] upon
legal opinions that distinguished between the legal status of the Sinai Penin-
1All orders were originally published in both Hebrew and Arabic. They are available online via the
al-Muqtafi searchable database, hosted by Birzeit University (Birzeit University Institute of Law 1995).
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sula and the Golan Heights, and that of the West Bank (Judea, Samaria) and
the Gaza Strip: the former were conquered from states whose sovereignty
over them was unquestionable; the latter were taken from conquerors whose
sovereignty over them was never recognized," (Naor 2015, 467).
Indeed, in the immediate aftermath of the June War, Begin had been among those in the
Israeli cabinet who voted in favor of an offer to Egypt and Syria to return to pre-war
borders in the Sinai Peninsula and Golan Heights respectively, "indicating that his map
of the homeland did not include the Sinai or Syrian land," (Gorenberg 2006). On this
point, scholars associated with each side of the political spectrum seem to agree – the
West Bank, in particular, held special meaning for Likud leaders and their supporters. In
a December 1977 speech to the Knesset, riding high on his new electoral mandate, Prime
Minister Begin stated pointedly:
‘"We do not even dream of the possibility – if we are given the chance to with-
draw our military forces from Judea, Samaria [the Biblical name for the West
Bank] and Gaza – of abandoning these areas to the control of the murderous
organization that is called the PLO...We have a right and a demand for [Israeli]
sovereignty over these areas of Eretz Yisrael [The Biblical "Land of Israel"].
This is our land and it belongs to the Jewish nation rightfully," as quoted in
Tessler (2009, 506), citing a December 28 speech reprinted in Laqueur and
Rubin (1984).
It is critical to note that the leaders on Israel’s right were keenly aware that the grow-
ing Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip presented a demographic
threat to Israel’s self-stated Jewish identity. Thus, while it is possible that those at either
end of the political spectrum would disagree with this characterization, Likud and its
allies on the right were often distinguished from Labor and its allies on the left simply by
the method and extent to which the Jewish Israeli population in the Territories would be
separated from the Palestinian population. In other words, both sought separation, even
if the right-wing leaders were less likely to support any form of statehood, or complete
transfer of authority, to the Palestinians. Lustick (1993) elaborates on the ways in which
Likud’s efforts to normalize Israeli absorption of the territories generated modes of de
facto separation and exclusion of Palestinians, including referring to non-Jewish residents
of the territories "who in fact comprised overwhelming majorities of their populations, as
‘the minorities’" (359) and setting up separate municipal court systems for Jewish settlers
"making it unnecessary for Israeli citizens to appear before local Arab courts enforcing
the military government’s interpretation of [in the case of the West Bank] Jordanian law,"
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(360). Further, in 1978, Begin proposed his own plan for "autonomy" for the Palestinians;
notably, it was based on a more personalized and individualized conception of self-rule
which did not involve specific territorial concessions (Tessler 2009, 528).
While the Israeli-Jewish population in West Bank settlements grew steadily, there are
two other features of Israel’s relationship to the Palestinian populations in the West Bank
and Gaza during this period that are worthy of note. First, in 1981, Israel set up the Israeli
Civil Administration (CIVAD), a special apparatus that, while still under the portfolio of
the Ministry of Defense, would be in charge of issues related to civil governance in the
Territories. The subsection below will go into more detail about Israel’s bureaucratic
investments in the Territories and what this reveals about its priorities. Second, it is
worth noting that, while the political incorporation of Palestinians living in the West Bank
and Gaza into the state of Israel was never offered, they were able to achieve a certain
degree of economic incorporation through working in Israel. At the end of the June War,
Israeli labor markets became available to workers in the West Bank and Gaza for the first
time, and those at the lower end of the income distribution and low-skilled workers were
the primary beneficiaries.2 In 1991, nearly one-third of gross national product (GNP)
in the West Bank and Gaza was estimated to be derived from Palestinians working in
Israel (Institute for Social and Economic Policy in the Middle East 1993, 24). As the
next chapter formulates generalized conceptions of exclusion and inclusion based on the
Israeli-Palestinian case, this is an important criteria to keep in mind – while economic
incorporation of Palestinians in the occupied territories was sporadic and dependent on
the political situation, their political incorporation was never seriously considered.
1987-1994
1987 marked the beginning of the First Intifada in the Palestinian Territories. While
the opening of Israeli labor markets to young, formerly low-income groups had brought
economic growth to the territories (Migdal 1980, 54-77), skilled Palestinians found it
harder to get jobs, investments in infrastructure stalled, and the share of output com-
prised by industry shrank. The territories were dependent on the Israeli economy and
other regional states for imports. Furthermore, the political realities of occupation were
becoming tiresome. Thus, a grass-root resistance emerged, and Israel responded with
force. This period saw a substantial increase in Israeli repressive tactics in response to
2Migdal (1980) provides an illuminating description of how increased living standards and economic
opportunities for this population actually ended up undermining the authority of some of the older, more
conservative local leaders in the West Bank that Israel, like Jordan before it, had been intent on propping
up.
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Palestinian protest. Significantly, the Intifada demonstrated the costliness of continued
occupation to Israel, and was one of the major factors that drew them to the pursue back
channel negotiations with the PLO, leading to the Oslo Accords in the early 1990s.
Hypothetically, one could imagine things simply reverting to the status quo after the
Intifada without any major changes to the sovereignty or administration of the territo-
ries. As an observer, then, we are in a position to ask why Israel chose to move ahead
with negotiations that were premised on the idea of recognizing the PLO and permit-
ting Palestinians some degree of self-governance. One possible driver was the change in
government in Israel – with a left-wing coalition coming into power in 1992. However,
it is critical to note that the Madrid process – a public, multilateral negotiating process
between Israel, Arab countries, and Palestinian groups – began in 1991 under the right-
wing Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir. So, in fact, Israel initially went to the negotiating
table under Likud’s leadership. I suggest that the costs of continued, unmediated, and
direct occupation was a major factor in pushing Israel to accept some degree of governing
autonomy for the Palestinians. These costs included both economic costs – which waxed
and waned and are discussed in some more detail below – but also political and reputa-
tional costs both at home and abroad. Had Israel’s aim been comprehensive annexation of
the territories and their populations, then the eventual benefits of occupation may have
outweighed these costs. However, the set of goals that emerged after the surprise war,
and victory, of 1967 were focused on, first, maintaining the security of Israel and its pop-
ulation, and second, absorbing as much of the territory of the West Bank, in particular,
into the Israeli state as possible while not politically incorporating population.
What, then, constitutes a minimal definition of Israel’s goals during the period in
which it has controlled the West Bank? In summary: From 1967 on, Israeli political
leaders were, at various times, either not able or not willing to fully relinquish control
of these territories to a Palestinian or Arab authority. It was broadly acknowledged that
there was a basic need, if not desire, to maintain control over the West Bank for the short
term while other possibilities for the future were debated. While Likud and the religious
Zionist parties were more hawkish in seeking to normalize Israel’s annexation of the West
Bank, even the left-wing Labor government that was in power from 1967 to 1977 saw the
territory as high in strategic value and held that its transferral to a Palestinian or Arab
authority (including, possibly, Jordan) must be contingent on a reduction in Palestinian
violence. Thus, it is possible to speak of a kind of consensus over maintaining Israeli
control of the West Bank, at least in the short term. Yet, what did this mean for Israel’s
relationship vis-a-vis the Palestinian population there? Two plausible options emerged, in
keeping with the more dovish and hawkish views, respectively: first, handing over parts
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of the territory to Jordan or a Palestinian entity if such concessions were done in exchange
for peaceful relations ("land for peace"), and second, not relinquishing the territory, but
instead maintaining and increasing Israeli control over it. To some extent, this is an
overly simplistic depiction, as there were segments of the left, especially in the early and
euphoric years after 1967, that were also territorial maximalists (Gorenberg 2006). Yet
the more hawkish viewpoint was almost universally adopted by those on the right.
Annexing the territory inclusive of the Palestinian population living there into the
Israeli state was never considered as a serious option. The main reason for this is that
incorporating the Palestinian population in the West Bank and Gaza would have shifted
the demographic makeup of the state of Israel considerably, eventually projecting a future
state of Israel that contained more Arab residents, who were Muslim and Christian, than
Jewish Israelis. This was seen as antithetical to the broader Zionist project of establishing
a homeland, and state, for the Jewish people. The evidence reviewed above implies that
Israeli political leaders from across the spectrum sought some form of separation of the
population – a division of Jewish Israelis from the area’s Arab residents. For the doves,
that separation took the form of a preference for two, separate political entities: the state
of Israel and an at least partially autonomous Palestinian- or Jordanian-governed state.
For the hawkish segments of Israeli leadership, it meant separate forms of governance
and state presence for the two populations: in essence, democracy for one and occupation
for the other. This desire for separation by either method aligns with the argument that
Israel was not ready to concede territory, however it was also not ready to extend its
state structures in their existing form into the territories and populations over which it
gained control. Nearly all segments of the Israeli political spectrum were united in their
desire to avoid incorporating the Palestinian population of the West Bank into the Israeli
state. This minimal definition of the Israeli state’s goals vis-a-vis the territory sufficiently
captures the spectrum of positions adopted by governments led by Labor, Likud, and the
unity coalition governments from 1967 to 1994. This was one in which absorption of the
territory, not its population, was paramount.
3.2.2 Israel’s Goals through the Lens of Bureaucratic Development
Because of Israel’s goals described above, its deployment of bureaucratic infrastruc-
ture across the territory was limited and strategic. Israel did not seek to develop relation-
ships of exchange with the Palestinian population, wherein the state provides goods and
services and the population provides either fiscal or political support. The distributive
bureaucracy of the Israeli state apparatus – which, after 1981, took the form of the CIVAD
– was limited. As of 1993, on the eve of the Oslo Accords, CIVAD in the West Bank and
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Gaza Strip employed approximately 22,000 people. Roughly 95 percent of them were
Palestinian, while most senior-level positions were held by Israelis (World Bank 1993a,
7). With a conservative estimate placing the West Bank and Gaza population at about 1.8
million at the time, this amounted to 83 Palestinian residents per civil servant.3 Table
3.1 shows comparable statistics on the number of Israeli citizens per civil servant within
Israel proper. Including both ministry employees and the police force, but excluding the
military, there were approximately 68 Israeli citizens per civil servant in 1993 – or over 20
percent fewer than in the West Bank and Gaza. Further, the fact that CIVAD’s staff was so
overwhelmingly Palestinian lends further support to the suggestion that Israel preferred
to accomplish its objectives in the Territories through a more indirect, or outsourced, style
of governance.
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
Ministry employees 52,460 53,549 53,914 55,278 56,183
Police 21,993 22,491 24,072 24,591 26,637
Total 74,453 76,040 77,986 79,869 82,820
Population 5,058,800 5,195,900 5,327,600 5,471,500 5,619,000
Citizen-civil servant ratio 67.9 68.3 68.3 68.5 67.8
Table 3.1:
Israeli Government Employees from 1991 to 1996 (Israel Central Bureau of
Statistics 1996)
Outcomes of these administrative and bureaucratic gaps were apparent to the World
Bank when authoring its report on development for the interim period before Palestinian
self-rule. At the time of writing in 1993, they note: "Many public services are in disarray:
municipalities are starved of cash; power outages are frequent; [and] public water sup-
ply is below WHO [World Health Organization] quality standards," *(World Bank 1993b,
16). The report also notes: "[p]ublic investment at 3 percent of GDP is remarkably low,
and especially so in the context of an overall investment rate of 30-odd percent of GDP,"
(World Bank 1993b, 23). Public investment reflects, among other things, the time hori-
zons and intentions of political leaders. Because Israel’s leaders did not intend permanent
incorporation of the Palestinian West Bank population into Israel, it is no surprise that
investment in infrastructure and other growth-enabling public goods were minimal.
The most detailed information on the economic costs of the occupation comes from
Benvenisti (1986). He notes: "In the mid-1970’s net transfers to the West Bank (by the
Israeli government) were negative, i.e. the territories contributed to Israeli public expen-
3According to the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics, the population of the West Bank and Gaza in 1993
was 1,832,800, which does not include Jewish settlers.
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diture. In the late 1970’s the burden came to $10-15 million a year. In the early 1980’s the
burden steadily decreased, and by 1983-84 was negative," (18). Israel financed the occu-
pation through a combination of income taxes collected on Palestinians working in Israel
and indirect taxes on goods produced in Israel or imported goods that were destined for
the West Bank and Gaza (Benvenisti 1986). Deducting the subsidies Israel placed on cer-
tain Israeli goods consumed in the West Bank, Benvenisti (1986) estimates that the Israeli
Treasury gained at least $40-50 million per year, on average, over the course of the oc-
cupation. However, as noted, Israel spent more than it gained during certain periods.
Further, it is worth noting that Benvenisti (1986) does not contain data on the two years
leading up to the First Intifada.
In conclusion, despite a pervasive military presence, Israel did not exhibit a sustained
intent to govern the Palestinian population or incorporate them into the Israeli state. This
is reflected, at a most basic level, in Israel’s failure to annex the territory. This meant
that incentives to provide infrastructure or basic services to the population were low. It
was deemed preferable to outsource these mundane, but costly, tasks of governance to
the local population. Thus, a careful reading of Israel’s history of involvement in the
West Bank since 1967 shows that signs of partial autonomy were beginning to emerge in
Israel’s strategies before the Oslo Accords. The formalization of this system of control
was embodied in the Oslo Accords and the creation of the PA. The details of this partial
autonomy were discussed extensively in the previous chapter.
3.3 Comparative Case Selection
Is there any reason to believe the relationship between an incumbent state’s goals, in
a setting of contested statehood, and the amount of autonomy won by a national move-
ment during conflict may be generalizable? The analysis that follows draws on the "most
similar" systems design – the foundation of the so-called comparative method – to se-
lect Palestine and Timor-Leste from the set of possible cases where we might observe the
proposed relationship between an incumbent state’s goals in a contested region and a
competing national movement’s achievement of autonomy.
Most similar systems design leverages the same research design principles as statis-
tical matching does in studies where this procedure is followed by regression analysis
(Nielsen 2016). Given a causal relationship of interest between explanatory variable X
and outcome variable Y , cases are selected that are similar on most other dimensions
other than their value of X. Then, the theory is tested by observing whether temporally
prior changes in X are associated with subsequent changes in Y . Other factors that are
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similar across the two cases can be ruled out as "causes" of Y , thus, if a relationship is ob-
served, we can increase our confidence that the changes in Y are a result of the changes in
X. As Nielsen (2016) describes, only those variables that are believed to be potential con-
founders in the causal story being tested should be used in the matching of most similar
units, since matching on too many variables will increase the distance between units. For
small-N most similar systems comparisons this is reassuring advice, since the number of
variables one will practically be able to "match" on in the selection of cases is limited.
Variable West Bank Timor-Leste
Time Period 1967-Present 1975-1999
Estimated population 598,637 (1967) 646,155 (1973)
Land area 2,178 mi2 5,743 mi2
Pop/square mile 275 113
Military occupation Yes Yes
Incumbent regime type Democracy Autocracy
Other secessionist challenges No Yes
Table 3.2: Comparing Palestinian and Timorese Cases of Contested Statehood
Source for Palestinian population estimate from Table 1 in Perlmann (2012). Timorese population estimate from Hull (2000), who
cites Ranck (1977, 62), reprinted by Kevin Sherlock in 1981. Land area estimates from the CIA World Factbook.
A number of similarities stand out across these cases which could have otherwise in-
fluenced autonomy, as an outcome, or the relationship between incumbent state goals and
autonomy (see Table 3.2). First, the Palestinian and Timorese national movements began
in the same decade from the mid 1960s to the mid 1970s, a time when most, but not all,
of southeast Asia and sub-Saharan Africa had been decolonized and a new set of self-
determination and liberation movements was emerging. This generation of movements,
like some anti-colonial struggles that preceded them, drew on the influential philoso-
phies of Frantz Fanon, Che Guevara, and Mao Tse-tung. However, they often were chal-
lenging incumbent states whose ruling parties had, themselves, achieved independence
following colonialism. Thus, self-determination movements beginning in the 1960s and
later did not benefit as much from a global environment of sweeping decolonization.
International norms of self-determination had, of course, been recognized, but whether
and how these norms would apply to these "second generation" self-determination move-
ments was far from clear. The PLO was founded in 1964, but it began its active campaign
of violent attacks against Israel after the 1967 war. Its initial stated goal was the "lib-
eration" of Palestine, including the lands that were officially part of the state of Israel,
however it moderated both its territorial ambitions and its tactics over time. Frente Rev-
olucionária de Timor-Leste Independente, or the Revolutionary Front for an Independent
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East Timor (FRETILIN) was founded in 1974 and became the main front for challenging
the Indonesian occupation after 1975.
Second, the size of the contested territory – and thus the proposed state – was small in
the case of both Palestine and East Timor, although, as can be seen in Table 3.2, the West
Bank was much more densely populated than East Timor at the beginning of occupation,
with more than twice as many estimated residents per square mile. This is reflected in
the West Bank’s more urban and peri-urban nature, whereas most of East Timor outside
of the city of Dili had, and has, a very rural feel. Population density, or level of urbaniza-
tion, represents a potential confounding variable in the observed relationships between
incumbent state goals and national movement autonomy. I discuss this possibility in
section 3.5 below.
A final similarity is that Israel and Indonesia both acquired the territory through mil-
itary means, thus the initial presence of the incumbent state in the territory was in the
form of military occupation. After this point, each country took a different path, but each
maintained the military as the most senior institution in terms of defining and enforcing
the law. The military’s role in the Palestinian Territories and East Timor should not be
taken as exogenous, or as a "given", in either case. Indeed, the balance of authority be-
tween the military and other political actors is a core part of the outcome to be explained,
namely how the extent of self-governance extended to the national movements in each
case. While the fact that both occupations began as military occupations is something
that is convenient to hold constant across the two cases, the fact that each maintained
the military occupation over time is, in essence, endogenous to the explanation advanced
here.
The main factors that I identify and discuss in section 3.5 as potential confounding or
omitted variables are: the regime type of the incumbent state; the role of pre-existing gov-
ernance structures; the presence of potential other threats to incumbent state sovereignty;
and features related to level of urbanization or terrain.
3.4 Timor-Leste
Indonesia’s approach toward the territory and population of East Timor from 1975
to 1999 was starkly different than the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. Below, I pro-
vide qualitative evidence that the Indonesian government, under then-President Suharto,
built up an extensive military and civil administration in the territory that sought to en-
sure Timorese acquiescence to Indonesian rule. In addition, this strategy ensured state
penetration of the island through the development of infrastructure and the dissemina-
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tion of propaganda. Further, although some settlers did migrate from other parts of the
archipelago into East Timor, the number of settlers and settlement flows were dramati-
cally less than what was observed in the West Bank. Indonesia’s devotion of resources to
not only a repressive military, but also a civil bureaucracy, infrastructure, and informa-
tional propaganda strongly suggests that the goals motivating their actions differed from
the goals of Israel in the West Bank. The evidence, detailed below, supports the asser-
tion that Indonesia sought full annexation of both the land of East Timor and its native
population.
3.4.1 Before Indonesian Rule
Before Indonesia took over the eastern half of the island of Timor, it had been under
the control of Portuguese colonizers since the mid-16th century, following initial settle-
ments by Dominican missionaries and visits by traders extracting and exporting sandal-
wood. Timor-Leste’s four-and-a-half centuries under Portuguese rule are important – not
only for the purposes of understanding the legacies of governance and repression that
this period left in its wake, but also because observing the Portuguese experience may
have influenced Indonesia’s own strategies toward the contested territory after it seized
control in 1975. The early aims of Portuguese merchants and colonizers in East Timor was
the export of cash crops. During the Portuguese occupation of East Timor, the economy
relied primarily on subsistence agriculture and the export of coffee once the sandalwood
supply was tapped (Hill 1978). Shortly after, the western half of the island of Timor fell
into the hands of the Dutch and was administered as part of the Dutch East Indies colony
until Indonesian independence.
Portugal’s goals in the colony were primarily to extract natural resources and export
for trade, but not to politically incorporate Timorese population. Thus, Portugal is unsur-
prisingly described as exercising a form of "indirect rule" in East Timor (Dunn 2003). It
was also ruled to some extent through the Portuguese Viceroy in Goa, rather than directly
from Lisbon (Saldanha 1994, 43). The use of indirect rule also left the colonial power
vulnerable to challenges from traditional chiefs (liurai). Later, it also enabled educated
Timorese to serve in the civil service and military at high levels. Some of the early leaders
pressing for Timorese independence emerged from this educated generation. (They did
not necessarily profess hostility toward a continued relationship with Portugal, but they
did later become a thorn in the side of Indonesia.) This strategy also entailed little effort
to develop the territory. Literacy rates were low and the first secondary school was only
opened in 1952 (Jones 2000, 44-5). Dunn (2003) provides the estimate that "in 1940 there
were only about 1000 children in primary schools in the entire territory," (18).
84
Notably, the most well-known uprising against Portuguese rule – led by Dom Boaven-
tura, a liurai from the southern coast – was reportedly spurred by protest against ex-
cessive taxation. Indeed, taxation was historically coercive when East Timor was under
Portuguese rule, and forced labor was common. Pinto and Jardine (1997) describes how
many who lived as subsistence farmers could not afford the Portuguese imposto, or head
tax. Those who couldn’t pay had to commit to more work for the government. Pinto and
Jardine (1997) relay the memory of one of the co-authors, Constâncio Pinto, who was to
become one of the leaders of the clandestine resistance against Indonesia:
"I know many old people who say that they were tortured in public, especially
during the arolamento, the population census. Arolamento was also the time
for tax collection. During that time the administrator would go from one vil-
lage to the next, registering people’s names as well as punishing people who
had committed some sort of infraction, such as failing to participate in forced
labor," (Pinto & Jardine 1997, 33).
Thus, there is evidence that Lisbon’s main administrative investments in East Timor were
in coercive institutions.
Two major turning points in the mid-twentieth century shaped Portugal’s long-term
considerations for its overseas holding in Southeast Asia. The first was World War II
and the destruction it left on the island in its wake, which Dunn (2003, 22) describes
as making the Portuguese occupation "untenable". The second was the 1974 Carna-
tion Revolution in Portugal that overthrew the Estado Novo. The increasing costliness
of maintaining control of East Timor relative to its strategic value meant that the new
Portuguese administration soon sought ways to free itself from its far-flung maritime
colony. By the time of Portugal’s unceremonious withdrawal in 1975, three major Timo-
rese associations had formed: União Democrática Timorense, or the Timorese Democratic
Union (UDT), a conservative party which initially sought to maintain ties with Portu-
gal; Associação Popular Democratica Timorense, or the Timorese Popular Democratic As-
sociation (APODETI), which favored "‘autonomous integration’ with Indonesia" (Pinto &
Jardine 1997, 14); and Associação Social-Democrata Timorense, or the Social Democratic
Association of Timor (ASDT), which was later to become FRETILIN, the main arm of
the Timorese resistance against Indonesia. When Portugal left their former colony, there
was a brief period of civil unrest between the various factions and FRETILIN emerged
dominant. They exercised a short-lived administration of the colony from September to
December 1975, and even issued a declaration of independence in November (Pinto &
Jardine 1997).
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3.4.2 Indonesian Rule: 1975-1999
In describing Indonesia’s initial views toward East Timor during the waning days of
Portuguese rule, Dunn (2003) recounts how a divide emerged within the senior Indone-
sian leadership over whether the territory should be given the opportunity of indepen-
dence or absorbed into Indonesia. On one hand, Foreign Minister Adam Malik provided
Timorese leader Jose Ramos Horta with written assurance that independence was "‘the
right of every nation’", including East Timor, and that "‘[t]he [Indonesian] government
as well as the people of Indonesia have no intention to increase or expand their terri-
tory, or to occupy territories other than what is stipulated in their constitution’," (Dunn
2003, 91). On the other hand, Malik’s position was "very much at variance with those
of a more influential group of generals who exercised greater influence over President
Suharto" and who "quickly arrived at a consensus that an independent East Timor was
not in Indonesia’s best interests," (Dunn 2003, 92). In the Cold War climate, following
the United States’ withdrawal from Vietnam, President Suharto’s right-wing regime had
growing concerns about an independent Timor falling under communist influence (Dunn
2003, 88-96). What began as a subversive information campaign to promote Timor’s in-
tegration into Indonesia in 1974 developed into military preparations in the fall of 1975
– with the tacit support of Australia, the United States, and other Cold War allies – and,
then, a full-scale military invasion of Dili in the early morning hours of December 7,
1975. Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor was one of the largest military operations in
Indonesian history (CAVR 2013, 209).
While Indonesia secured control of Dili, the capital, and other major cities, they were
unable to quickly "pacify" the rest of the country. With the invasion, FRETILIN fighters
and much of the Timorese population fled for the mountains. Large scale exoduses from
civilian areas such as Baucau, Ainaro, and areas around Liquica meant thousands of Tim-
orese retreated behind FRETILIN lines. Dunn (2003, 253) notes: "Fretilin leaders were
to become concerned at their inability to cope with the basic needs of more than half a
million people, with limited food supplies, few medicines, and without doctors." Because
Indonesia faced greater difficulties in securing the interior and the eastern part of the
country, 1977 saw renewed military advances by Indonesia. "Starve or surrender" tactics
were used to get Timorese down from the mountains and to coerce them into declaring
loyalty to Indonesia. In 1979, humanitarian relief was permitted into the country, and the
scale of some of the devastation from the first four years of occupation became apparent.
Shockingly, it was "estimated that between one-tenth and one-third of the population had
perished because of the war, and more than 200,000 of the remainder were languishing
in resettlement camps," (Dunn 2003, 283).
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Indonesia may have defined its strategy in opposition to what it saw as Portugal’s
failures in maintaining control of the territory through indirect rule and limited develop-
ment. Indeed, Indonesia’s strategy differed dramatically from Portugal’s. While fighting
an armed conflict against the resistance, led by FRETILIN, President Suharto swiftly rat-
ified legislation in 1976 that formally incorporated East Timor as a province of Indonesia
(Saldanha 1994, 101). As stated in CAVR (2013, 363-4):
"The state structure that Indonesia imposed on Timor-Leste was itself heavily
militarised [sic]. This derived from the extensive involvement of the armed
forces in Indonesian politics and the economy during President Soeharto’s
New Order regime...In Timor-Leste, the Indonesian military had an even more
pervasive role than in New Order Indonesia. Angkatan Bersenjata Republik In-
donesia, or the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (ABRI) was directly
involved in establishing the province of Timor-Leste and thereafter dominated
its administration."
This, as might be predicted, produced extremely high levels of repression and violence
across the territory. Even after those first few years, gross human rights violations, the
use of deadly force, and indiscriminate violence were used by Indonesia and its allied
militias over the course of the conflict. Human rights violations and assassinations of
alleged Indonesian collaborators also occurred on the FRETILIN side, but the scale was
incommensurable to the destruction that Indonesia and its allies left in their wake.
Interestingly, in addition to the extensive use of repression, the Indonesian regime
went to great lengths to demonstrate its goals of developing and modernizing Timor-
Leste, the country’s newest province. This was especially the case after 1979, when many
of the FRETILIN guerrilla fighters had come back down from the mountains. At this time,
"the intensity of Fretilin disturbances dwindled drastically and the government started to
consider the resettlement of the population back to their own villages," (Saldanha 1994,
139). While contemporary annexation projects usually do not refer to "civilizing" the lo-
cal population – as referenced in Mamdani (1996)’s description of direct rule – they often
use similar, but more sanitized, language about developing or modernizing the region.
In this vein, Indonesia framed itself as Timor’s best hope for post-colonial development.
Propagandistic media reported that "The most striking activities in East Timor now are
humanitarian developments. Whether physical infrastructure or mental (and spiritual)
developments–their objective is to lift East Timorese’s human dignity who are just freed
from colonization for almost five centuries."(Unknown n.d.-b). When describing Indone-
sia’s approach after gaining control of the eastern half of the island, Saldanha (1994) says:
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Indonesia had no other choice but to develop this former Portuguese colony
after the region had joined the Republic of Indonesia. The main goals were
to improve the welfare of the people and to legitimize its integration with
Indonesia, as well as to show the government’s good intentions regarding the
development of this region," (30).
Of course, it would be more accurate to acknowledge that pacification and development
were both goals of the regime, and with the former came a great deal of horrific violence.
In any case, though, development, as a way to cultivate loyalty and integration, was por-
trayed as a natural outcome following annexation.
The government’s information campaigns sought to emphasize the region’s integra-
tion and similitude to the rest of the country. One way in which Indonesia sought to
normalize the annexation and incorporation of East Timor as another province was by
demonstrating that standards of living and prices were comparable in East Timor as
compared to Jakarta. In another newspaper article published under the auspices of the
Indonesian regime, it was noted:
"For those coming to Dili for the first time, they will be curious to see the avail-
ability of essential goods and grocery in stores. It’s useless to bring cigarettes
from Jakarta because they are abundantly available in Dili, Baucau, Maliana
and Oeccusi. A blank cassette tape is only 350-400 Rupiah. A pair of Levi’s
jeans is only 4000 Rupiah. The price of a cigarette is generally the same as in
Jakarta, except Dunhill is 200 rupiah," (Unknown n.d.-a).
Other headlines that were translated from the pro-Indonesian newspaper articles during
the time include: "Integration and Its Meaning [As] Felt by the Little People"4; "The Fu-
ture Filled With Hope"; "A story of a pro-East Timor integration fighter"; and "National
Consciousness as a Great Country Starts to Spring in East Timor". These concerted efforts
to generate a positive image of East Timor’s integration into Indonesia stand in sharp con-
trast to the statements made, both in public and private, by Israeli leaders with regards
to the Palestinian population of the West Bank and its relationship to the state of Israel.
It seems almost paradoxical that violent repression could co-exist with rapid economic
growth, but in the case of Timor-Leste under Indonesian rule this appeared, at least at
times, to be the case. The first set of aggregate economic data available after Indonesia’s
1975 invasion covers 1981-1982, and it is estimated that East Timorese GDP grew by
4I thank Jennifer Frentasia for her assistance with translation. Here, she notes that "rakyat kecil, literally
translated as ’little people’, is an Indonesian term to describe poor, powerless people. It is not a derogatory
term for East Timorese...It’s widely used in political campaigns (similar to "People Power" used by Filipino)
and everyday conversations."
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8.1 percent in this year (Saldanha 1994, 186). From 1983 to 1990, annual GDP growth
averaged almost 8 percent, compared to an average rate of just under 6 percent between
1969 and 1972, which was the period of late Portuguese rule that had the most consistent,
year-to-year growth record.5 Some of this growth from the early 1980s onward could
have been due to the fact that the resistance movement’s main bases had been reclaimed
by Indonesia at this time and many civilians had returned, voluntarily or not, into the
large towns. Thus, economic production may have resumed somewhat normally at this
time.
Living standards were already extremely low by regional and international standards
when Indonesia took control of the province. Although there were certainly increases
in living standards under Indonesia occupation, an estimated 52 percent of the popula-
tion remained illiterate in 1990 and the infant mortality rate was approximately 106 per
1,000 births – both of which were very high in comparison to Indonesia’s other provinces
(see Saldanha (1994, 275) Table 5.47). Further, the housing stock in East Timor was of
lower quality than elsewhere in Indonesia, with 64 percent of households in homes where
the roof was made of leaves – compared to 10.8 percent across all of Indonesia – and 54
percent in houses with the walls made of bamboo – compared to 33 percent on average,
across the whole country – rather than more durable material (Saldanha 1994, 276). Fi-
nally, it is worth noting that Timorese province was almost entirely dependent on the
distribution of revenues from the central government, which effectively meant that Tim-
orese had very little, if any, input into how development priorities were defined or how
funds were spent (Saldanha 1994, 168-170).
Unlike Israel in the West Bank, Indonesia instituted a relatively extensive bureaucracy
in East Timor, down to the village level, to demonstrate a strong state presence in the
new territory. The civil service built by Indonesia was "nearly twice as large in relation to
population than the [Indonesian] national civil service," (CAVR 2013, 403). This can be
contrasted with the case of Israel’s civil service investments in the West Bank, which were
less intensive than in other parts of Israel’s territory. Indonesia’s vast civil service comple-
mented its deep military presence across the country. Complaints were common among
Timorese that Indonesians from other islands were occupying all of the civil service po-
sitions, and employment prospects for educated Timorese were fairly grim. For example,
Jones (2000, 53) notes that, in 1999, less than 12 percent of teachers were native Tim-
orese, with the rest coming primarily from Java, West Timor, and other nearby islands.
The Indonesian state was also involved in settling a number of farmers on East Timor,
5From 1954 to 1963, estimates appearing in (Saldanha 1994, 186) show the economy contracting in
three out of nine years, although 1956 and 1958 saw growth rates in excess of 8 percent.
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although it is less clear whether this was an intentional effort to generate demographic
advantages or merely an effort to solve distributional conflicts on other islands.
Ultimately, there was little indication that settlement was used to substantially alter
the demographic make-up of the island. Above all, military and political domination,
including propaganda and repression, were the Indonesian regime’s tools of choice for
concentrating power. Settlement of other Indonesians on the island was also seen as part
and parcel of the larger development strategy for the island. As a government informa-
tional document cited in Eiran (2015, 108) describes:
"In an informational document in 1984, Indonesia presented transmigration
as intended to help the Timorese: ‘The increase in rice production in the
Province of East Timor is...due to the increase in the skill of the people of
East Timor in farming. In this context, mention must be made of the positive
results from the effort made by the government to bring...expert farmers from
Bali to East Timor. The exemplary farmers were placed alternately among the
East Timorese farmers so that the Timorese farmers could learn from the Bali-
nese farmers the right ways of farming,’ (Republic of Indonesia 1984, 51-52)."
Thus, Indonesian information campaigns actively sought to frame settlement by Indone-
sians from neighboring islands as transferring productive skills to the Timorese. This
can be contrasted with Israel’s approach to settlement, which emphasized the normaliza-
tion of settlements as part of Israel, but which did not emphasize any real or rhetorical
connections to the Palestinian population.
3.4.3 Timorese Autonomy
Overall, the Indonesian occupation of East Timor was a slow-moving humanitarian
catastrophe. Research by the Timor-Leste Commission for Reception, Truth and Recon-
ciliation (CAVR) in cooperation with the Human Rights Data Group (HRDAG) found an
estimated 102,800 conflict-related deaths in the 1974 to 1999 period – with a margin
of error of 12,000. This included approximately 18,600 that were killed in conflict while
over 84,000 were estimated to have died "due to hunger and illness which exceed the total
that would be expected if the death rate due to hunger and illness had continued as it was
in the pre-invasion peacetime period," (CAVR 2013, 488). Indonesia’s highly repressive
and omnipresent form of rule left little to no room for self-governance by the Timorese
independence movement at either the local or national levels during occupation.
The resistance, dominated by FRETILIN, primarily took the form of a guerrilla move-
ment whose bases were mostly rural after the first few years of conflict. Simultaneously,
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the resistance operated through a clandestine, urban front that attempted to subvert In-
donesian rule and support the rural movement by channeling resources to them. Shortly
after Indonesia’s invasion in December 1975, FRETILIN and its armed wing, Forças Ar-
madas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste, or the Armed Forces for the National Lib-
eration of Timor-Leste (Falintil), set up bases in the mountains (CAVR 2013, 417-8). In
these initial years of occupation, the FRETILIN/Falantil bases featured a relatively well-
organized administrative apparatus from the sub-village to the district level (CAVR 2013,
420). It is during this period, from 1975 until 1978-1979, that we would be most likely
to observe FRETILIN developing any sort of formal institutions of autonomous gover-
nance. Indeed, the CAVR (2013) report suggests that FRETILIN had quite a thoroughly
developed civilian and military administrative structure, and likely fulfilled some of the
core, transactional functions we associate with the "state" in these zones that had not
yet formally fallen under Indonesia’s command, including distributing food and water
and providing security to civilian supporters. However, because Indonesia possessed dis-
proportionate military force and because any areas that were controlled by the national
movement were seen as a threat to Indonesia’s annexation project, the zonas libertadas did
not last long. Unlike in the Palestinian case, there is no evidence that Suharto’s regime
was willing to permit partial self-governance by FRETILIN for an extended period of
time.
This early separation of FRETILIN and Falantil fighters from the main Timorese popu-
lation centers meant that any form of "self-governance" practiced by the resistance move-
ment was limited to those rural areas that it controlled. The resistance carried on in both
the mountains in the interior and in the major towns along the coast. In 1978-1979, In-
donesia began campaigns to target the "liberated areas" under FRETILIN control in the
mountains, causing the descent of many civilians from the mountains back down into the
major towns (CAVR 2013, 418). The report states:
"The separation of civilians from the armed resistance prompted the Resis-
tance movement to enter a new phase, in which Falintil in the forest were
supported by civilians in the settled, Indonesian-controlled areas. Previously,
by contrast, civilians had been organised by Fretilin cadres in the Resistance
support bases (bases de apoio), and Falintil had been responsible only for secu-
rity."
From this point on, the use of clandestine, urban networks to support the resistance in
the context of extensive Indonesian military, civil and intelligence apparatuses became
a prominent feature of the movement. In the mid-1980s, "Falintil began to decline in
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numbers and in its military capability, but an extensive network of non-military support
in the towns and villages of East Timor was developed," (Dunn 2003, 296-7). Further,
the resistance was not just limited to men: Mason (2005) details women’s participation in
the non-violent resistance, both providing traditional forms of domestic support to male
combatants and through participation in protest action.
In the mid-1980s, it became clear to the Timorese resistance fighters that Indone-
sia had disproportionate military power on its side, and Conselho Nacional da Resistência
Maubere, or the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) was founded as a new
umbrella organization to represent the resistance internationally. As described in CAVR
(2013, 419), the focus of the struggle for independence was increasingly moved to the
international, diplomatic arena from this point on. It was also at this time that a notable
ideological division emerged within the national movement, personified as a rivalry be-
tween the leader of the guerrilla resistance movement based in the mountains, Xanana
Gusmão, and the exiled FRETILIN party leader, Mari Alkatiri (Shoesmith 2003). The
founding of CNRM was a result of Gusmão breaking with the increasingly "doctrinaire"
Marxists in FRETILIN’s Central Committee in 1986 (Shoesmith 2003, 240), and was in-
tended as "a nonpartisan umbrella organization" for the resistance, including FRETILIN,
the UDT, and other underground actors, (Pinto & Jardine 1997, 122). While intended
to unite the resistance movement and make the armed wing more representative of all
the factions, this was also part of Gusmao’s "plan to remove the resistance struggle from
FRETILIN control," (Shoesmith 2003, 240). From this point on, Falintil was officially
under the command of the umbrella group rather than just FRETILIN.6
This movement structure is in stark contrast to the Palestinian resistance. Palestinian
local leaders affiliated with or sympathetic to the PLO were able to take advantage of
some degree of formal autonomy to secure their substantial foothold in the West Bank
– first, and temporarily, through municipal governments that were freely elected in the
1970s, but more notably after Oslo, through the creation of the Palestinian Authority as
a formal governing entity in Palestinian areas of the West Bank and Gaza. The Timorese
resistance, on the other hand, faced a different incumbent state with a different set of
goals and tactics. The more densely populated towns were absorbed under Indonesian
military rule fairly quickly after the invasion, although the eastern region was the last
to be subdued. None of the resistance movement’s three fronts – the armed, clandestine,
6The umbrella group in the lead-up, and then immediately following, independence became known as
Conselho Nacional da Resistência Timorense, or the National Council for Timorese Resistance (CNRT) and
was the primary group that represented Timor on the international stage and supplied leaders for the new
state’s institutions. FRETILIN, however, was the dominant party in the Constituent Assembly elections
(Shoesmith 2003, 242).
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and diplomatic fronts – engaged in formal, repeated transactions of governance with the
Timorese population. Indonesia’s commitment to absorbing the entire region as the 27th
province of the country meant that FRETILIN and, later, CNRM had little opportunity to
develop those relationships.
Instead of an extended period of "partial autonomy", the Timorese resistance move-
ment’s diplomatic outreach, changing international conditions, and the end of Suharto’s
rule all contributed to an about-face in Indonesia’s approach to East Timor. In 1999,
following a surprising announcement by Indonesia’s new, transitional leader, President
B.J. Habibie, a referendum was conducted on whether East Timor should be granted full
independence or merely function as an autonomous region within Indonesia. The an-
nouncement of the vote – and the vote itself, in which 78.5 percent of Timorese voted for
independence – unleashed a bloody campaign of destruction by the Indonesian military
and affiliated militias, leading to the death of at least 1,200 civilians (G. Robinson 2003).
The country then entered a two-and-a-half year period of transition under the United
Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), and finally achieved full
independence in 2002.
The devastation of the 24-year-long occupation, combined with the targeted and effi-
cient destruction of key infrastructure during their withdrawal, left UNTAET and Timo-
rese leaders with a daunting task of rebuilding infrastructure and building new state in-
stitutions. The transitional period lasted from 1999 to 2002 – between the independence
referendum and de jure independence. Lemay-Hébert (2012) discusses the conflict be-
tween "institution-building and local empowerment" that dogged UN transitional efforts
in Timor-Leste, where, he argues, international officials initially prioritized the former at
the expense of the latter. This stirred resistance to UN administration efforts by Timorese
political elites, who felt they were being asked to observe and provide token consent for
executive action, rather than being actively engaged in the process (474). Undoubtedly,
the UNTAET period generated its own legacies for the institutional development of the
Timorese state, a topic to which we briefly return in chapter 5.
3.5 Alternative Explanations
While it is clear that Indonesia and Israel differed in their goals for their newly ac-
quired regions – East Timor and the West Bank, respectively – there may be other reasons
that lead us to observe differences in the amount of autonomy, or self-rule, that the na-




One clear distinction between the two cases is the regime type of the incumbent state
during the time that it controlled the contested territory. Israel was, and is, widely rec-
ognized as an electoral democracy. Israel was coded as either a 9 or 10 for the 1967-2010
period in the revised combined Polity score, a variable in the Polity IV project dataset that
codes country-years from -10, indicating a strong autocracy, to +10, indicating a strong
democracy (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers 2015). Indonesia, on the other hand, had a revised
combined Polity score of -7 until 1997, -5 in 1998 (the year that Suharto resigned, initiat-
ing Indonesia’s democratic transition), and 6 thereafter. Thus, Indonesia was ruled by an
autocratic military regime for nearly the entire period in which it controlled East Timor.
Regime type might confound the relationship between state goals and national move-
ment autonomy if it influences the methods used to achieve those goals. For example,
some literature suggests that democratic regimes are less likely to use repression when
faced with threats (Davenport 1999; Poe & Tate 1994; Poe, Tate, & Keith 1999; Rummel
1997). However, this claim has been qualified in the literature – for example, Regan and
Henderson (2002) suggest that less developed, semi-democratic regimes may be most
likely to use repression, reinforcing the assertion that regime type and political violence
may exhibit an "inverted-U" relationship (Fein 1995). Davenport and Armstrong II (2004)
decompose the relationship by estimating several non-parametric and parametric mod-
els; in the latter, they find that, below a certain level of democracy, democratic regimes
are no less likely to use repression. An additional characteristic of Suharto’s regime,
however, is that it was a military regime, and this may make it more likely to use re-
pression against nationalist threats even vis-a-vis other types of autocracies (Davenport
& Armstrong II 2004; Poe, Tate, & Keith 1999). Indeed, in terms of numbers of casual-
ties, although many thousands of Palestinians have died as a result of the conflict with
Israel since 1967, the scale and intensity of violence employed by the Indonesian regime
in Timor-Leste far exceeds that which was used by Israel in the West Bank in the period
under study.
Could the use of large-scale and, at times, indiscriminate violence have precluded the
possibility of the Timorese national movement gaining any degree of formal governing
autonomy? I acknowledge the possibility that repression itself served to either partially
or fully mediate the relationship between incumbent state goals and nationalist move-
ment autonomy in these two cases. In fact, the qualitative analysis above suggests that,
more generally, the strategy and tactics of control employed by Indonesia and Israel differed
in several ways – including the extent of civilian bureaucracy deployed in the contested
territory, the amount of informational propaganda used (and the targets of this propa-
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ganda), and the degree of state-sponsored settlement of non-indigenous populations into
the contested territory. While repression was used by both regimes, the extent and in-
tensity of repression is one other tactical distinction between these two incumbent states.
Nonetheless, the presence of a potential mediating variable, while deserving of further
analysis, does not falsify the hypothesis that incumbent state goals and nationalist move-
ment autonomy are causally linked.
Another possibility is that regime type precedes the causal process described above,
namely: regime type drives incumbent state goals, which, in turn, shapes autonomy ar-
rangements. Indeed, it seems plausible that, due to the differences in decisionmaking in-
stitutions across autocracies and democracies, the process by which an incumbent state’s
objectives in a contested territory are defined will differ across regime types. As described
above, what Israel’s goals should be in the West Bank and Gaza was, and continues to be,
a topic of much open discussion. By contrast, we can infer that Indonesia’s approach in
Timor-Leste was more strongly determined by a closed circle of elites close to President
Suharto. While beyond the scope of the current study, it would be perfectly plausible
to suggest that regime type is an antecedent to the creation of incumbent state goals.
While it does not explicitly test this proposed configuration of causal variables, chapter 4
does analyze the relationship between regime type, incumbent state goals, and nationalist
movement autonomy on a larger dataset.
3.5.2 Pre-Existing Governance Structures
Another plausible rival explanation is that the extent of pre-existing governance struc-
tures drove incumbent state strategies in both cases. In the West Bank, Israel could
build upon the historically important municipal councils, a structure which had been
in place in the region in different forms since Ottoman times, whereas Indonesia did not
encounter any similar formal governing institutions at the local level in Timor-Leste.
In fact, local governance has a nuanced and intricate history in East Timor that was not
discussed in detail above due to space limitations. Traditional local chiefs (liurai) played
an important role in dispute resolution and other forms of local governance before the
arrival of the Portuguese, and thus both Portugal and Indonesia had to choose how they
wanted to interact with these local leaders. While some were coopted under Lisbon’s
rule, for example, others, such as the liurai of Manufahi, Dom Boaventura, who was men-
tioned above, led important revolts against colonial rule. Hill (1978, 56-7) highlights the
symbolic importance of the liurai-led resistance against colonial rule:
"The ’Great Rebellion’ of 1912 [led by Dom Boaventura and eventually quashed
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by the Portuguese] was important for the growth of nationalism in East Timor.
According to Francisco Xavier do Amaral, founding President of FRETILIN,
(whose mother remembered well the battle of 1912), Dom Boaventura suc-
ceeded in establishing a seat of government in Manufahi, the authority of
which extended over approximately 16,000 hectares and which he governed
for 18 months. Regardless of the historical validity of this claim it was clearly
an important precedent for nationalist leaders to use in their political cam-
paigns after 1974 when they were trying to persuade Timorese that they could
run their own country."
Given the checkered history of both cooperation and resistance emanating from these lo-
cal rulers, Indonesia faced a certain level of unpredictability in terms of how the liurai
would react to the imposition of Jakarta’s rule on the island. In fact, Indonesia managed
to successfully coopt some of these leaders. APODETI, the main Timorese party that sup-
ported integration with Indonesia, benefited from the early endorsement of Guilherme
Maria Gonçlaves, the liurai of Atsabe, and his son, Tomas, received military training from
Indonesia prior to the 1975 invasion (CAVR 2013; Dunn 2003). Further, in the months
leading up to the independence referendum, militias affiliated with an Ainaro liurai were
responsible for brutal attacks against resistance leaders and their sympathizers (CAVR
2013, 283).
While running the risk of oversimplifying the issue of liurai loyalties and oppositions
– positions which were obviously taken on an individual basis and sometimes shifted –
it is clear that, at a minimum, Indonesia did face the opportunity to cultivate indirect
rule on East Timor just as Portugal had done. It would be inaccurate to suggest that
Timor-Leste did not feature any local governing structures, and thus it follows that these
existing structures might have been part of a plan to delegate limited autonomous self-
rule to the Timorese population under Indonesian occupation between 1975 and 1999.
While the formality of local governing institutions did not approach the status quo of the
municipal councils in the West Bank that preceded Israeli occupation, for example, it is
nonetheless defensible to see Indonesia’s decision to exercise a more direct form of rule
– one which did not allocate any power to local, traditional authorities – as a strategic
choice toward fulfillment of a specific set of goals.
3.5.3 Other Secessionist Threats
While the Palestinian movement was, and is, the sole national resistance movement
Israel faces, Walter (2009) makes the argument that Indonesia’s responses to organized
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separatist movements in East Timor and Aceh were conditioned on the perceived threat of
possible future secessionist demands from other regions. This explains, according to her
logic, why President Suharto’s regime was more willing than might otherwise be expected
to "signal toughness" in the conflict and to continue incurring the costs of occupation and
repression past when one might think it was rational to do so (Walter 2009, 148-159). By
extension, we might believe that incumbent states with numerous potential secessionist
threats on the horizon would not grant any degree of governing autonomy to the first
such threat, since it might be a "slippery slope" toward granting autonomy, or even full
independence, to more and more communities.
Indeed, this argument deserves serious consideration. However, it seems likely that,
if the potential of future secessionist threats in other regions of the country were to enter
into the incumbent state’s calculus in a given contested territory, the way it would do so is
by, first, shaping the incumbent state’s goals vis-a-vis that territory. As was discussed with
regime type, this does not undermine the analysis above of how those goals, in turn, may
have shaped autonomy outcomes for the Palestinian and Timorese national movements.
It does, however, suggest a way in which these goals themselves could be endogenized as
part of a larger theory of what generates different incumbent goals in the first place.
Further, it is not so far-fetched to suggest that Israel’s approach to the Palestinian
Territories in the early years of occupation could have stirred secessionist or separatist
tendencies among its own Arab population. Israel contains a large Arab-Palestinian mi-
nority within the 1948-9 armistice lines – namely, within Israel’s recognized boundaries,
excluding the occupied territories. If Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip were
able to successfully achieve some degree of autonomy (as they eventually did), this could
have also generated a "slippery slope" effect with Israel’s own Arab minority. One possi-
bility is that Israel’s Arab community may have sought to move to the newly autonomous
territories or, if full independence was granted, to the independent state of Palestine.
This suggests that Israel may have had longer term reputational concerns in mind, too,
just as Indonesia did in its dealings with Timor-Leste. Thus, if these concerns drove
Indonesia to allow no self-governing autonomy for the Timorese population during the
occupation, why did Israel pursue such a different path with the Palestinians? The threat
of "secession" of the Arab-Palestinian minority in Israel was certainly more remote than
the threat from Indonesia’s other regions, and there may have been elements on the far
right of Israel’s political spectrum that would not have been too troubled by Israel’s Arab-
Palestinian citizens moving into a new Palestinian state. Indeed, one way to conceptualize
the difference is that Israel did not face a less serious secessionist threat than Indonesia,
but the integrity, and longed-for Jewish identity, of the Israeli state would have been less
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threatened by these forms of secession.
3.5.4 Urbanization and Terrain
Finally, it was suggested in section 3.3 that the physical nature of terrain, and levels
and patterns of urbanization, could constitute confounding variables in this analysis. In
particular, Timor-Leste featured a more mountainous terrain – which has been shown
to be well-suited to guerrilla-style insurgencies – and was less urbanized than the West
Bank. This may have shaped opportunities and incentives facing the nationalist move-
ments themselves in each setting. For example, FRETILIN may have been more likely
to adopt a rural, guerrilla movement structure rather than focusing on setting up bases
of governance. On the other hand, Palestinian nationalists benefitted from pre-existing
urban structures such as the municipal councils and universities in the West Bank.
Indeed, it seems plausible that pre-existing features of the terrain and population dis-
tributions would have affected both incumbent state strategies and resistance movement
structure. However, it is also worth noting that partially autonomous rebel organizations
have been well-documented in quite rural areas, including the Shining Path in Peru’s
Andean hills and Renamo in rural Mozambique (Weinstein 2007). This, in and of itself,
should not have been a limiting factor for FRETILIN if it had sought to set up its own
governing institutions amongst segments of the Timorese population. Further, there is
also extensive research suggesting that urbanized, or highly concentrated, populations
are easier to govern, so one must ask why, if that was the main factor driving Israel’s
strategy in the West Bank, did they not choose a more direct style of rule? These ques-
tions suggest that other factors were more important in shaping Indonesia and Israel’s
strategies, respectively.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter has argued that Israel’s goals in the West Bank – namely, a set of goals
that shifted with time but which, at a minimum, sought to maintain control over parts or
all of the territory without governing the population – shaped the approach they adopted
and, subsequently, the forms of self-rule available to Palestinians. In addition, I have
traced the sequence of Indonesia’s occupation of Timor-Leste, a case that, I argue, shares
a number of essential similarities with the Palestinian one. Indonesia’s occupation was
not just military: it extended a vast civil service into the then-province of East Timor, in-
vesting considerably in infrastructure and education. Under Suharto’s regime, Indonesia
also deployed an intensive propaganda campaign, directed not only at international au-
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diences, but also domestic Indonesian constituents, to project the image of East Timor as
a normally and fully integrated province within the country. This evidence suggests that
Indonesia’s annexation goals were more inclusive in nature; despite the widespread and
systemic use of violence and repression on a large scale, the Indonesian regime ultimately
aimed to "pacify" and ensure the loyalty of the Timorese population to the government
in Jakarta. This strategy closed off options for the resistance movement, leaving it little
room to establish any formal relations of governance with the population before the end
of the occupation.
Chapter 4 examines a broader universe of cases, taking what we have learned from
chapters 2 and 3 to assess the relationship between incumbent state goals and nation-
alist movement autonomy in other settings of contested statehood. Chapter 5 returns
to Timor-Leste and examines the relationship between legacies of conflict, the coercive
capacities of the new state, and attitudes toward taxation.
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CHAPTER IV
Other Settings of Contested Statehood: Do Existing States
Constrain the Emergence of New Ones?
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 2 demonstrated a peculiar divergence in the coercive and fiscal capacities of
the Palestinian Authority (PA), an entity formed to provide partial self-rule to Palestini-
ans living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. I suggested that the PA’s capacities may not be
growing in the ways we would expect due to functional restrictions that allow it to build
certain forms of coercive capacity but not others. Chapter 3 explored the origins of these
restrictions on Palestinian governing autonomy, and, through a counterfactual analysis
using Timor-Leste as the comparative case, proposed that Israel’s goals in the West Bank
played an important role in generating the constraints on Palestinian institutional auton-
omy. But how generalizable is this observation: namely, that an incumbent state’s goals
in a contested region can shape the degree of autonomous self-rule obtained by a com-
peting, nationalist movement? For nationalist movements aspiring toward statehood, the
Palestinian experience suggests that governing autonomy obtained during conflict can
have far-reaching implications for the ability of the movement to build state-like capac-
ity. Thus, gaining a better understanding of governance during conflict might inform the
development of strong and responsive state institutions in the long term.
The present chapter broadens the scope of analysis both conceptually and empirically
by advancing a typology of regions of contested statehood. These regions are defined as
populated areas where an existing (or "incumbent") state exercises disproportionate con-
trol, but faces opposition from a nationalist movement that seeks to establish self-rule.
Drawing on the arguments of the previous two chapters, I define and categorize regions
of contested statehood along two dimensions: First, the type of annexation strategy pur-
sued by the incumbent state in the contested region (whether it is primarily inclusive
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or exclusive of the existing population) and, second, whether the competing nationalist
movement has been able to construct partially autonomous political institutions or not.1
If there is a causal connection between incumbent state goals and movement autonomy,
then we should observe cases of contested statehood clustering in two cells of the subse-
quent four-cell framework. Employing a contemporary subset of cases of conflict from the
UCDP-PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (n = 81), I find that situations of partial autonomy
are less likely to arise in settings where the incumbent state is pursuing inclusive annexa-
tion. Instead, when incumbent states are pursuing exclusive annexation – or a less easily
classified strategy of "benign neglect", described more below – nationalist movements are
more likely to obtain partial self-rule over the course of the conflict.
There are a number of possible explanations for this observed correlation. First, there
is the explanation offered in the earlier analysis of Palestine and Timor-Leste, namely that
incumbent state goals are shaping opportunities for nationalist movement self-rule. Sec-
ond, an omitted variable, or a set of omitted variables, may be driving both incumbent
state goals and nationalist movement autonomy. Third, reverse causality is a possibility;
because incumbent states and nationalist movements are usually engaged in a series of
interactions over time, the amount of governing autonomy obtained by the nationalist
movement may shape incumbent state goals. Resource and space limitations prevent me
from observing and coding year-to-year variation in incumbent state goals or nationalist
movement autonomy for each of the 81 conflicts in my subsample. Therefore, the second
and third possible explanations above cannot be definitively ruled out. However, the cor-
relational findings in this chapter, in conjunction with the detailed case studies presented
in the preceding two chapters, increase our confidence in the first proposition: that the
objectives of the stronger party in a conflict setting – the incumbent state – influence
governance outcomes.
The rest of this chapter proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 describes the method and
purpose of conceptual typologies in brief. It then defines the theoretical scope of the
subsequent typology and some of its assumptions. Section 4.3 introduces two types of
incumbent states in contested territories: one which pursues the annexation of both the
territory and its existing population (inclusive annexation) and the other which seeks to
annex territory first and foremost, but does not actively seek to absorb the population that
lives there (exclusive annexation). Section 4.4 is informed by the analysis in the preceding
two chapters and thus aims to define, in more general terms, the concept of autonomy, or
1Conceptually, this dimension focuses on the two categories of "no autonomy" and "partial autonomy".
"Full autonomy" would be possible at the end of conflict if the movement obtained full independence, for
example, but the current study focuses mainly on the period during active conflict or contestation. This is
discussed in more detail below.
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the degree of self-rule obtained by a national community seeking statehood. In section
4.5, I introduce the data and coding methodology, and I provide descriptive results of the
classification of 81 self-determination conflicts drawn from the UCDP-PRIO Armed Con-
flict dataset. This analysis demonstrates that nationalist movements are more likely to
gain partial autonomy in settings where the incumbent state is pursuing an exclusive an-
nexation strategy or a somewhat mixed strategy. Nationalist movement autonomy during
conflict is significantly less common in settings where the incumbent state is committed
to inclusive annexation. Section 4.6 concludes by considering some of the implications of
partial autonomy for movements that seek to transition to statehood, and for the popula-
tions living in this environment. It also draws some conceptual parallels between direct
rule and the "inclusive annexation/no autonomy" settings and between indirect rule and
the "exclusive annexation/partial autonomy" settings.
4.2 Building A Conceptual Typology: Purpose, Scope, and Assump-
tions
The primary purpose of a conceptual typology is to identify and map out the dimen-
sions of a concept (D. Collier, LaPorte, & Seawright 2012). Such conceptual, or descrip-
tive, typologies are ideally "mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive – that is, every
case of the phenomenon fits into a type, and only into one type, and types are designed to
minimize within-type variation and maximize variation between types," (George & Ben-
nett 2005, 238). The aim of such an exercise is not necessarily to make causal claims,
but to identify "clusters of characteristics" that seem to co-occur (George & Bennett 2005,
238). In this sense, the contribution of a conceptual typology is usually directed toward
theory construction rather than theory testing.
In this case, the typology follows the partially inductive research in chapters 2 and
3. Scholars agree that conceptual typologies can often play an important role in multi-
method research (D. Collier, LaPorte, & Seawright 2012, 226). Transitioning from indi-
vidual cases toward a more general typology represents a move "up the ‘ladder of ab-
straction’, or generality," (George and Bennett (2005, 242), citing Sartori (1970)). In the
Palestinian and Timorese cases, I proposed that incumbent state goals may have shaped
the amount of autonomy gained by the national movement in each case. The following
analysis assesses whether this correlation is a "typological regularity" in a broader set of
cases (George & Bennett 2005, 239). Moving toward more abstract concepts has its costs,
as Sartori (1970, 1034-5) presciently warned:
"Now, the wider the world under investigation, the more we need conceptual
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tools that are able to travel...[T]he larger the world, the more we have resorted
to conceptual stretching, or conceptual straining, i.e., to vague, amorphous con-
ceptualizations...And the net result of conceptual straining is that our gains in
extensional coverage tend to be matched by losses in connotative precision."
The conceptual exercise below and empirical classification aims to take Sartori (1970)’s
warnings seriously, and thus follows the sequence of, first, clearly defining qualitative
categories which are useful but not overly broad, and, second, cautiously aiming to match
these concepts to variables which can be observed and measured on a dichotomous or
ordinal scale. Only by being transparent about each step of the process might the reader
identify the utility of the overall framework.
The relevant scope of the subsequent typology is defined as settings of contested state-
hood. In summary, these are settings in which we can distinguish two political units:
first, there is an existing state whose membership in the state system – if not its precise
geographic borders – is widely recognized. Borrowing language from Mampilly (2011), I
refer to this as the incumbent state. The incumbent state exercises a relatively high degree
of coercive and political control over a contested piece of territory. The second political
unit is a national movement or organization seeking autonomous self-rule, liberation, or
independence. It is in conflict with the incumbent state because it wishes to exercise co-
ercive and political control over the contested territory. In other words, it seeks to obtain
its own monopoly on violence (Weber 1919) and set up its own structures of political
decision-making. Note that there is no constraint on whether the incumbent state exer-
cises a form of democracy or authoritarianism, nor on whether the national movement
has expressed support for the creation of either democratic or non-democratic institu-
tions. Referring to the nationalist challenger as a movement or organization implies that
some basic level of support for the nationalist project being pursued exists amongst the
population of the contested region. Nonetheless, the movement or organization may be
more or less democratic in its relationship to the population on whose behalf it is sup-
posedly advocating.
Importantly, the incumbent state’s substantive reasons for continuing to hold the con-
tested territory may differ. For example, the justifications may be described as purely
economic, geo-strategic, political, symbolic, or some combination of the above. However,
I do assume that, regardless of the intentionality of the incumbent state’s actions that
led it to acquire the territory, it has an underlying desire to retain control over it. This
condition should be understood in its minimal sense: for example, within the incumbent
state’s constituent population or within its political system, there may be an active de-
bate about whether the state should hold onto this additional territory and at what cost.
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However, the basic assumption is that the state’s political leadership during the period of
analysis is not ready to immediately, or unconditionally, give up the contested territory. It
may appear problematic to refrain from defining the degree of intentionality or strategy
involved in the incumbent state’s acquisition of the contested territory. The subsequent
framework rests on the assumption that any territorial acquisition by a state results from
some combination of that state’s own intentional strategy and other observed and unob-
served factors that will shape the precise nature of the final result. For now, we leave the
relative importance of these various factors undefined.
I make one key assumption about the national movement. First, I allow that the par-
ticular grievances and demands of the national movement may vary, but I restrict my
attention to national movements whose ultimate goal is to replace incumbent state in-
stitutions with a new state authority for the national community that it claims to repre-
sent. In other words, the national movement seeks self-rule; it may also reference self-
determination, liberation, separation, secession, or independence in its discourse. I do
not present a theory of what factors lead national communities to mobilize around such
goals. There are important questions regarding whether a movement coalesces around
national self-determination (Kelle 2017; Lawrence 2013), when we might expect collec-
tive action dilemmas to undermine such mobilization (e.g. Lichbach 1994; Olson 2002),
and to what conditions such mobilization might be a response. To simplify and restrict
the set of cases to which the following typology applies, the starting point of the analy-
sis is a setting in which an existing state is in possession of a contested territory and is
faced with an organized national movement that seeks to replace the existing state’s in-
stitutions with new institutions of self-rule. These movements are not organized around
demands for autonomy within the existing system (although, as we have seen, this may
be what they get). Instead, they advocate for the creation of new institutions to supplant
the old. As a movement, they may be engaged in a range of forms of resistance against
the incumbent state, adopting non-violent or violent tactics, and these approaches may
vary within the movement or over time.
Finally, we must restrict the temporal window of analysis somehow, so while we fo-
cus our attention on the period immediately following the emergence of an organized
challenge to the incumbent state, this does not rule out the possibility – or perhaps prob-
ability – that such a movement is building on long-standing historical claims to the region
in question. The reader may be concerned that the varied nature of these deep, historical
legacies across cases will complicate the ability of our framework to produce generaliz-
able propositions. In other words, won’t the incumbent state’s actions, and subsequent
outcomes for the national movement, vary significantly depending on the historical roots
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of the conflict? Indeed, we must allow for this possibility. Thus, for the subsequent dis-
cussion, the key concepts and variables to be defined should be thought of as changes, or
deviations, from what existed immediately prior to the period in question. For example,
when the incumbent state’s goals are discussed, these should be understood as a move
toward a certain goal from an unspecified starting point.
The territory is contested precisely because of the existence of these two units. It is
also worth noting that the universe of cases is not equivalent to all cases of civil conflict.
The scope of this framework parallels that of Lustick (1993, 3), who pays special attention
on "those cases [of state formation] where force majeure was not decisive in the determi-
nation of outcomes, or where it is not expected to be decisive." This lack of decisiveness
parallels the concept of the territory being "contested". I also assume that the contested
territory is populated. Unpopulated, or very sparsely populated, territories are excluded
from the analysis because one of the main concepts of interest is the development of gov-
erning institutions, which, in this case, necessarily includes governance of a population,
in addition to activities related purely to the use of a territory. Hypothetically, the popu-
lation in the contested territory could be incorporated into the incumbent state or could
be incorporated into a new state should the national movement achieve its goals.
4.3 Inclusive versus Exclusive Annexation
I define regions of contested statehood according to two dimensions. The first dimen-
sion aims to address the question of why the incumbent state seeks to maintain control of
the contested region. As noted earlier, the conceptualization presented here is agnostic
as to whether the motivation is best described as economic, geo-strategic, political, sym-
bolic, or some combination of the above. I offer a relatively simple way to distinguish
between types of incumbent states, based on the answer to the following question: Does
the incumbent state seek to incorporate both the contested territory (its land and natural
resources) and the population that resides there into the existing state, or does it primar-
ily seek to incorporate the territory?2 Territory, defined to include both land and other
natural resources, and people – or, in economic terms, labor – constitute the two types of
resources that could plausibly motivate incumbent states to maintain control over a pop-
ulated region. Incumbent states for which the incorporation of the existing population
2We could also imagine a power that only sought to incorporate people, but not territory. Such perni-
cious state projects have, of course, existed – for example, those that depended on the trans-Atlantic slave
trade or other slave economies. I do not discount that this type of authority structure exists, however I
do not include it in my typology of regions of contested statehood, since the primary axis of contestation
cannot be defined by competing claims over a geographical region.
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is at least as important as the annexation of the contested territory are defined as seeking
inclusive annexation. Incumbent states whose primary aim is the annexation of contested
territory, not its existing population, are referred to as pursuing exclusive annexation, as
they seek to exclude the existing population from the expansion of the state.3 Each is
defined in more detail below. These two categories should be thought of as ideal types,
while the analysis that follows will acknowledge that most state projects fall somewhere
between these poles. Nonetheless, I argue that incumbent states in contested regions can
be usefully distinguished as falling toward one end or the other on what is probably a
continuous spectrum of types.
4.3.1 Inclusive Annexation
States that acquire a populated territory may seek full inclusion of both the territory
and its existing population within the geographic and substantive boundaries of the state.
I refer to this type of state as one pursuing inclusive annexation. Adopting a rational
choice framework, we classify incumbent states as "inclusive annexers" if the expected
benefits of incorporating the population exceed the expected costs. "Incorporating", in
this context, means ultimately governing. Of course, there is a wide range of ways that
we might conceive of these costs and benefits. For example, state leaders may perceive
benefits such as increasing the tax base, obtaining a larger population from which to re-
cruit into a state’s armed forces, or political benefits that a state’s rulers may perceive
by absorbing additional citizens of a particular demographic, ethnic, linguistic, or reli-
gious group. Costs, on the other hand, may include the cost of extending government
infrastructure and services to the newly acquired population, the costs of extending the
benefits of citizenship to additional residents, and the risk of incorporating a new pop-
ulation, some segment of which may present a threat to the existing leaders’ rule. What
is important is that the state’s leaders perceive the benefits to outweigh the costs, not that
they actually do. Thus, one could imagine imperfect information or stochastic or unan-
ticipated shocks playing a role in generating outcomes that leaders did not expect when
their goals were initially defined.
One implication of the basic definition above is that incumbent states engaging in
3I use the words "existing", "native", "local", or "indigenous" population to connote the population re-
siding in the territory just prior to the incumbent state’s acquisition of the territory. These terms should
not be interpreted as offering an evaluation of historic claims, or rights, to the land – a point which will
become particularly important in the discussion of settlement strategies below. Further, the term "native"
has unfortunate paternalistic and racist connotations which I seek to avoid. These are also discussed by
Mamdani (1996). In my writing, "native" can be thought of as "pre-existing" or "already inhabiting" the
territory in question.
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inclusive annexation are relatively more likely than other incumbent states to extend the
visible presence of the state into the contested region. Importantly, the relative costliness of
coercive versus non-coercive state-building strategies will shape the mix of institutional
functions – i.e. whether they are monitoring, repressing, or providing services to the
existing population. An example helps to demonstrate how incumbent states often couch
this in the language of development. Mundy and Zunes (2015, 40)’s description of the
case of Morocco’s attempted absorption of Western Sahara reflects what we would expect
under inclusive annexation:
"Moroccan development efforts in Western Sahara – from administrative struc-
tures to the built environment – have attempted to erase any sense of differ-
ence between the occupied areas and the rest of Morocco. What looks, from
the perspective of international law, like an illegal aggrandizement scheme
is, from Morocco’s point of view, nothing more than a development scheme
aimed at addressing the underdevelopment of its ‘Saharan Provinces,’ in the
same way that Morocco seeks to address development challenges in its other
peripheral regions..."
Incumbent state presence can be thought of more broadly, too. The literature on state-
building acknowledges a variety of possible techniques, including more symbolic exten-
sions of the state through the use of official flags and slogans, as well as more specific in-
formation and propaganda campaigns. Such observable markers of state presence would
be included in the definition of what we might expect to observe under inclusive an-
nexation. Inclusive annexation may be associated with a variety of approaches to state-
building – using "carrots", "sticks", or both – but in any case we can expect relatively high
degrees of incumbent state presence throughout the contested territory.
A second, observable implication of a strategy of inclusive annexation can be found in
how such states will formalize their relationship to the local population in the contested
region. In the contemporary global system, where citizenship is the normal mechanism
of state inclusion, states pursuing inclusive annexation are relatively more likely to offer
– or, as the case may be, demand – citizenship of the population. There is a robust lit-
erature on citizenship, variation in its forms, the mix of rights and responsibilities that
it may entail, and how politicians may manipulate its applicability. There of course may
be "tiers" of citizenship, something which is acknowledged more directly in the empirical
operationalization of the concept below. In sum, though, citizenship may be used to win
or coerce support, but it is very unlikely that we would observe a state pursuing inclusive
annexation without offering citizenship to the newly acquired population. Since incum-
bent states are now subject to more scrutiny from international observers than were the
107
colonizers of the past, inclusive-annexing states will often commit to a de jure uniformity
of rights for all segments of their population, including in the contested region that they
are seeking to annex. However, they may limit these rights in practice through, among
other things, the disproportionate use of repression in the recently acquired territory.
Suffice it to say that the norms of citizenship and rights create, at the very least, surface-
level distinctions between incumbent states pursuing inclusive annexation today and, for
example, warlords, monarchs, colonial empires and state-builders of the past.
4.3.2 Exclusive Annexation
Incumbent states that place relatively greater emphasis on incorporating the newly ac-
quired territory into their borders but relatively less emphasis on absorbing the territory’s
population that currently resides in the area are defined as seeking exclusive annexation.
Such states may place a premium on control of the contested territory or its natural re-
sources, and the existing population is seen as an impediment, rather than enabler, of
this goal. In these cases, the perceived benefits of incorporating the population into the
existing state are outweighed by the costs. Critically, the perceived benefits of maintain-
ing control of the territory, or its extractable resources, in the contested region are greater
than the perceived costs.
Since it is difficult to reliably trace the intentions of incumbent states in contested ter-
ritories, one of the key observable differences between inclusive and exclusive annexation
will be the nature, location, and types of investments in state presence that are made. Ex-
clusive annexation results in a more limited and strategic deployment of state presence
than inclusive annexation. Exclusive-annexing states will be more likely to invest in a
bureaucracy that is designed to control and protect territory and, where relevant, their
own populations that have settled in the contested land. They will minimize, to the ex-
tent possible, bureaucratic linkages between the state and the existing, or indigenous,
population. While exclusive annexation projects may also be accompanied by the liberal
use of repression against the existing population, the distributive arm of the state – the
provision of goods and services – will be limited. Further, the incumbent state adopting a
strategy of exclusive annexation will not actively seek to extend formal political inclusion
to the population living in the contested territory. This may be hard to observe, since, as
discussed earlier, states offering citizenship to those residing in the territory they claim is
now a strong international norm. However, exclusive-annexing states are expected to go
to greater efforts than inclusive-annexing states to condition or restrict the extension of
citizenship to residents of the contested territory.
Exclusive annexation projects – or those in which an incumbent state seeks to augment
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the territory under its control – are often accompanied by state-sponsored settlement of
the territory to "right-people" it, as described by Brendan O’Leary (cited in Haklai &
Loizides 2015, 5). In fact, settlement projects may also accompany inclusive annexation.
However, in these cases, they are less likely to be overtly directed by the state, and they
are more likely to be smaller in scale. Because demographic pressure on the existing
population would be against the interests of the inclusive-annexing state, such forms of
settlement could ultimately run counter to their aims. For the exclusive annexer, these
pressures may encourage displacement of the existing population that facilitates the in-
cumbent state’s primary goal: annexation of the territory itself. Table 4.1 summarizes the
conceptual distinction between the two types of incumbent states.
Inclusive Exclusive
Annexation goal Territory and population Territory
State presence in contested region Extensive Minimal
Settler population (from incum-
bent state to contested region)
Minimal Moderate to Extensive
Citizenship for existing popula-
tion in contested region
Likely Unlikely
Table 4.1: Distinguishing Traits of Inclusive versus Exclusive Annexation
Importantly, incumbent state type is primarily driven by the goals adopted and pur-
sued by the state, thus the distinction among types is largely an elite-based theory of state
action. The extent to which these elite goals coincide with those of the general population
is something which may vary extensively across states. This conceptualization is thus
predicated on another assumption: that the goals of political leaders are substantively
important for shaping the action of states. Notably, incumbent states may change their
type over time as the goals of political leaders change. For example, Mampilly (2011)’s
fascinating account of how Sri Lanka, the incumbent state, handled the Tamil national
movement in the northern and eastern parts of the country suggests that their approach
varied over time, from an intentional strategy to change demographic patterns in the re-
gion, consistent with an exclusive annexation strategy, to, at times, a desire to extend
services to the Tamil population, something which we would expect under inclusive an-
nexation. Similarly, Sudan’s approach in South Sudan evolved over the two, consecutive
civil wars.
Finally, it is worth noting that some of the more symbolic, softer tactics of state-
building may be used in either form of annexation. These include policing the use of
nationalist terminology, ideology, and historical narratives in the public sphere (for ex-
ample, in educational textbooks) that may run counter to the incumbent state project.
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These ways of managing information and ideas may exist under either annexation type.
However, under inclusive annexation, as mentioned above, the incumbent state is more
likely to position itself as the steward of development, law, and order vis-a-vis the local
population and, as discussed, they are more likely to make the labor and capital invest-
ments required to maintain that position. Exclusive annexers will probably exert less
effort on such messaging and investment strategies.
4.4 National Movement Autonomy
As defined above, the contested region features an incumbent state and a national re-
sistance movement, with relatively weaker coercive control, that seeks to form a new po-
litical authority structure for the existing population or some subset of it. Therefore, the
second dimension of this typology relates to the extent of autonomy over governance that
the movement seeking statehood has been able to achieve for the population it claims. In
this context, autonomy is defined as the existence of formal institutions of self-governance
in part or all of the contested region that are controlled by, and serve, members of the national
community seeking statehood.
It is important to clarify how this definition relates to existing understandings of au-
tonomy in the literature. The chief relational elements of the concept to be defined are:
autonomy for whom and from whom. Here, we are primarily thinking of autonomy for
the aspiring state – which currently takes the form of a nationalist movement of organi-
zation – from the incumbent state. Thus, this is a concept about relationships between
organizations; it is not, at least directly, between populations.
This conceptualization of autonomy differs from some standard versions that are seen
elsewhere in political science. In American politics, the concept of autonomy is per-
haps most frequently used in context of executive bureaucracies to denote a bureaucratic
agency’s freedom to act and pursue policy goals independently from political parties or
leadership (e.g. Carpenter 2001; Huber & Shipan 2002) or, alternatively, to conceptual-
ize the individual agency of "street-level" bureaucrats from their superiors (Hupe & Hill
2007; Lipsky 2010). In comparative politics more broadly, the autonomy of the state
resurged as a central research topic in writing after the much-vaunted edited volume,
Bringing the State Back In (P. B. Evans, Rueschemeyer, & Skocpol 1985), an institution-
alist response to pluralist or interest group-based theories of politics. P. Evans (1995)
brought us the concept of "embedded autonomy" to describe state involvement in indus-
trialization in the so-called developmental states (see also Ang 2016; Johnson 1982; Kohli
2004). I note that this was a resurgence, rather than a wholly new focus of comparative
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politics, because the work that focused explicitly on state autonomy from the landed, or
even industrial, elite often explicitly channeled the classic perspectives of Karl Marx and
Max Weber.4 In the typology below, the idea of autonomy – something that a national-
ist organization that claims to represent a population is able to exercise – does share a
basic definitional component with some of the above-mentioned varieties found in the
literature. Like these definitions, we are interested in the extent to which institutions are
immune from a certain kind of interference. However, in our set of cases, autonomy is
minimized when it is challenged from without by the incumbent state, not from within by,
for example, party leaders, organized interest groups, or the private sector elite.
The present study is not the first to use autonomy in reference to national movements
for self-determination. In this literature, it is perhaps most commonly associated with de-
colonization – an intermediate status of self-rule, short of independence. More recently,
Lawrence (2013, 51) and others have problematized the notion that autonomy – which
she groups under a broad category of demands for political reform sought by national
communities under colonial rule – was simply "an early stage in an evolutionary process
toward nationalist resistance," despite what historians, as well as colonists and nation-
alists themselves, may have claimed. Autonomy, she argues, was a distinct demand for
reform within the existing colonial system. National autonomy has also taken on its own
normative and strategic dimensions. As Weller and Wolff (2005, 1-2) describe, after the
Cold War and with emerging nationalist conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe,
"autonomy was re-discovered as a potential remedy to self-determination claims.
It was now no longer seen as the secessionists’ stepping stone toward inde-
pendence, but instead, in a 180-degree reversal of the previous position, au-
tonomy was now considered as a possible tool in accommodating separatist
movements without endangering the continued territorial integrity of an ex-
isting state."
As they explain, following the breakup of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yu-
4Of note for readers of the current study, the centrality of the coercive and fiscal capacity of states to the
concept of autonomy is highlighted in particular by Hamilton (2014, 7), but also the tension embedded in
the concept:
"In particular, control of the means of coercion would appear to facilitate state auton-
omy...Given the concentration of the coercive power of the state in the military/police ap-
paratus, its level of integration and adherence or resistance to government authority is obvi-
ously of crucial importance in state cohesion or in determining the outcome of divisions and
conflicts within the state. But if the possibility of state autonomy appears to be enhanced by
control of the means of coercion and by a high level of cohesion within the state, it is limited
by the state’s dependence upon resources – chiefly taxes and loans – generated through the
mode of production and, in capitalist societies, the private sector."
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goslavia, it was gradually accepted in Europe as a more palatable form of devolution to
compromise with separatist factions.
The specific form autonomy takes in any given region may vary, which may explain the
larger concept’s under-theorization in the literature. It may refer to religious or linguis-
tic autonomy; it may refer to devolved versions of the legislative, executive, or judicial
branches at the regional level; or it may refer to a greater devolution of state functions,
such as taxation, policing, or mechanisms of dispute resolution. While special auton-
omy granted to an ethnic or linguistic community may be interpreted as a devolution of
governance to that community, I only define it as such when that community is granted
additional control over some functions of governance that other communities or regions
within the incumbent state do not have. In between the two poles of no autonomy and
full autonomy, there may be a range of configurations. I refer to any form of autonomy
that functionally limits the de facto authority of the autonomous unit as partial autonomy.
This is described in more detail below.
In regions of contested statehood, I propose that national movements seeking state-
hood may be categorized according to three levels governing of autonomy that they may
acquire over the course of conflict. I focus explicitly on arrangements that occur prior to
any formal peace negotiations that may occur to end the conflict between the incumbent
state and the national movement. Thus, the analysis is restricted to autonomy exercised
during the period of active contestation.
First, the national movement may possess no autonomy. In these cases, the national
movement does not engage in any of the formal functions of a government, including:
providing internal policing within the areas that they control; extracting revenue through
taxation; engaging in formal dispute resolution; or managing the distribution of public or
club goods and services to the population. The "rebel governance" literature delves into
great detail to understand how rebel movements are able to provide certain governmen-
tal functions even in settings of ongoing conflict (Arjona 2016; Mampilly 2011; Weinstein
2007) It is somewhat difficult to imagine the theoretical extreme case in which a national-
ist movement or organization is engaging in absolutely none of the governance activities
captured in this literature. In fact, the conceptualization of autonomy mirrors the dis-
cussion of inclusive and exclusive annexation, in that these are ideally defined categories
that, in practice, differ continuously rather than categorically. Therefore, we can think of
the polar extreme of no autonomy as very conceptually close to cases where the nation-
alist movement engages in very little autonomous governance. Empirically, I suggest that
nationalist movements practicing little or no autonomy will take one of two, main forms:
either they will be organized as a cell-based resistance movement amongst the existing
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population with no control of territory, or they will be exclusively focused on protecting
their territory from incumbent state control but they will not engage in any of the other
governance-related activities mentioned above (i.e. internal policing, taxation, dispute
resolution, or distribution of other public or club goods).
The other extreme consists of nationalist movements that exercise complete self-rule,
including coercive authority over internal policing and external defense, and control over
the day-to-day affairs of governance. In short, this is observationally equivalent to com-
plete independence. In these cases, the territory is no longer contested and features a new
set of state institutions. Across the areas of the contested region that are claimed by the
national movement, there is no variation in the autonomy from the incumbent – or, in
this case, preexisting – state. One question is whether a nationalist movement can obtain
full autonomy without obtaining sovereign independence. Indeed, there are cases that we
would likely categorize as very close to the polar extreme of "full autonomy" that are not
recognized as independent by the incumbent (or preexisting) state or by all members of
the international community. Somaliland is one such example, having achieved de facto
independence from Somalia despite not being recognized as an independent state by the
incumbent state or international community.
Of course, nationalist movements may also fall somewhere between these two ex-
tremes, and it is this category of partial autonomy that is most challenging to define.
Partial autonomy can be considered a form of self-rule, however it is limited in scope.
In contexts of partial autonomy, the incumbent state, by definition, retains control over
some aspects of state authority. Those aspects may vary, but partial autonomy refers
here to any arrangement whereby the nationalist movement possesses autonomy over some
functions of governance but not others. For example, the national movement may super-
vise its own courts or other institutions of dispute resolution, and these institutions are
autonomous in the sense that they are not superseded by those of the incumbent state.
Alternatively, the nationalist movement may be highly involved in managing the distri-
bution of public or club goods such as schooling or healthcare, but not have autonomy
over the other functions of governance, such as policing or taxation. We can even think
of the provision of official documents, such as passports, as a club good. By definition,
the partially autonomous national movement fulfills some subset, but not all, of the fol-
lowing functions of governance – internal policing, taxation, dispute resolution, and the
distribution of some public or club goods (other than policing, defense, or dispute resolu-
tion). Further, a nationalist movement is not described as possessing partial autonomy if
equivalent autonomy is granted to a collectively exhaustive set of subnational units across
the incumbent state’s entire territory or population. In other words, I do not explicitly
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include federalism within the scope of the concept of partial autonomy. A vast body
of scholarship on federalism attests to its consideration as a distinct concept. Because
federal systems are, by definition, federated throughout the entire country, it is usually
a noisy way of capturing the institutional arrangement that results from an incumbent
state’s conflict with a specific nationalist movement. For a movement or organization to
have obtained partial autonomy within the present framework, it must not be a form of
autonomy that is universally granted.
As is evident from the preceding two chapters, these conceptualizations of autonomy
– like those of inclusive and exclusive annexation – are informed by the findings from the
Timorese and Palestinian cases. On moving from cases to concepts, George and Bennett
(2005, 239) note that "[c]ase studies can contribute to the inductive development of ty-
pological theories in the early stages of a research program by identifying an initial list
of possible theoretical variables." The PA is an extremely institutionalized case of partial
autonomy. One of the purposes of creating the subsequent typology is to ascertain how
common it is to observe partial autonomy in settings of contested statehood using this
broader definition.
4.5 Empirical Analysis
Empirically defining the universe of cases of contested statehood is not straightfor-
ward. On one hand, regions of contested statehood do not necessarily have to meet a
violence threshold. In particular, the threshold for inclusion into the Correlates of War
project datasets of 1,000 battle-related deaths per year (Sarkees & Wayman 2010) seems
too high to capture some of the low-level conflicts between incumbent states and self-
determination movements – or conflicts which were historically violent but have since
subsided – that are nonetheless important to include. Even if we can define cases of con-
tested statehood according to a lower threshold of violence, we must subset the space
of conflict zones in another way. Cases of contested statehood must, as defined above,
must be regions that are contested between an incumbent state and a movement seeking
secession, independence, or national liberation. Thus, they contain at least two, specific
actors.
The UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Version 4-2016) provides a useful starting
point (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand 2002; Melander, Pettersson,
& Themnér 2016; UCDP 2013). The UCDP/PRIO dataset is a "conflict-year dataset with
information on armed conflict where at least one party is the government of a state in
the time period 1946-2015," (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2017). The threshold for
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inclusion into the dataset is 25 battle deaths per year. From this dataset, I use the conflict-
year data to select the following subset of conflicts over statehood:
First, as mentioned, I focus on intrastate conflicts over territory. The UCDP/PRIO
dataset categorizes conflicts over the source of incompatibility, which may include gov-
ernment, territory, or government and territory. Incompatibilities over government in-
clude disputes "concering [the] type of political system, the replacement of the central
government, or the change of its composition," (UCDP 2013). Those over territory con-
cern "the status of a territory, e.g. the change of the state in control of a certain territory
(interstate conflict), secession or autonomy (internal conflict)," (UCDP 2013). Because I
focus exclusively on intrastate conflicts in the UCDP/PRIO dataset, the latter source of
incompatibility is closely aligned with the definition of regions of contested statehood.
Second, because the theoretical focus of this framework is contemporary cases of con-
tested statehood, I focus on conflicts that reached the 25 annual battle death threshold
for any year between 1993 and 2015. These include conflicts that passed the battle death
threshold sometime on or after 1993, but are part of an ongoing conflict that began much
earlier. Alternatively, conflicts that began and passed the battle death threshold in 1993
or later are also included. In fact, UCDP/PRIO codes two start dates for each conflict
episode: first, as precisely as possible, they code each episode for when it incurred its first
battle-related death. Second, they code each episode for the date at which it passed the
25 annual battle death threshold. Thus, some cases in our subsample – such as Myan-
mar’s battles against a number of secessionist movements, Iran and Iraq’s conflict with
the Kurds, Ethiopia’s conflict with Ogaden, or Israel’s conflict with the Palestinians – had
their first battle-related death a number of decades before 1993.
This reliance on the 25 battle death threshold means that we run the risk of missing
some conflicts that may have been quite violent before 1993 but whose violent activity
diminished in the mid- to late-1990s, even if the conflict was ongoing. An interesting
example is the conflict between the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland. The period
commonly referred to as "The Troubles" from 1968 to 1998 only makes it into our sub-
sample because it once again reached the 25 battle death threshold in 1998 with the series
of bombings by the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), despite decades of earlier con-
flict between republicans and unionists. The violence associated with this longstanding
conflict, much of which involved the Irish Republican Army (IRA), simmered in the early
1990s.
Beginning the period in 1993 excludes the creation of new states that were part of
the former Soviet Union, a short wave of new state creation which may have been cat-
egorically different than other, more isolated incidents of aspiring statehood. However,
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it does not exclude related conflicts in the former Yugoslavia or the Caucasus, some of
which were ongoing into the 1990s and 2000s. The temporal scope allows us to focus
on contemporary conflicts over statehood where the incumbent authority is necessarily a
sovereign state rather than a multinational empire. The result is a sample of 81 unique
conflicts. For each of these conflicts, UCDP/PRIO contains annual observations from
1993 to 2015, or whenever the conflict ceased. However, to simplify the classification of
conflicts in the subsequent typology, I focus on the simple cross-section of conflicts and
ignore temporal variation. This has implications for my coding, which I discuss below.
4.5.1 Variables and Coding
My dataset contains three variables related to the incumbent state’s goals and three
variables related to the national movement’s acquisition of autonomy. To code each
variable for each conflict, I consult a variety of qualitative sources. First, I rely on the
UCDP/PRIO Online Database (http://ucdp.uu.se), which is a companion to the Armed
Conflict Dataset and includes qualitative descriptions of each conflict in the dataset. Sec-
ond, I use additional sources for supplemental knowledge of the governance dynamics
that characterize each conflict.5 The set of variables capturing the observable implica-
tions of the incumbent state’s annexation strategy are assessed from the time the conflict
spell begins through the end of the conflict spell. They are as follows:
• Bureaucracy : Indicates the extent of non-coercive (civilian) bureaucratic presence
of the incumbent state in the contested territory. Coded as 1 if bureaucratic pres-
ence is relatively more extensive in the contested region than elsewhere in the in-
cumbent state; 0 if bureaucratic presence is relatively equal in the contested region
to elsewhere in the incumbent state; and −1 if bureaucratic presence is relatively
less extensive in the contested region than elsewhere in the incumbent state.
• NoSettle : Indicates if the incumbent state refrained from encouraging the settle-
ment of people from elsewhere in the incumbent state into the contested terri-
tory. Coded as 1 if there are no indications of incumbent state-sponsored popu-
lation transfer or settlement of the contested territory and there are no indications
of forced transfer of the existing population out of the contested territory.6 Coded as
5Sources consulted include: Aspinall (2009); Burma Issues/Peace Way Foundation (2008); Cornwell
(1998); Dapice (2016); Englebert and Hummel (2005); Human Rights Watch (2000); Ibrahim (1994); Jullien
(2013); Katzman (2008); Middle East Institute (2016); Mukhopadhyay (2009); Santoshini (2016); Socialist
Republic of the Union of Burma (1982); Tansey (2009); Vladisavljević (2004); Yavuz (2001).
6Note that other strategies of repression that may be used by the incumbent state short of forced reloca-
tion are not considered here.
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0 when population movement favorable to the incumbent state occurred, but it did
not appear to be explicitly sponsored or encouraged by the incumbent state. Coded
as −1 when there are indications of incumbent state-sponsored or -encouraged pop-
ulation transfer or settlement of the contested territory or there are indications of
forced transfer of the existing population out of the contested territory.
• Citizenship: Indicates whether the incumbent state extends citizenship to all res-
idents of the contested region. Coded as 1 if the incumbent state actively encour-
ages naturalization or preservation of citizenship specifically for residents of the
contested region that the nationalist movement claims to represent. Coded as 0 if
the incumbent state does not actively encourage, but also does not actively work to in-
hibit, citizenship for residents of the contested region that the nationalist movement
claims to represent. In many cases this means simply maintaining the existing citi-
zenship rules that permit citizenship to all residents. Coded as −1 if the incumbent
state restricts, or otherwise works to inhibit, citizenship for residents of the contested
region that the nationalist movement claims to represent. In addition, I create an
aggregate measure of incumbent state goals that is simply a sum of the three mea-
sures above for each conflict (GoalSum).
The amount and form of autonomy over governance that a nationalist movement ob-
tains in a conflict setting is often difficult to observe from the birds-eye view of the re-
searcher. To keep the coding exercise tractable, I code whether the national movement
possessed partial autonomy of any kind – as defined above – over the course of the conflict.
I introduce three variables to capture autonomy at different stages of the conflict:
• AutoPre: Coded as 1 if the national movement or organization possessed partial
autonomy immediately before the current conflict episode commenced, and 0 oth-
erwise. Note that this corresponds to functional, governing autonomy above and
beyond what other units in the state receive. So, for example, Nagaland was previ-
ously granted state status in India, but India is a federation, so they are not coded
as having obtained any special governing autonomy prior to the conflict.
• AutoDuring: Coded as 1 if the national movement or organization practiced partial
autonomy during the majority of years of the conflict episode, and 0 otherwise. Note,
again, that this corresponds to functional, governing autonomy above and beyond
what other units in the state receive. If the movement entered the conflict period
with some degree of special governing autonomy (AutoPre = 1), then AutoDuring
only equals 1 if additional autonomy was gained during the conflict period and was
sustained during a majority of the conflict years.
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• AutoAfter: If the conflict episode ceased by 2015, this variable is coded as 1 if
the national movement or organization concluded the conflict with greater governing
autonomy than had been achieved immediately prior to, or during, the conflict, and 0
otherwise. This captures autonomy arrangements that result from truces and peace
deals at the cessation of hostilities. Because some conflicts have not yet ended in
2015, observations on this variable are inevitably right-censored.
Whether the national movement in question for each conflict gained autonomy during
the period of contestation (AutoDuring) is closest to the theoretical concept described
above. However, I also include AutoP re and AutoAf ter in the dataset in case unexpected
relationships emerge between incumbent state goals and autonomy at these other stages
of the conflict. I also create an aggregate measure of national movement autonomy that
is simply a sum of the three measures above for each conflict (AutoSum).
Finally, to address an alternative explanation for national movement autonomy that
emerged in the preceding analysis of Palestine and Timor-Leste, I include a variable mea-
suring regime type (Polity) which is simply the revised combined polity score for the
incumbent state for the first year of the conflict episode (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers 2015).
This measure ranges from -10 (highly autocratic) to +10 (highly democratic). All cases,
including values for the six constituent variables (all variables except the sum measures)
and the Polity values, are listed in Appendix C.
There are some complications in moving from a conflict-year dataset to a cross-sectional
dataset of conflict regions. First, the criteria for inclusion in the UCDP/PRIO dataset is
the battle deaths threshold, but this means that a single incumbent state could be fighting
against multiple nationalist groups in a single observation, or a single case (a.k.a. a set
of yearly observations for a single conflict). This raises the question of which national
movement should be the subject of focus for the coding of the autonomy variables. Here,
it is worth noting that multiple groups fighting the incumbent state in the same conflict
will only appear as a single case if they share the same incompatibility with the central
government. Thus, when coding autonomy for each conflict case, I consider whether any
of the nationalist movements obtain autonomy. If there are multiple groups, this means
they may exercise that autonomy in cooperation, or competition, with other nationalist
groups that are making similar claims in the same conflict setting. This empirical reality
does not perfectly reflect the simplified scope of areas of "contested statehood" that I have
defined – namely, regions featuring a single incumbent state and single nationalist move-
ment. Because the formation of the typology is primarily a descriptive exercise, I do not
expect the existence of multiple nationalist groups, in some cases, to introduce error in
the way cases are classified. However, when hypothesizing about possible causal mecha-
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nisms that link incumbent state goals to the extent of autonomy obtained by a nationalist
movement, we would ideally control for the number of nationalist movements in each
setting.
4.5.2 Descriptive Results
The variables related to incumbent state goals, described above, are coded such that
those characteristics associated with exclusive annexation have a lower value, while traits
associated with inclusive annexation have higher values. After coding all 81 conflicts,
the aggregate measure of incumbent state goals (GoalSum) ranges from −3 to 2 (see Fig-
ure 4.1). No states were observed engaging in active promotion of citizenship directed
specifically at the population in the contested region, thus there were no cases where
Citizenship = 1 in the sample. In a way, this is unsurprising. Because the sample only
consists of contemporary cases in 1993 and later, it is likely that residents of the con-
tested region were already incorporated as citizens in the incumbent state. Further, if
they were not already incorporated, this was likely due to the preferences of the incum-
bent state. Here, the Palestinian case comes to mind, however we also see exclusionary
tactics regarding citizenship arise in other settings: Citizenship = −1 for Myanmar’s role
in Arakan state; Sri Lanka’s role in the Tamil Eelam region; Iraq in Kurdistan; Azerbaijan
in Nagorno-Karabakh; and Israel in southern Lebanon.7 A full 96 percent of cases are
between −1 and 1. Some of these are due to an aggregation of exclusive practices on some
dimensions and inclusive practices on others.
How can we recover the two categories of incumbent state – those pursuing inclusive
annexation, and those pursuing exclusive annexation – from this relatively condensed
distribution? In particular, what should be done with the 32 cases for which GoalSum =
0? I experiment with three dichotomous variables: For incl1, inclusive annexation is
defined as those cases with GoalSum > 0; for incl2, inclusive annexation is defined as
those with GoalSum ≥ 0; and, finally incl3 uses the same criteria as incl1 but drops the
cases where GoalSum = 0. The first method (incl1) divides the cases such that 44 (54 %)
are classified as exclusive annexers and 37 (46%) are inclusive annexers (see Table 4.2).
The second method places 68 cases – a full 84 percent of the sample – in the inclusive
annexation category.
In some ways, it seems empirically accurate that most conflicts between self-determination
movements and existing states will emerge in regions that the existing state is fully inter-
7Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon began and ended during an internationalized civil war. It is
a stretch to conceptualize this as a case of attempted annexation, or even as a strategic intent to absorb of
territory.
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ested in maintaining, inclusive of the population that lives there. In particular, given our
focus on contemporary cases of conflict, most incumbent states consider their sovereignty
over the territory within their borders relatively unambiguous and thus, through their ac-
tions (those captured by Bureaucracy, NoSettle, and Citizenship) will seek to preserve
the status quo. If we consider these "zero" cases to be those where the incumbent state
was merely preserving the status quo and maintaining existing sovereign claims, then
it seems sensible to group those with other cases of inclusive annexation. However, an
examination of the component variables of GoalSum is instructive. In fact, we see that
56 out of 82 cases (68%) were coded as NoSettle = 1, meaning that the incumbent state
refrained from state-sponsored, or state-condoned, settlement of incumbent state popu-
lations into the contested region. In light of this, many of the cases for whichGoalSum = 0
are those which demonstrated a more exclusive tendency in either citizenship practices
or bureaucratic development in the contested region. For this reason, the first method
(incl1) is seen as preferable from a conceptual standpoint wherein at least some exclusive
policies were pursued. Finally, incl3 restricts the sample to 50 cases, and thus can be
seen, conceptually, as the more conservative version of incl1.
Figure 4.1: Goals of Incumbent States in Contested Regions (GoalSum)
Variable Criteria Inclusive Exclusive
incl1 GoalSum > 0 37(45.7%) 44(54.3%)
incl2 GoalSum ≥ 0 68(83.9%) 13(16.1%)
incl3 GoalSum > 0 (zeros dropped) 37(74.0%) 13(26.0%)
Table 4.2: Three ways of defining inclusive annexation
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The distribution of cases acrossAutoSum – the aggregate measure of nationalist move-
ment experiences with self-governing autonomy immediately prior to, during, and im-
mediately after the conflict – shows that very few cases receive the maximum score of
3 on this measure (see Figure 4.2). As mentioned, observations on AutoAf ter are right-
censored due to the presence of conflicts in the dataset that were ongoing at the time
of writing. Indeed, 30 conflicts could not be coded on AutoAf ter, including offensives
against the Islamic State in Afghanistan, Cameroon, Chad, Egypt, Lebanon, Libya, Niger,
Nigeria, Russia, Syria and Yemen. Due to this large amount of missing observations, and
in an aim to capture a measure which fits best with the concept of autonomy obtained and
practiced during a period of active contestation, we focus most of our attention below on
the AutoDuring variable.
Figure 4.2: Nationalist Movement Autonomy in Contested Regions (AutoSum)
Self-determination movements only obtained governing autonomy during the conflict
(AutoDuring = 1) in 24 out of 81 cases (30%). Further, while both settings of inclusive
and exclusive annexation are more likely to coincide with a nationalist movement that
has no governing autonomy during conflict (AutoDuring = 0), autonomy during conflict
is more prevalent in cases where the incumbent state adopts a more exclusive approach,
using the incl1 measure (see Table 4.3). A χ2 test demonstrates that the relationship
between annexation strategy and autonomy gained during conflict is statistically signif-
icant at (p = 0.05). Using incl2 or incl3, we still observe autonomy during conflict more
frequently in settings of exclusive annexation, but the relationship does not reach a con-
ventional level of statistical significance. Using the more conservative incl3 measure, for
example, we find that 5 out of 13 cases (38%) of exclusive annexation featured nationalist
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movements that gained autonomy during conflict, whereas only 7 out of 37 (19%) cases
of inclusive annexation did the same (χ2 = 2.01, p = 0.16).
AutoDuring = 0 AutoDuring = 1 T otal
Exclusive (incl1 = 0) 27(61.4%) 17(38.6%) 44 (54.3%)
Inclusive (incl1 = 1) 30(81.1%) 7(18.9%) 37 (45.7%)
Total 57(70.4%) 24(29.6%) 81 (100.0%)
Pearson χ2 = 3.75, p = 0.05
Table 4.3:
Classification of Incumbent State Strategy and Nationalist Movement Auton-
omy (Row Percentages)
While the autonomy variables described above clarify when a nationalist movement
obtained governing autonomy, if at all, they do not clearly align with the distinction
between partial and full autonomy discussed in section 4.4 above. Mapping the category
of "no autonomy" into our dataset is fairly clear: In these cases, the autonomy variables
will be coded as zero. Full autonomy is defined above as de facto, and perhaps also de jure,
independence. Full autonomy is present in a subset of those cases where AutoAfter = 1.
However, since AutoAf ter is defined as simply a status in which the nationalists have
more autonomy than they had going into the conflict, or during the conflict, it is not
necessarily true that all cases for which AutoEnd = 1 are settings where full autonomy
has been exercised. We observe 16 cases which obtained additional autonomy at the
conclusion of a conflict episode, including cases such as Timor-Leste – which obtained full
independence – but also those such as the Donetsk separatist region in Ukraine, whose
autonomy from Ukraine cannot yet be described as complete at the time of writing.8
In many ways, those cases that obtained some functional autonomy during the conflict
(AutoDuring = 1) are the most precisely aligned with the concept of partial autonomy.
By definition, this autonomy is not full, since the conflict is ongoing. It is instructive to
note that there is no statistically significant relationship between annexation strategy and
autonomy exercised immediately prior to the conflict (AutoP re), nor between annexation
strategy and autonomy obtained at the end of conflict (AutoAf ter), for the restricted sub-
sample for which we could code this variable. This applies across all three operationaliza-
tions of inclusive annexation. This finding increases our confidence in the assertion that
the explanation for the correlation between incumbent state goals and nationalist move-
ment autonomy exercised during conflict is uniquely appropriate to the dynamics that
occur during the active period of contestation. The lack of correlation with autonomy
8Although the conflict in Donetsk is ongoing, I was able to code AutoEnd for this conflict because the
episode fell beneath the battle death threshold in 2014 and did not exceed the threshold again in 2015.
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prior to conflict also increases our confidence in the relative independence of incumbent
state goals at the beginning of conflict – as we have defined them – from the amount of
autonomy the nationalist movement already had prior to the conflict. The lack of sig-
nificant relationship between annexation strategy and autonomy at the end of conflict,
while only observed in the restricted subsample of 51 cases, suggests that, even if the
stepwise switch in Indonesia’s strategy – from permitting no autonomy to Frente Revolu-
cionária de Timor-Leste Independente, or the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East
Timor (FRETILIN) whatsoever to allowing for full independence – was a result of their
goal of inclusive annexation, this relationship between goals and autonomy obtained af-
ter conflict is probably not generalizable. Inclusive annexing states appear no more likely
than their exclusive annexing counterparts to permit autonomy at the end of conflict.
The rarest combination of traits is an incumbent state pursuing inclusive annexation
(incl1 = 1) and a nationalist movement that exercise partial autonomy during conflict
(AutoDuring = 1). The seven cases where this occurred were: Donetsk (Ukraine); Kosovo
(Yugoslavia/Serbia); Lugansk (Ukraine); Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan); Novorossiya
(Ukraine); Serb territory/Republika Srpska (Bosnia-Herzegovina); Serb territory/Serbian
Krajina (Croatia). Notably, nearly all of these cases feature very prominent external spon-
sors for the nationalist region that obtained autonomy: three cases feature pro-Russian
separatist movements in Ukraine; two are conflicts where Serbian forces were support-
ing separatist regions in neighboring Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia; and Nagorno-
Karabakh has benefited from extensive Armenian support. Kosovo obtained de facto
sovereignty after the 1998-1999 war, but it was coded as AutoDuring = 1 since the
Kosovo Liberation Army also made extensive gains and exercised some of the functions
of governance during the conflict, although its sources of external support during this
time are disputed. In summary, though, the seven cases in this cell of the typology sug-
gest that robust external sponsorship of the nationalist movement may undermine the
relationship between incumbent state goals and nationalist movement autonomy that we
would otherwise expect to see.
Finally, we see that democratic incumbent states are no more likely than autocratic
ones to adopt exclusive strategies. In fact, according to the preferred cutoff for defining
inclusive versus exclusive annexation (incl1), incumbent states pursuing inclusive annex-
ation are more democratic (P olityincl=0 = 0.84, P olityincl=1 = 3.0), t = −1.72, df = 80,
p = 0.09). Further, although incumbent states are more democratic in cases where nation-
alist movements obtain autonomy during conflict, the relationship is not statistically sig-
nificant (P olityautoduring=0 = 2.42, P olityautoduring=1 = 0.38), t = 1.45, df = 43, p = 0.15).
Recalling that regime type was offered as a possible alternative explanation in chapter 3 –
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namely, that Indonesia’s authoritarianism was the primary reason that FRETILIN did not
obtain greater autonomy over governance during the occupation and conflict – this calls
into question the generalizability of this claim to other cases, even if it was salient for the
Indonesia-Israel comparison.
In sum, these findings suggest that national movements are more able to achieve au-
tonomy during conflicts with incumbent states in settings where the incumbent state pri-
oritizes incorporating the contested territory itself, rather than its population. We find
stronger statistical relationships when we group incumbent states with more ambiguous
goals (those cases where GoalSum = 0) with those pursuing this form of exclusive annex-
ation. Some of these are cases that may be more accurately referred to as those where
incumbent states adopted strategies of "benign neglect", i.e. where the incumbent state
does not sponsor or condone a population transfer strategy (NoSettle = 1), however they
also underinvest in bureaucracy (Bureaucracy = −1) e.g. Georgia in South Ossetia, or the
Syrian regime in its Kurdish north. Others, such as the Phillippines in Mindanao, India
in Bodoland, or the United Kingdom in Northern Ireland, did not necessarily underin-
vest in bureaucracy or pursue exclusionary citizenship rules, however they also ignored
population movements that were likely to enflame tensions with the population seeking
self-determination (NoSettle = 0). Thus, this category of incumbent state whose goals
sum to zero requires a bit more exploration. One can perhaps conclude that national
movement autonomy is most likely to thrive in settings of definitive exclusive annexation
or settings where the incumbent state strategy is a bit more ambiguous.
4.6 Discussion
The creation of a two-by-two typology of regions of contested statehood demonstrated
that incumbent state goals appear to be linked to opportunities for nationalist move-
ments, which oppose the incumbent state, to obtain autonomy over some aspects of gov-
ernance. It may not be the intentional decision of the incumbent state to outsource gover-
nance of the existing population, but rather the goal of exclusive annexation may, rather
simply, create opportunities for nationalist movements to establish governing institu-
tions. What I suggest, building on the small-N analysis in the preceding chapter, is that
the incumbent state’s goals are just one driver among others that determine opportunities
for autonomy. It is also most useful to think of these relationships in probabilistic terms
since unobserved variables and stochastic factors may push incumbent states defined as
one type to, under certain circumstances, behave as the opposite type.
Ultimately, the analysis of the West Bank in chapter 2 pushed us to think about how
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the acquisition of partial self-rule – or autonomy – for nationalist movements in conflict
settings can affect their development of state-like capacity. While the Palestinian Author-
ity represents a very formalized version of partial autonomy, the analysis in the present
chapter shows that nationalist movements obtaining some functional authority in regions
that are contested with the incumbent state is not an uncommon phenomenon. From
Kosovo to Tamil Eelam to Azawad, rebel movements seeking national self-determination
have been able to consolidate and institutionalize their roles as near monopoly providers
in the areas of policing, taxation, justice, goods provision, or some combination of the
above. If we are to infer lessons from the Palestinian case, these spells of autonomy have
serious implications for how such movements might transition toward developing other
forms of state-like capacity. In the Palestinian case, we saw that the Palestinian national
movement, when in power, experienced a limited form of autonomy over policing and
security which then appeared to facilitate the use of repression and distort fiscal capacity
development. Would we expect similar distortions in the other cases of "partial auton-
omy" observed in the dataset in this chapter?
Practical constraints prevent us from considering all of the potential legacies of these
settings where nationalist movements obtain autonomy over some functions of govern-
ment, but not others. Unsurprisingly, these are often difficult areas and populations to
access. One example is the special autonomous province of Aceh in Indonesia, which is
permitted to follow and enforce shari’a law, thus practices autonomy in the areas of jus-
tice, policing, and some autonomy over taxing and spending. However, its emphasis on
policing and imposing religious law has developed disproportionately to other forms of
state activity – such as distribution of public goods. This uneven capacity may be fueling
disproportionate investment in certain forms of capacity over others.
In theorizing potential causal links between annexation strategies and nationalist move-
ment autonomy, it may be useful to investigate parallels between inclusive and exclusive
annexation and forms of colonial rule. Although not identical in their aims, there are par-
allels between the inclusive annexation strategy and the concept of "direct rule" used to
describe a form of colonial rule, used most notably by the French, in sub-Saharan Africa.
Mamdani (1996, 16) describes direct rule as containing "a single legal order, defined by
the ‘civilized’ laws of Europe. No ‘native’ institutions would be recognized. Although
‘natives’ would have to conform to European laws, only those ‘civilized’ would have ac-
cess to European rights."9 More contemporary examples of inclusive annexation share
9There is some debate over whether direct rule, the more heavy-handed imposition of colonial institu-
tions, had positive or negative effects on future development for the newly independent state. Lange (2009,
6) finds that direct rule had positive downstream effects on development, arguing that it "institutionalized
more bureaucratic states and made possible corporate state action by helping to discipline and coordinate
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this commitment to a single, unified legal framework.
Exclusive annexation, and its association with autonomy, on the other hand, has a
natural linkage with the concept of indirect rule. For example, Hechter (2001) argues
that the prevalence of direct, rather than indirect, rule in the contemporary state system
has been consequential precisely because it has not guaranteed national autonomy and
thus has generated greater demands for national self-determination. Just as one of the
implications of the inclusive annexation strategy is a "direct" style of rule, states pursu-
ing exclusive annexation may adopt a strategy more akin to "indirect rule" vis-a-vis the
existing population. Although its most well-known application was in the British colo-
nial context, even early modern Europe featured relationships of indirect rule between
monarchs and local leaders. Tilly (1992, 25) notes, prior to the consolidation of nation-
states, "indirect rule made it possible to govern without erecting, financing, and feeding
a bulky administrative apparatus." In Africa, Berry (1993, 25) describes how indirect rule
was deployed by "most colonial regimes," explaining that "[o]ne obvious way to cut costs
was to use Africans both as employees and as local agents of colonial rule. African clerks
and chiefs were cheaper than European personnel." As Naseemullah and Staniland (2016)
argue, indirect rule has not disappeared with decolonization. Gerring, Ziblatt, Gorp, and
Arevalo (2011) provide a historically unbounded definition of indirect rule as essentially
any form of decentralized rule. Thus, the concept has travelled beyond the colonial con-
text.10 Perhaps even more so than is allowed under the colonial and the more general
formulations of indirect rule, contemporary states pursuing exclusive annexation may
seek to symbolically distinguish institutions serving the existing population from those
serving the incumbent state and, if it exists, its settler population. This distinction will
not be between the "customary" and the "civil" as described by Mamdani (1996), but be-
tween different nationally defined constituencies.
This analysis may be fruitful for a number of other areas – for example, different
annexation strategies and different associated opportunities for autonomy would be ex-
pected to generate different organizational structures amongst national resistance move-
state agents; states of former directly ruled colonies were more infrastructurally powerful and the inclu-
sion of societal actors in policy making and policy implementation promoted development." However, this
assumes that the institutions of direct rule are successfully preserved and captured by the founding party
and leaders of the new state. On the other hand, examining differences in directly and indirectly ruled
areas of India using an instrumental variables approach, Iyer (2010) finds that direct rule had a negative
effect on development outcomes. A clear definition of the concept of direct rule, along with an assessment
in each case of how much of its institutional legacies persist, seems fundamental to resolving this debate.
10My theory diverges from Hechter (2001) on the effects of indirect rule in necessarily diminishing na-
tionalism. This is primarily due to differences between our conceptualizations of indirect rule – for Hechter,
it is a somewhat organic solution that arises to organize pre-state solidary groups and to mediate their re-
lationship to the state. In my cases, it is not at all organic.
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ments. Under inclusive annexation, we can expect the organizational structure of the
national resistance movement to be influenced by the pervasive, institutional presence
of the incumbent state. While many factors can play a role in determining the organi-
zational structure of the resistance, inclusive annexation projects may be more likely to
facilitate a dispersed resistance movement whose bases are located outside of major urban
or populated areas, where the incumbent state’s strong presence will serve as a deterrent.
By contrast, we might expect the opposite form of national resistance movement under
exclusive annexation – one which is able to locate in major urban or populated areas
where the national community seeking statehood resides. Thus, national movements in
environments of exclusive annexation will likely have more potential to set up civil and
political organizational structures. The correlation of incumbent state strategy, resistance
movement autonomy, and resistance movement structure is just one possible extension of
the framework defined in this chapter. The next chapter zeroes in on Timor-Leste for a fi-
nal time with some exploratory analysis of how a setting of attempted inclusive annexation
affected the resistance movement, its transition to statehood, and capacity development
in one of the world’s newest states.
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CHAPTER V
Conflict Legacies and Tax Morale in a New State: The Case
of Timor-Leste
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we return our focus to a single case of contested statehood – the Demo-
cratic Republic of Timor-Leste – which gained its independence in 2002 following cen-
turies of Portuguese colonial rule, decades of Indonesian occupation, and a short transi-
tional period under United Nations (UN) administration. Chapter 3 contrasted Indone-
sia’s motivations in East Timor, as the territory was then known, with Israel’s approach
toward the Palestinian Territories, arguing that the former constituted a case of inclusive
annexation, in which the Indonesian state, despite periods of extreme violence targeted
at civilians, aimed to annex both the territory and the existing population of East Timor.
This strategy ensured that the Timorese national movement – first under Frente Revolu-
cionária de Timor-Leste Independente, or the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East
Timor (FRETILIN), and, subsequently, Conselho Nacional da Resistência Maubere, or the
National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) – exercised virtually no formal gov-
erning autonomy during the Indonesian occupation from 1975 to 1999. Rather, the re-
sistance consisted primarily of a guerrilla movement dispersed across the mountainous
interior, supported by clandestine, urban cells and a diplomatic wing that pressed for
East Timor’s independence in the international arena. FRETILIN did control isolated
"liberated zones" in the early years of the conflict, compelling the movement to engage in
limited, transactional governance with Timorese civilians. However, because Indonesia
prioritized comprehensive control of the whole territory, including integration of, ideally,
a subdued civilian population into the Indonesian state, these areas were quickly targeted
and quashed. The trajectory of the Timorese independence movement toward the end of
occupation also diverged from that of Palestinian nationalists. In East Timor, the resis-
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tance movement underwent a dramatic transition from no control over governance to a
mandate for full independence following Indonesia’s complete withdrawal from the ter-
ritory.
The Timorese national movement’s transition from resistance to governance was uni-
directional and unambiguous when compared to the Palestinian case, where the relative
importance of resistance and governance has oscillated, at times, while at others both
have occurred simultaneously. This chapter, like chapter 2, seeks to determine how in-
cumbent state-nationalist movement relations during conflict have shaped the develop-
ment of fiscal capacity in the emergent state. Did Timor-Leste’s unambiguous transition
from occupied province to independent state generate different, observable outcomes in
the fiscal relationship between the new state and its citizens than those that were observed
in the more muddled and incomplete Palestinian state formation process?
The subsequent analysis draws on original survey data to explore individuals’ will-
ingness to comply with taxation – the micro-level foundation of state fiscal capacity. This
introduction of a new research design and level of analysis requires some explanation.
A more deductive comparison to the Palestinian case would examine the association be-
tween state coercive and fiscal capacities across regions within the country, mirroring the
operationalization of those variables used in chapter 2. There are several reasons that
I have chosen not to pursue this path. First, due to the availability of natural resource
rents, discussed in more detail below, the Timorese state’s overall tax effort is extremely
low. Outside of Dili, the capital city, many people are employed in the informal sector
or fall below the earnings threshold making them exempt from income tax.1 The taxable
income base is highly concentrated in Dili, and income tax is deducted from employee
wages at source. This means that those who reside in neighboring districts but work in
Dili will be taxed in Dili at their place of work, making it difficult to accurately measure
the geographic incidence of taxes collected. Districts, sub-districts, and sucos (villages)
do not collect any regular or substantial fees of their own. Thus, it is difficult to oper-
ationalize an outcome variable that is comparable to the local revenues observed in the
Palestinian case. Second, the coercive capacity of the Timorese state does vary across re-
gions, as will be elaborated below, but it is hard to identify this variation as exogenous to
the state’s capacity in other areas, including fiscal.
Thus, rather than replicating the research design pursued in chapter 2, I aim to an-
swer a more tractable and relevant set of questions, namely: In a newly independent, post-
conflict state where experience with consent-based taxation is virtually non-existent, what leads
1The Timorese government also collects import duties, excise taxes on certain goods, taxes on the
petroleum sector, and business taxes on certain service industries.
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to variation in individual attitudes toward taxation? Do the legacies of conflict and occupation
influence this variation? Wars of self-determination that result in the creation of a new
state may culminate in a mood of national optimism, but the challenge of constructing
institutions that satisfy the expectations of the population can make the post-conflict pe-
riod even more daunting. Beyond short-term reconstruction and recovery, new states also
must cultivate new norms and practices of state-society relations. This study offers an ex-
amination of the correlates of tax morale in a setting where such norms are, on the whole,
very nascent. I use novel survey data from a pilot test that I conducted in three districts
in 2015, combined with qualitative analysis, to generate several hypotheses about re-
gional variation in attitudes toward taxation, as well as variation in these attitudes at the
individual level. I test these hypotheses on a nationally representative survey of Timo-
rese citizens (N = 1,243) conducted by The Asia Foundation in November and December
2016.
I find that individuals in the region where the post-independence government has typ-
ically displayed a less decisive monopoly on violence are consistently less likely to sup-
port taxation in exchange for services and less likely to believe that it is the government’s
responsibility to ensure that people are prosperous. The divide between those from the
eastern part of Timor-Leste (lorosa’e) and those from the western region (loromonu, of-
ten loosely defined to include both the western and central regions) is politicized, since
tensions emerged between these groups following independence over participation in
the resistance movement and, subsequently, the composition of the new state’s military.
Some attribute the tensions to agitators who do not reflect the general attitudes of the
population, whereas others maintain that the division is, in fact, salient to many regu-
lar citizens. Most recently, 2015 saw the killing of a paramilitary commander Paulino
Gama (known as "Mauk Moruk"), a former coup leader who had been leading violent
attacks against police checkpoints in the eastern district of Baucau (Wassel & Rajalingam
2015). While the Timorese case doesn’t feature externally imposed variation in state co-
ercive capacity like we saw in the West Bank, it is accurate to say that the government has
the most coercive capacity in Dili and less in the periphery, most especially in the east.
Lower coercive authority – or state presence in general – appears to be associated with
less expressed dependence on government and lower tax morale. While we cannot say
if this apparent correlation is causal, these distinctive attitudes in the eastern region of
the country may be due to legacies of less state control in those areas. This research sug-
gests that Timor-Leste may exhibit a more straightforward, positive correlation between
coercive and fiscal capacity development than we saw in the Palestinian case.
Due to extensive oil and gas reserves, the Timorese population has faced a low tax
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burden since independence. However, at the time of writing, the government is plan-
ning to introduce new forms of taxation, such as a value-added tax (VAT), to compensate
for dwindling resource rents and to diversify its funding sources as proven oil and gas re-
serves are expected to be exhausted in the coming decades. Thus, the current study comes
at an opportune time to measure initial attitudes toward taxation and to ascertain how
experiences with conflict and the state formation process itself may have influenced these
attitudes. While we would expect overall tax morale to be low in a resource-dependent
country like Timor-Leste, individual- and regional-level variation can have implications
for future policies aiming to develop a domestic tax base.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 5.2, I review rele-
vant findings from the large body of work in behavioral economics and political science
on tax compliance. There is not much dialogue between this work and research on the fis-
cal capacity of states. Quasi-voluntary compliance is particularly important in new and
aspiring states such as Timor-Leste and Palestine, where individual relationships with
state authorities are often complicated by legacies of occupation and conflict. Thus, this
chapter aims, at least implicitly, to connect compliance to fiscal capacity as one of its
necessary, micro-level foundations. Section 5.3 provides important historical context on
the Timorese resistance movement and Timor-Leste’s fiscal situation after independence.
In section 5.4, I summarize results from my pilot survey of 34 residents of Timor-Leste,
which suggest sources of individual- and regional-level variation in attitudes. Section
5.5 draws on the preceding sections to generate hypotheses regarding individual- and
regional-level variation in willingness to comply with taxation. Section 5.6 presents find-
ings from the larger 2016 survey of Timorese respondents. Section 5.7 concludes, spec-
ulating about how these findings may be shaped by the particular conflict legacies of
Timor-Leste, and what they may mean for other newly independent states or states tran-
sitioning out of conflict. There are many ways in which the case of Timor-Leste is quite
different from that of Palestine. This important caveat means that we must be cautious
in attributing any differences in the state’s fiscal relationship with its population to the
different legacies of conflict in the two countries. Yet the observations made here can still
inform our understanding of how state-citizen bargains develop, and vary subnationally,
in a state that has recently emerged from a period of contestation.
5.2 Tax Compliance and the Fiscal Capacity of States
The literature on tax compliance offers a number of possible explanations for why
individuals pay taxes. Large-N empirical studies are particularly well-suited to identify
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the role of macro-level institutional, economic, and cultural factors, yet these studies have
largely focused on developed countries. The experimental literature, on the other hand,
has contributed to more precise identification of why the propensity to pay taxes may
vary across types of individuals, types of taxes, types of policy interventions, and further
how these micro-level factors might interact. This section reviews some of those findings,
including more recent extensions of this work to the developing world. I conclude that
uncertainty remains in how these findings might travel to settings of recent conflict, or
contexts where the norms of consent-based taxation are relatively nascent.
Both large-N observational studies and experimental work on the topics of tax com-
pliance and evasion are informed by formal theory. A fairly general definition of tax
payment is a redirection of one’s private revenue toward public gain. Yet there are some
ambiguities inherent in this definition, and thus in the transaction itself: First, is it certain
that these revenues will be used for "public gain"? Second, as an individual contributing
revenue, will I benefit from how these revenues are spent? With the answer to both of
these questions usually clouded by some degree of uncertainty, it is not immediately clear
why one would voluntarily pay taxes. The first observation from formal models of taxa-
tion – and, quite simply, from casual observation – is that people comply with taxation
because they fear punishment for not doing so. The effects of coercion and the threat of
enforcement appear as powerful explanatory variables for compliance at the individual
level. Two straightforward results of the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) workhorse model
of tax evasion are that an increase in either the penalty rate applied to tax evaders who
are caught or the probability of being caught always decreases evasion. Building on this
model, there is evidence that taxpayer compliance, a seemingly irrational behavior, is at
least partially based on individuals overweighting the low probability of audit (Andreoni,
Erard, & Feinstein 1998). These theories of taxpayer compliance and evasion share the
assumptions that taxpayer decisions are made in an environment of uncertainty about
the true capacity and enforcement effort of the state (Alm, McClelland, & Schulze 1992).
Even so, given the low probability of being audited or punished in many settings, schol-
ars challenged the idea that information asymmetries were enough to explain the high
levels of compliance observed in many developed country contexts.
Of course, taxpayers may also comply because revenues are spent on goods or ser-
vices that benefit them. Experimental and individual-level observational research has
found that the perception of taxation as a fiscal exchange – in which individual compli-
ance is motivated by the value and quality of goods received in return for tax revenues
contributed – may increase compliance (Alm, Jackson, & McKee 1993; Alm, McClelland,
& Schulze 1992; Bodea & LeBas 2014). In some ways, this is an intuitive result: those
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who value state spending relatively more are relatively more likely to comply with taxa-
tion than those who value state spending relatively less. However, existing research also
suggests that strong incentives for shirking may still exist if it is perceived that the good
will be provided even without their contribution. Even if individuals highly value state
spending, if they are reasonable sure that the valued goods or services will still be pro-
vided even if they don’t pay their taxes, and if they think there is a low probability of
being punished for shirking, then one could imagine they still might not pay their taxes.
In addition to these "extrinsic" motivations, researchers began to theorize, and aimed
to empirically observe, intrinsic motivations matter in shaping tax compliance (Dwenger,
Kleven, Rasul, & Rincke 2016; Luttmer & Singhal 2014). Some subset of these motiva-
tions are often captured under the somewhat nebulous concept of "tax morale." Some have
conceptualized tax morale as "residual compliance" – in other words, compliance that is
not due to the threat of enforcement or punishment, and thus have encouraged scholars
to observe it in settings where enforcement activity is known to be minimal (Dwenger,
Kleven, Rasul, & Rincke 2016; Luttmer & Singhal 2014). Beyond the threat of enforce-
ment or the value of goods received in exchange for paying one’s taxes, the perception of
what the rest of the population is doing and notions of fairness are likely to affect indi-
vidual compliance behavior (Carpio 2014; Cowell 1992; Grimes 2006; Levi 1988). In new
state settings, information about what others are doing may vary depending on social and
organizational linkages that predate independence. After a dramatic political transition
such as regime change or new state creation, individuals may have had little opportunity
to observe voluntary compliance or non-compliance among their fellow citizens. Thus,
in such settings, it is perhaps relatively less likely that views toward taxation and actual
behavior are driven by these "social" effects.
Overall, there are reasons to believe that individuals’ attitudes toward taxation and
compliance are shaped from an accumulation of experiences and are not easily perturbed.
In an older, but revealing, study, Listhaug and Miller (1985) find that a set of more "sym-
bolic" variables – capturing, for example, political ideology, religious values, and politi-
cal dissatisfaction – are more predictive of one’s attitudes toward cheating on one’s taxes
than "self-interest"-related variables related to income and standard of living. Luttmer
and Singhal (2014)’s incisive explanation for why field experimental work which aims
to ascertain the effect of moral suasion campaigns on compliance produced null effects
could be taken as a broader critique of some of the experiment-based literature. They
note: "Individuals’ views of the competence of the government and the value of the pub-
lic services it provides are formed through a lifetime of personal experience: a few lines
of text in a mailed letter may just not be sufficient to cause taxpayers to update their be-
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liefs or attitudes in many contexts," (158). To understand compliance behavior, we may
need to incorporate more stable traits or predispositions of individuals, such as trust in
government (Levi 1988; Levi & Stoker 2000; Torgler 2003) and pro-social spirit (Andriani
2015), which appear to be positively correlated with tax compliance.
Nationalism is often grouped together with other forms of "civic duty" that may make
individuals more willing to pay taxes. Luttmer and Singhal (2014, 150) cite a telling ex-
ample of the Kenya Revenue Authority’s efforts to boost compliance by timing a campaign
"to coincide with Kenyatta Day celebrations in honor of...national heroes" and pushing
the message that "[p]resent taxpayers are taking a leading role in freeing their country
from donor dependency to economic independence," (citing Waweru (2004)). Similarly,
the reader will recall the new Director General of the Palestinian Authority Ministry of
Finance, when Palestinians took over responsibility for direct taxation for the first time,
noting that, while nonpayment of taxes under occupation was once a legitimate tool of
protest, "[n]ow delay in paying means a delay in building the Palestinian state," (Green-
berg 1994). These are just two among many examples of leaders using nationalist lan-
guage and conceptions of national duty to motivate tax compliance. These efforts by
politicians assume that cultivating greater individual attachment to the nation will re-
sult in a greater sense of responsibility toward the fiscal state. This assumption has not
been extensively scrutinized or tested in the existing literature on compliance and eva-
sion. On one hand, we may expect newly independent states, such as Timor-Leste, that
have fought a long struggle for independence, to have high overall levels of nationalism
and civic duty, thus increasing motivations to pay taxes. On the other hand, the com-
plexities of the occupation and violent conflict also may have undermined societal trust
and pro-social norms. The premise of the analysis below is that the national struggle had
varied effects across individuals depending on whether they or a loved one fought for the
resistance, what part of the country they are from, and other traits. Thus, we can also
expect individual attachments to the post-independence state and, therefore, willingness
to pay taxes to vary as well.
The survey-based design proposed below has some advantages and disadvantages as
compared to these experimental-based approaches. First, surveys only ask for respon-
dents’ opinions or views, and thus cannot make inferences about their actual behavior
when it comes to complying or not complying with taxation. While lab experiments are
well-suited to observe behavior, the ability to generalize from findings in the lab to "real
world" contexts is often uncertain. Field experiments are a promising way to understand
individuals’ behavior in a more natural setting and take advantage of the properties of
randomization for causal inference, however they are sometimes cost-prohibitive. The re-
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search design proposed below should be seen as complementary to existing and ongoing
experimental work in this field.
While this chapter is primarily devoted to understanding tax compliance in a new
state setting, it also has implications for our understanding of fiscal capacity develop-
ment from the state’s perspective. Whether voluntary, quasi-voluntary, or fully coerced,
compliance is a necessary condition for states to extract revenue from their populations.
The literature on fiscal capacity development in states, summarized in some depth in
chapter 2, notes that cultivating voluntary or quasi-voluntary compliance is often desir-
able from the state’s perspective, as it is less costly and risky than coercion-based com-
pliance. However, it is not costless to develop the foundations for consent. In a young,
post-conflict democracy such as Timor-Leste, one might assume that institutions will be
fashioned which prioritize consent over coercion, because the costs of coercion can be
particularly high. Further, the availability of extensive natural resource revenues has ex-
tended the time horizon and thus, to some extent, reduced the urgency of these efforts.
Unlike the advanced democracies where the motivating question for much of the existing
research has been to understand why individuals pay taxes, the most relevant and timely
question for Timor-Leste is how consent-based tax compliance can be developed in the
first place.
5.3 The Timorese Resistance and Transition to Independence
As described in chapter 3, the Indonesian occupation of the eastern half of the island
of Timor – now the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste – began in December 1975 under
then-President Suharto’s "New Order" regime with the support of the United States, Aus-
tralia and other Cold War era allies. Prior to Indonesia’s invasion, East Timor had been
a colony of Portugal. While the pre-independence period was covered in some detail in
chapter 3, here I will focus on key features of that history that might generate longer term
effects in the ability of the post-independence state to develop fiscal relationships with
its citizens.
The attitudes of contemporary Timorese citizens toward taxation may be influenced
by their own experiences and, perhaps, those of their predecessors. Over four centuries of
Portuguese colonial rule, and subsequently in the relatively short Indonesian period, the
Timorese population had almost no experience with voluntary or quasi-voluntary fiscal
exchange with a central state. Portuguese colonial administrators were largely motivated
by extraction of natural resources, maintenance of maritime trade routes, and the export
of labor-intensive agriculture. Therefore, "taxation" of the population, in its broadest
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sense, was coercive and included not just revenue but forced labor. Accounts of this pe-
riod consistently report that Portugal invested little in the development of this relatively
remote colony and vastly undersupplied public goods to the population. Significant in-
vestments in educational institutions did not really occur until the 1950s. As described in
chapter 3, Portugal engaged in indirect rule in the remote districts, coopting local tribal
chiefs (liurai) when possible. It is undoubtedly difficult to summarize a colonial experi-
ence which lasted so long in a few brief sentences, but it is relatively uncontroversial to
claim that Timorese living during this period observed little connection between the taxes
and resources they paid to the empire and the benefits, if any, they received in return.
Before the Indonesian occupation began, the Timorese population that was alive in
1975 had what may have been a brief glimpse into how FRETILIN would rule, but there
is no evidence to suggest that regularized systems of taxation were set up and maintained
during this short period. FRETILIN was established in 1974 as Portuguese colonial rule
over East Timor was coming to a close. Following a failed coup by a competing move-
ment that sought integration with Portugal, FRETILIN leapt into power for a brief win-
dow between September and December 1975 and exercised temporary administration of
the territory. However, FRETILIN’s reign, and East Timor’s initial independence, was
short-lived. Portugal’s withdrawal left Indonesia with an opportunity to consolidate its
rule over the eastern half of the island of Timor, and Indonesian counterintelligence op-
erations to promote East Timor’s absorption into Indonesia had already begun. During
its short and tenuous period of rule, FRETILIN aimed to develop a program "focused on
decolonization, land reform, administrative reform, popular education and the develop-
ment of small industries based on primary products like coffee," (Fernandes 2011, 14).
However, the movement never really had a chance to advance these governance goals.
FRETILIN anticipated that Indonesia might seize the opportunity and thus had some
time to prep for the invasion. At the time of Indonesia’s invasion of Dili:
"FRETILIN had at its disposal an army of more than 10,000 men – a hard
professional core of some 2500 regular troops and another 7000 who had ob-
tained military training under the Portuguese. A further 10,000 or so were
given short courses of military instruction. It was a ’people’s army.’ None of
the FRETILIN commanders had been tutored on military tactics or strategy at
staff colleges, and none had command experience other than in junior posts
(mostly noncommissioned) before the civil war. However, several had already
emerged as shrewd and inspiring leaders," (Dunn 2003, 251).
FRETILIN and its military arm, the Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste,
or the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of Timor-Leste (Falintil), were best equipped
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for guerrilla-style warfare. Thus, the main resource it extracted from the Timorese pop-
ulation in the lead-up to Indonesia’s invasion, and in the early years of Indonesian rule,
was human recruits, not tax revenue.
Even more extensively than Portugal, Indonesia deployed coercion and, at times, in-
discriminate violence as a central feature of its state-building strategy. However, quite
unlike Portugal, Indonesia engaged explicitly in direct rule and, despite the use of re-
pression and violence, it also pursued developmental priorities. The amount of revenue
that the Indonesian state earned from taxation in East Timor was far less than it spent on
infrastructure, development, and, of course, the brutal military occupation. As recounted
by Saldanha (1994, 135), despite the immediate disorder after seizing control of the coun-
try, "the government of Indonesia immediately carried out preparations to manage East
Timor under the motto ’implementing development in order to catch up with the other
provinces’." While initially working uncomfortably alongside local, ethnically Timorese
officials, the Indonesian administration expanded and "the majority of employees and of-
ficials at government offices were Indonesians from outside East Timor," (139). Because
East Timor was at a comparably low level of development, significant investments were
made in roads, education, health care, irrigation, and the creation of new administrative
offices (Saldanha 1994, 139). (Further, in the first four to five years of the occupation, the
Indonesian military was engaged in intense fighting with FRETILIN to "pacify" moun-
tainous areas under the resistance movement’s control, where many civilians had fled
with them and were now living.) Despite the fact that Indonesia vastly outspended Por-
tugal in its administration of the province, neither the Portuguese nor the Indonesian
approach allowed room for a fiscal exchange between the Timorese population and its
government.
In 1999, with a change in leadership in Indonesia and the Cold War over, Indone-
sian President Habibie initiated a referendum in East Timor to determine the territory’s
status. The announcement of the vote – and the vote itself, in which 78.5 percent of Tim-
orese voted for independence – unleashed to a bloody campaign of destruction by the
Indonesian military and affiliated militias, leading to the death of at least 1,200 civilians
(G. Robinson 2003). The country then entered a two-and-a-half year period of transition
under United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), and finally
achieved full independence in 2002. The UN maintained a support mission in the terri-
tory until 2005, and returned following an attempted coup and security crisis in 2006,
withdrawing again in 2012.
Oil and gas exploration began in the 1960s and uncovered significant offshore oil and
gas reserves in the Timor Sea. Since 2004, the independent Timorese state has begun re-
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couping oil and gas rents, and set up a sovereign wealth fund to manage and invest oil in-
come in 2005. Oil and gas revenues comprise almost 97 percent of government revenues,
and the oil share of GDP was 75 to 80 percent in 2012-2013 (International Monetary
Fund 2016). This places Timor-Leste among the most resource-dependent – although not
resource-rich – economies in the world. As the literature on resource-dependent regimes
tells us, this would predict low tax effort by the government and overall low tax morale
among citizens. However, depending on assumptions about oil and gas prices and future
spending, and depending on how a water boundary disputer with Australia is resolved,
some estimate that Timor’s petroleum fund could be depleted as soon as 2026 (Scheiner
2016). Further, the government is limiting, with some success, its spending from oil
revenues and is already engaged in efforts to increase non-petroleum revenues through
increased tax collection. A draft law for a value-added tax was shared by the Ministry
of Finance for public consultation in mid-2016 before being put before the legislature.
Thus, the current study comes at an opportune time to assess Timorese "baseline" at-
titudes toward taxation when, as of yet, the majority of the population does not have
extensive experience with taxation. The primary, existing taxes are an import and sales
tax – 2.5 percent each – levied on most goods upon entry; a flat income tax rate of 10
percent for those who make more than $500 per month; and a services tax (5 percent) for
hotel, restaurant, and telecommunications businesses (Timor-Leste Ministry of Finance
n.d.).
5.3.1 Regional and Partisan Legacies of the Conflict
The resistance against Indonesia and the brutality of the occupation affected all Timo-
rese individuals – many lost their own lives or the lives of family members during this pe-
riod. In addition, the conflict divided families: a substantial minority of Timorese fought
on behalf of pro-integration militias and often faced off against family members and for-
mer friends who fought for independence on the other side. The struggle for Timor-
Leste’s future from 1975 to 1999 also tapped into local and regional divisions. In partic-
ular, the distinction between those from the Western part of the country (loromonu) and
those from the East (lorosa’e) emerged during the conflict and continued to have salience
after independence (see Map 5.1). The nature and significance of these regional identi-
ties is hotly debated – while some Timorese argue that the distinction is only reinforced
by those seeking to create political rivalries and divide the country, others maintain that
the West versus East divide is, in fact, meaningful and continues to produce tensions in
the current, post-independence era. Some have noted that the latent distinction emerged
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Map 5.1: Timor-Leste Administrative Districts, using borders from Hijmans (2009)
In 2006, Timor-Leste had its first major crisis of governance since independence, and it
is broadly acknowledged that the East-West division played a role in fueling the tensions
underlying the crisis. The crisis erupted from within the FALINTIL Timor-Leste Defense
Force (F-FDTL), the official military of the new state, but whose namesake, FALINTIL,
had been the armed wing of the national resistance movement during the Indonesian
occupation. A group of petitioners from the military began a protest over perceived dis-
crimination within the institution; the protest was based on the claim that the military
was discriminating against loromonu.
As Shiosaki (2017, 57) summarizes, the common understanding of the reemergence of
East-West tensions after independence is rooted in perceptions of unequal contribution
to the resistance movement:
"The geographic location of these regions had strategic advantages and disad-
vantages. The resistance was strongest in the eastern region of Timor-Leste
because of its distance from the border with West Timor and its mountain-
ous terrain. The last bastion of the resistance was Mount Matebian in Baucau
[an eastern district of the country]. The military wing of the resistance move-
ment, the National Liberation Forces of Timor-Leste (FALINTIL), was more
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active in the east. These strategic advantages contributed to a perception that
the eastern region put up a stronger fight...The pro-autonomy militia groups,
supported by the Indonesian military, were more active in the western region
because of its proximity to the border and, as a result, more loromonu were
coerced into these groups."
Due to the violence inflicted by pro-Indonesian militias, this stereotype that Westerners
were to some degree complicit carried over into the post-independence period and, ulti-
mately, affected relations within the coercive institutions of the new state, including the
military and police. Many of the initial soldiers recruited into F-FDTL were resistance
movement veterans from the east, and efforts to correct the imbalance with younger re-
cruits from the West did little to dispel tensions (Shiosaki 2017).
According to the account of Hasegawa (2013, 117), then Special Representative of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations and Head of Mission:
"[then Brigadier General, Taur Matan Ruak] ...TMR told me how the whole
thing started. According to him, Gastao Salsinha, the leader of the petition-
ers’ group, had complained that he had not been promoted to the rank of a
captain, in spite of the fact that he had earned second place in the competency
examination. TMR said that Salsinha was not promoted because he had been
caught smuggling sandalwood for export to Indonesia. TMR also pointed out
that many of the newly recruited soldiers demanded comparatively easy treat-
ment; this contrasted with the severe hardship he and other guerrilla fighters
had endured, without any reward, during the independence struggle. He felt
the need for more discipline among young soldiers."
In fact, the crisis with the petitioners only escalated, with young people and martial arts
groups, including the eastern based Colimau 2000, becoming involved on both sides. The
military was deployed, casualties ensued, and this led to a major split between the Prime
Minister, who authorized the military deployment, and the President (Hasegawa 2013;
Shiosaki 2017). A United Nations commission later found that the Minister of Interior,
Minister of Defense, and General Commander of the Police abused their authority in arm-
ing civilians during the crisis, all of whom had resigned or left their posts after the crisis
(Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) 2006).
Timor-Leste features a vibrant, multi-party system, however regional identities con-
tinued to intersect with Timorese politics and the party system years after the 2006 crisis
(Shiosaki 2017). Timor-Leste’s two largest parties – FRETILIN and the National Congress
for Timorese Reconstruction (CNRT) – emerged from the national resistance movement
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and its leadership. FRETILIN is, of course, the namesake party of the founding group
of the national movement. CNRT was officially founded in 2007 by Xanana Gusmão, the
charismatic resistance movement hero who split off from FRETILIN during the resistance
in the mid-1980s. FRETILIN, likely because of its association with the rank and file of
the resistance movement, has historically done well with voters in the east, although there
were signs that regionally-based voting may have been attenuated in the 2012 elections
(Shiosaki 2017). However, it would be inaccurate to categorize FRETILIN as the party of
the resistance movement: For example, Mari Alkatiri, one of the founders of FRETILIN
and the first Prime Minister in independent Timor-Leste, was based in exile during the
entire Indonesian occupation, whereas Gusmão, the first elected President, was a promi-
nent hero of the guerrilla resistance movement, which he led, in part, from an extended
stint in prison. Largely due to Gusmão’s widespread popularity, CNRT formed part of
the governing coalition in 2007, despite FRETILIN having won a larger share of the to-
tal votes, and again in 2012. In 2015, Xanana Gusmaão voluntarily stepped down as
prime minister, citing an opportune moment to pass power along to the next generation,
bringing FRETILIN into the ruling coalition and an unprecedented, but perhaps tenuous,
degree of cooperation between the two parties.
While regional and partisan divides have been prominent in Timorese politics fol-
lowing independence, the current study comes at a time when the relative salience of
these dimensions is an open question. The 2015 pilot survey and the larger 2016 sur-
vey described below precede parliamentary elections planned for summer of 2017. Some
scholarship and informal conversations conducted by the author suggest that the distinc-
tion between lorosa’e and loromonu is not as salient as, quite simply, divisions between
urban and periphery. As discussed by Leach (2017, 187), there are a number of candi-
date "dualisms" that Timorese individuals may use, separately or in tandem, to define
themselves:
"Examples include tensions between an individual’s rural affiliations and their
newer urban networks...as members of immediate family or of a wider ’house’;
between coexisting beliefs in lulik [traditional conception of sacredness] and
Christianity; between roles as a member of parliament, or the youngest brother
in a family; as a police officer, or member of a martial arts gang."
What Leach (2017) and others have noted is that the theme of rectifying a debt for those
those who suffered during the national resistance to Indonesian occupation was a com-
mon strain running through the politics and events of 2006.
More recently, the distinctive political and security environment in the eastern part of
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the country reemerged in 2015, a year which saw the killing of a paramilitary comman-
der Paulino Gama (known as "Mauk Moruk"), a former coup leader who had been leading
violent attacks against police checkpoints in the eastern district of Baucau (Wassel & Ra-
jalingam 2015). In the spring of 2015, Wassel and Rajalingam (2015, 32)’s Community
Police Perceptions survey found that respondents from the eastern part of the country
were more likely than those in other regions to say that the security situation in the coun-
try had become worse in the past year, likely due to the policing activity and violence that
had emerged around Mauk Moruk’s group and his eventual capture and defeat. Thus, re-
gional identities may have shaped Timorese individuals’ relationship to the state in the
short term due to these more recent events, but there also may be more stable, longer-term
aspects to those identities that draw on the legacies of the conflict and resistance.
5.4 Pilot Survey Results
Before implementing a large-scale survey, a pilot study was conducted to understand
how Timorese citizens who have little experience with direct taxation would respond to
questions about their views on taxation. This section will review the method and results
of that study in brief, since some of its findings are used to inform the hypotheses below.
In May 2015, I surveyed a small sample of respondents (N = 34) from three districts
in Timor-Leste: Dili (16), Bobonaro (9), Baucau (9). The survey was conducted in Tetum.
Despite hundreds of mother tongues that vary regionally, Tetum is the lingua franca of
the vast majority of the population. I conducted the survey door-to-door with a research
assistant and interpreter. Districts were selected non-randomly to achieve regional repre-
sentation: Dili is the district where the capital city is located, Bobonaro is in the western
part of the country, near the border with Indonesian West Timor, and Baucau is the most
populated eastern district. Subdistricts were also non-randomly selected to pick towns
that were densely populated enough to make survey work practical. The primary sam-
pling unit in each district was the village (suco). Two sucos in each subdistrict were ran-
domly chosen, then two starting points were chosen randomly at least 300 meters apart.
From each starting point, approximately every other house was selected and the closest-
birthday method was used to choose individual respondents in each household. Consent
was obtained before each interview. The sample size does not provide enough statistical
power to generalize to the population of any particular village, however the purpose of
the pilot test was to ascertain how questions would be interpreted by respondents and to
begin to generate hypotheses of how attitudes toward taxation might vary across groups
of individuals. There are no tests for statistical significance; the cross-tabulations pre-
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sented here are merely descriptive.
To measure individuals’ underlying support for taxation as a method of funding pub-
lic services, respondents were asked the following question:
I am going to read two statements to you. Please tell me which one you agree with
more:
Statement 1: It is better for our community to pay higher taxes, if it means that
there will be more services provided by government.
Statement 2: It is better for our community to pay lower taxes, even if it means
there will be fewer services provided by government.
There were three possible responses: "Agree more with statement 1", "Agree more with
statement 2", or "I don’t know" (although the latter option was not read aloud). The lan-
guage of this item was adapted from language used in rounds 5 and 6 of the Afrobarom-
eter surveys (see, e.g. Afrobarometer Round 6: The Quality of Democracy and Governance
in Algeria 2015). Similarly, in these surveys, respondents are asked which of two state-
ments they agree with more, but the statement wording is somewhat different: The first
statement is "Citizens must pay their taxes to the government in order for our country
to develop," and the second statement is "The government can find enough resources for
development from other sources without having to tax the people." Because of the ex-
traordinary dependence of the Timorese budget on natural resource rents, I modified the
wording in my survey so that the two statements were more explicitly framed around
notions of fiscal exchange, whereby lower taxes definitively leads to fewer services. In
examining the distribution of responses below, we can infer that support for Statement 2
would be even higher if we had used the Afrobarometer item wording, wherein respon-
dents were not asked to consider the possible effect of tax revenues on service provision.
Thus, we can confidently interpret agreement with Statement 2 in this pilot test as less
support for a relationship of fiscal exchange between the population and government,
and less support for community contributions toward public goods provision.2
In our sample, 7 out of 18 women (39%) supported statement 1 (higher taxes), whereas
only 2 out of 16 (13%) of men did (Table 5.1). Men were more likely to support lower
taxes than women. Further, residents of the capital district, Dili, were more likely to
support higher taxes (38%) compared to residents of either the eastern (22%) or western
(11%) district (Table 5.2). The capital district has the highest average levels of income,
so it is somewhat surprising that respondents from Dili appear to support more taxation
2In addition, the Afrobarometer surveys gives respondents the option to either agree or strongly agree
with either statement. To keep the options simple, we do not ask respondents for the strength of their
agreement.
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Higher taxes (1) Lower taxes (2) NA
Male 2 (12.50%) 11 (68.75%) 3 (18.75%)
Female 7 (38.89%) 8 (44.44%) 3 (16.67%)
Table 5.1: Views toward taxation and services by gender.
and public services than those in the lower-income districts. The nature of the exist-
ing tax system sheds some light on why those in the capital district, who have higher
average incomes, might not have associated "higher taxes" with a higher, individual tax
burden. Currently, income tax in Timor-Leste is based on a flat rate and grants complete
exemption to a large share of wage-earners. Thus, "higher taxes" could be interpreted
as broadening the tax base to include lower income brackets, and thus may not neces-
sarily imply, for respondents in Dili, more redistribution to more rural or low-income
areas. The question is worded simply for maximum comprehension, but this does intro-
duce ambiguity to how respondents interpret "higher taxes" and how they interpret that
would, or would not, affect their own tax burden. By referencing "our community", the
measure was meant to induce respondents to think about people like themselves, either
living in close geographic proximity to them or in the same social and cultural networks.
An additional finding that may help explain the difference between Dili and outlying
districts is that support for higher taxes appears to be increasing in level of education.
While the number of those surveyed who had completed a post-secondary or university
degree was small – only 5 total – 2 of them supported higher taxes (40%, Table 5.3).
The percentage supporting higher taxes declines as level of education declines, with 28%
of those with some secondary education or secondary schooling completed supporting
statement 1; 25% of those with some primary education or primary education completed;
and 0% of those with no formal education (although there were only 3 total individuals
this group). On the other hand, those who characterized their current standard of living
as "fairly good or very good" were most likely to support lower taxes – 7 out of 11, or
63.6% – as opposed to those who describe their living condition as "neither good nor bad"
(55.6%) or those who report it as "fairly bad or very bad" (50%, not shown in tables). This
suggests that education and perceived standard of living could be pushing in opposite
directions on an individual’s support for big government.
Of particular interest to the current project is how the post-conflict context in Timor-
Leste and the legacies of the transition to independence might affect individual willing-
ness to comply with state extraction. One category of interest was those who reported
receiving a special government pension for individuals who were veterans of the national
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Higher taxes (1) Lower taxes (2) NA
Baucau 2 (22.22%) 6 (66.67%) 1 (11.11%)
Bobonaro 1 (11.11%) 4 (44.44%) 4 (44.44%)
Dili 6 (37.50%) 9 (56.25%) 1 (6.25%)
Table 5.2: Views toward taxation and services by region.
Higher taxes (1) Lower taxes (2) NA
No formal 0 (0.00%) 1 (33.33%) 2 (66.67%)
Some primary / primary 2 (25.00%) 5 (62.50%) 1 (12.50%)
Some secondary / secondary 5 (27.78%) 12 (66.67%) 1 (5.55%)
Post-secondary / university 2 (40%) 1 (20%) 2 (40%)
Table 5.3: Views toward taxation and services by education level.
resistance movement or surviving family members of such veterans. The pilot test in-
cluded the following item:
Does anyone in your household currently receive a veteran’s pension or a "sur-
vivor’s" payment – a payment made to certain surviving members of a veteran’s
family – from the government?
Eight respondents reported a household member receiving a pension, compared to 24
reporting no household member receiving a pension. Two respondents did not answer
the question. 75% (or 6 out of 8) of those who reported receiving pensions favored lower
taxes and fewer services compared with 50% of those (12 out of 24) who reported not
receiving pensions (see Table 5.4). Notably, 6 out of 24 of the non-recipients did not
answer the question about tax preferences or said "I don’t know." This could indicate a
failure to understand the question. If all of the non-responders were actually members of
the "lower taxes" group, then the proportions would be similar across those whose family
receives a veteran or survivor pension and those whose family does not.
We also asked some questions about fiscal decentralization, such as whether respon-
dents agreed with allowing districts, or even sucos (villages), the authority to raise taxes.
Residents of Baucau district were more likely to agree or strongly agree with allowing
Higher taxes (1) Lower taxes (2) NA
Family receives 2 (25.00%) 6 (75.00%) 0 (50.00%)
Family does not receive 6 (25.00%) 12 (50.00%) 6 (25.00%)
Table 5.4: Views toward taxation by veterans’/survivors’ pension.
145
Agree (1) Neutral (2) Disagree (3) NA
Baucau 6 (75.00%) 0 (0.00%) 2 (25.00%) 0 (0.00%)
Bobonaro 6 (66.67%) 0 (0.00%) 2 (22.22%) 1 (11.11%)
Dili 10 (62.50%) 1 (6.25%) 5 (31.25%) 0 (0.00%)
Table 5.5: Support for districts having authority to tax, by region.
Taxes Oil/gas rev Foreign aid/other NA
No formal education 0 (0.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (33.33%) 2 (66.67%)
Some primary/primary 2 (25.00%) 4 (50.00%) 1 (12.50%) 1 (12.50%)
Some secondary/secondary 7 (41.18%) 8 (47.06%) 2 (11.76%) 0 (0.00%)
Post-secondary / university 2 (40.00%) 2 (40.00%) 0 (0.00%) 1 (20.00%)
Table 5.6: Preferred source of government financing, by level of education.
district-level taxation (75.0%) versus those in Bobonaro (66.7%) or the capital district of
Dili (62.5%, Table 5.5). The same was found with support for suco-level taxation, sug-
gesting that views toward fiscal decentralization are more regionally driven, and those
in the eastern part of the country are more supportive of these forms of decentralization.
Individual-level demographic and social factors show less systematic correlations with
responses to this question.
When asked their opinion on what sources of financing the Timorese government
should draw on for public services, those with higher levels of education were generally
less likely to say oil and gas revenues, foreign aid, or anything else, and were more likely
to say taxes (see Table 5.6).
In summary, we find that attitudes toward taxes among this small sample of Tim-
orese respondents appear to be correlated with gender, region, and level of education.
Women, individuals from the capital district, and individuals with higher levels of edu-
cation supporting higher taxes in exchange for more services. It is not clear from the pilot
test whether being a member of a family receiving a pension for serving the national re-
sistance is strongly correlated with attitudes toward taxation. Below, we test alternative
hypotheses about this relationship on the larger dataset, which includes a more detailed
question about forms of social assistance received from the government, thus enabling
a comparison between veteran/survivor pension recipients and those who receive other
forms of assistance. Finally, allowing local authorities to raise their own tax revenue
seems to be slightly more popular in the eastern district of Baucau, which has historically
been the hub of several loose resistance movements against the central government.
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5.5 Hypotheses
Drawing on the literature and the pilot survey results, I formulate the following hy-
potheses:
First, there are reasons to believe that the region of residence will affect attitudes
toward taxation. As described in section 5.3, one salient regional divide that has in-
formed Timorese politics, and which draws on the legacies, or perceived legacies, of the
national resistance is the distinction between East and West. Additionally, the pilot sur-
vey, while not conducted on a representative sample, implied that those from the Eastern
districts may have greater preference for localized control over taxation and goods provi-
sion. These characteristics, taken together, imply a lower attachment to the central state.
One possible explanation for this is related to the legacies of conflict and the sources of
tension that fueled the petitioners demands and subsequent violence in 2006. In particu-
lar, if those in the eastern part of the country perceive that they made an unfair sacrifice,
or contribution, to the national struggle that has not been appropriately recognized by
the state, then we might expect them to have lower attachment to the state and, thus, less
willingness to voluntarily direct revenues toward the central state.
H1. Residents of the eastern districts will express lower tax morale than residents
of other districts, ceteris paribus.
However, there may be another source of geographic variation in attitudes that is dis-
tinct from the East-West divide. In particular, attitudes may differ across respondents
who reside in the urban core versus those that live in the periphery. The vast majority of
economic activity in Timor-Leste is concentrated in the capital – Dili. In fact, the defini-
tion of Dili as the "center" is almost a requisite precondition for the definition of "east"
and "west" described above (Leach 2017). Perhaps attachments to the state and attitudes
toward fiscal exchange with the government are driven more by one’s location vis-a-vis
the capital city, rather than an east versus west divide. That would generate the following
hypothesis:
H2. Residents of the capital district will express higher tax morale than residents
of other districts, ceteris paribus.
In addition to regional drivers of attitudes, there are certain individual-level traits that
could be important in shaping attitudes. In the two hypotheses below, we build on the
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initial results that emerged from the pilot study. First, there are reasons to believe that
those who have benefited from state expenditures on social programs will have a more fa-
vorable attitude toward contributing tax revenues. Interestingly, the pilot survey results
were ambiguous as to whether this relationship applied to those receiving the form of
social assistance that is most explicitly tied to the country’s conflict legacies – the pension
for veterans of the national resistance movement and their surviving family members. We
explore this relationship further, and with a wider range of social benefits, in the larger
poll.
H3. Recipients of social benefits will express lower tax morale than non-recipients,
ceteris paribus.
Finally, the pilot survey suggested that gender may be another factor influencing attitudes
toward taxation. Women in Timor-Leste may be more likely to perceive the benefits of
government expenditures, such as the Bolsa de Mãe, a conditional cash transfer program
for female-headed households; other spending programs related to women’s, maternal,
and neonatal healthcare; or education spending. Thus, drawing on the observed gender
differences in the pilot study, I suggest the following hypothesis:
H4. Female respondents will express higher tax morale than male respondents, ce-
teris paribus.
Each of these four hypotheses is tested in the larger dataset below.
5.6 Empirical Analysis
In November 2016, The Asia Foundation fielded a survey of a simple random sample
of Timorese adults, 18 years old and older, from all thirteen municipalities (N = 1,243).
To test the hypotheses above, we use individual responses to survey questions that proxy
for tax morale and expectations of government. We use four different dependent variables
in the analysis. First, to proxy for an individual’s willingness to pay taxes in exchange
for government services, we include a question that is identical to one of the questions
included in the pilot survey.
I am going to read two statements to you. Please tell me which one you agree with
more:
Statement 1: It is better for our community to pay higher taxes, if it means that
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there will be more services provided by government.
Statement 2: It is better for our community to pay lower taxes, even if it means
there will be fewer services provided by government.
Respondents were given a three-point scale to indicate "Agree more with Statement 1",
"Agree more with Statement 2", or "Neutral". We refer to this variable as communitytax
in the analysis below, with values ranging from 1 to 3 with higher values indicating more
agreement with statement 1 (higher taxes on the community).
In addition, The Asia Foundation included a question that it has used in previous
polls which, instead of asking about the respondent’s "community", attempts to measure
an individual’s own willingness to pay. Respondents were asked to rate on a five-point
scale the extent to which they agree or disagree with the following statement:
I would be willing to pay tax to receive better services (healthcare, education, roads,
etc).
Responses options were: "Strongly agree", "Agree", "Neither agree nor disagree", "Dis-
agree", or "Strongly disagree". This variable is designated individtax below, with values
ranging from 1 to 5, with higher values indicating stronger agreement with an individ-
ual’s willingness to pay tax.
Like the pilot survey, we included an additional item on the larger survey to frame re-
spondents’ considerations about taxation within the context of Timor-Leste’s alternative
sources of revenue:
Which of the two statements do you more agree with:
Statement 1: The government of Timor-Leste relies too much on funding from the
oil and gas sector. Individuals and businesses in other sectors should pay more taxes
to pay for public goods and services (such as schools, hospitals and roads).
Statement 2: The government of Timor-Leste should continue to rely on funding
from the oil and gas sector. Individuals and businesses in other sectors should not
be taxed more now to pay for public goods and services (such as schools, hospitals
and roads).
The wording of this question more concretely primes policy, explicitly mentioning the
government of Timor-Leste, rather than individual or collective behavior. It also refer-
ences the petroleum sector as the primary source of non-tax revenue, a feature of the
economy that is well-known to wide swaths of Timorese society. If stated preferences
for lower taxes on oneself or one’s community are attenuated due to social desirability,
this question may be less so because it is framed as a matter of government policy, rather
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than individual or group compliance, and it explicitly primes the lower stakes option
of continuing the status quo, namely reliance on oil and gas. We refer to this item as
lesspetro below, and code responses as highest when respondents agree with statement 1
(lesspetro = 3) and lowest when they agree with statement 2 (lesspetro = 1), with those
that express neutral attitudes in the middle.
Finally, the survey also included a question to assess broader expectations of the gov-
ernment’s role in providing for the population, asking respondents whether they agree,
strongly agree, disagree, strongly disagree, or neither, with the following statement:
It is the government’s responsibility to ensure that people are prosperous.
This item is referenced as govresp, with values ranging from 1 to 5. In this case, higher
values indicate higher agreement with the statement, thus higher expectations of govern-
ment.
Descriptive statistics of the dependent variables are shown in Table 5.7.
Table 5.7: Descriptive Statistics: Dependent Variables
Variable Levels n %




















For independent variables, we include an indicator which captures what region re-
spondents are from. We have fairly even distribution across regions, with 24 percent of
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respondents from Dili district (dili); 30 percent of respondents from the central districts
(central, includes Ainaro, Aileu, Manufahi, Ermera, and Liquica districts); 26 percent
from eastern districts (east, includes Manatuto, Viqueque, Baucau, and Lautem districts);
and 20 percent from western districts (west, includes Oecussi, Bobonaro, and Covalima
districts).3 We also include gender (f emale): the sample includes 618 females and 621
males. We also include ordinal variables to capture an individual’s age, education, and
income categories. The distribution on these variables is depicted in Table 5.8. One thing
that is notable about this sample, and the Timorese population at large, are the overall
low levels of schooling and low income base. Over one-third of respondents reported
having no formal schooling or no income. Many of those reporting no income likely live
as dependents with another wage earner or works in subsistence agriculture and thus
does not have a significant cash income.
Finally, to identify beneficiaries of various social assistance schemes, we asked which,
if any, of the following government payments did the respondent or a family member re-
ceive: Veteran’s [or survivor’s] payment (pay_vet); Bolsa de Mãe (pay_bolsa, a conditional
cash transfer for eligible, rural mothers); a disability assistance payment (pay_disab);
an old age pension (pay_old); or a pension for government employees and members of
parliament (pay_govpen). All are coded as dummy variables, taking a value of 1 if the
respondent reported receiving the payment and a value of 0 if they did not.
5.6.1 Analysis
First, I estimate four ordered probit models with each of the dependent variables men-
tioned above, controlling for whether an individual or his or her family receives any of
the social benefits from the government noted above, age category, gender, income cate-
gory, education category, and region of residence (Central, East, West, or Dili, the latter
being the excluded category). Standard errors are clustered at the municipal level to
account for lower-level non-independence among error terms for respondents from the
same municipality. Results are shown in Table 5.9.
Keeping in mind that the magnitude of the coefficients cannot be interpreted as marginal
effects and the different scales of the dependent variables, I focus my discussion on the
direction, rather than the magnitude, of the observed coefficients. I find that those that
receive Bolsa de Mãe payments – the conditional cash transfer program – and those that
receive old age pensions are significantly less likely to support more taxes on their com-
munity. (Further, controlling for social assistance benefits, older respondents express
310 respondents, or 0.8 percent of the sample, was coded as NA.
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Table 5.8: Descriptive Statistics: Selection of Independent Variables
Variable Levels n %







educ No formal schooling 435 34.8
Grade 1-3 incomplete 382 30.6
Finished grade 3 74 5.9
Finished grade 6 103 8.25
Finished grade 9 82 6.6
Secondary school incomplete 69 5.5
University or above 87 7.0
NA 17 1.4









Ordered Probit Models of Support for Taxation and Views Toward Government
(1) (2) (3) (4)
communitytax individtax lesspetro govresp
pay_vet 0.0547 −0.00470 0.148 −0.0154
(0.102) (0.0815) (0.178) (0.0943)
pay_bolsa −0.180∗ −0.151 −0.0303 0.118
(0.0824) (0.112) (0.0625) (0.0729)
pay_disab −0.300+ 0.0528 −0.351∗ 0.481
(0.167) (0.270) (0.155) (0.366)
pay_govpen 0.0759 −0.170 −0.0809 −0.746∗
(0.228) (0.115) (0.184) (0.290)
pay_old −0.217∗∗ −0.0806 −0.153 0.0980
(0.0816) (0.0935) (0.130) (0.0948)
age 0.0479∗ 0.0342 0.0265 0.0101
(0.0212) (0.0223) (0.0216) (0.0268)
f emale −0.0638 −0.00904 −0.00689 0.00901
(0.0537) (0.0522) (0.0580) (0.0598)
income 0.0637 0.153∗ −0.0279 0.133∗∗
(0.0419) (0.0682) (0.0424) (0.0453)
educ −0.00815 0.0479+ −0.00438 −0.00748
(0.0187) (0.0247) (0.0222) (0.0220)
central −0.0333 −0.378 0.321∗ 0.532∗∗
(0.275) (0.382) (0.127) (0.199)
east −0.445∗∗∗ −0.745∗∗∗ 0.0523 −0.388∗
(0.0829) (0.140) (0.178) (0.165)
west −0.320 −0.266+ 0.0800 −0.0915
(0.287) (0.152) (0.172) (0.278)
α1 −0.994∗∗∗ −1.471∗∗∗ −0.688∗∗∗ −2.169∗∗∗
(0.105) (0.189) (0.111) (0.307)
α2 −0.238 −0.587∗∗ −0.0310 −1.410∗∗∗





N 1104 1178 1077 1168
adj. R2
Robust standard errors clustered by municipality are in parentheses.
+p < 0.1, ∗p < 0.05, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗∗p < 0.001
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more support for their community paying more in taxes, suggesting that the receipt of
the benefit – or preexisting traits that make one more likely to receive the old age pen-
sion — is driving the correlation, not age.) Those who receive disability pensions are also
less likely to support higher taxes on the community, albeit at a lower level of statistical
significance (p = 0.10). Notably, however, none of these social assistance benefit recipi-
ents are significantly less willing to pay taxes themselves. The receipt of social benefits
thus appears to be associated with views toward collective, not individual, tax burdens.
Thus, there is some support for H3, but it is most clearly observed with respect to atti-
tudes toward taxation of one’s community, not one’s individual tax burden. Further, the
relationship between receiving social benefits and tax morale appears to be conditional
on the type of benefit received. For example, the pension for veterans of the resistance
movement and survivors shows no relationship with attitudes toward taxation across any
of the four models. This suggests that there may be something distinctive about receiving
the veterans’ and survivors’ pension, or something distinctive about those individuals
who are selected to receive it, that is not associated with lower tax morale, as we might
expect based on the results for the other forms of social assistance.
The ordered probit models also reveal some regional differences. Those from the east-
ern region are less likely to support more taxes on their community and less willing to
pay more taxes as individuals, consistent with H1. In other words, a respondent from the
eastern region has a significantly higher probability of indicating that they prefer lower
taxes on their community or they are neutral (communitytax = 1|2) as compared to a re-
spondent from Dili. We do not find conclusive support for H2. Dili respondents were the
excluded category in the regressions in Table 5.9, and, while they are significantly more
willing to pay individual taxes than those from the east (p = 0.05) and those from the
west (p = 0.10), their attitudes on this measure are not significantly different from those
in the smaller villages and towns in the central region. Further, it is those in the central
districts, not in the urban core, that are most likely to support a reduction in Timor-
Leste’s reliance on petroleum revenues, and on whether it is government’s responsibility
to ensure prosperity, Dili respondents fall somewhere in between those from the east and
those in the central region. Finally, those from the east are less likely to believe it is gov-
ernment’s responsibility to ensure that the population is prosperous. Thus, I find that the
most robust relationship is between those from the east and those from Dili: Easterners
are less likely to agree with more taxes of their community, less willing to pay more taxes
individually, and also expect less of government in terms of ensuring prosperity, when
compared to Dili residents and sometimes residents from other regions.
Interestingly, we do not find support for H4 – gender does not seem to influence atti-
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tudes toward taxation or government. It is possible that the correlation between gender
and attitudes toward taxation observed in the pilot study was confounded by other vari-
ables. One possibility is that women who received the Bolsa de Mãe transfer were driving
the findings regarding positive tax morale in the pilot study. We have controlled for re-
ceipt of a variety of social transfers in the larger sample, so it is possible that this is why
the gender result is no longer observed.
Rather than including fixed effects dummies for three out of the four regions (with
one excluded category), an alternative way to account for variation between regions is
to include group-level intercepts for each region that, themselves, vary according to an
underlying probability distribution. This is what Gelman and Hill (2009) refer to as a
varying-intercept model, but which is more commonly referred to as a random effects
model. These models are convenient when the researcher is interested in explicitly com-
paring the random effects themselves and how these intercepts vary across groups. The
model takes the following form:






Because these can be easily combined into a single equation, the "multilevel" designation
might strike some readers as counterintuitive. However, note there is both an error term
that varies by individual and one which varies by group j, which, in this case, is region.
Both error terms are assumed to be normally distributed with mean equal to zero.4 In
the varying-intercept model, α̂j can be interpreted as the estimated, baseline value of the
dependent variable for an individual from a given region. Gelman and Hill (2009, 253)
note that it is equivalent to a weighted average of the mean of the outcome variable for













where nj = the number of observations in the sample from group j. This type of model
4Group-level predictors can be added to the second equation above if the researcher seeks to explicitly
model and estimate the effects of variables that vary by groups. Further, the other coefficients captured in
the vector β could, like αj , also be specified as varying across groups according to a random distribution or
a combination of group-level predictors and a random error term. For now, we estimate a simple model to
gain a sense of variation across regions and to compare results with the ordered probit models above.
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"corrects" estimated group-level intercepts for the sample size within the group, pulling
estimates closer to the overall sample mean for those groups with small sample sizes
and pulling estimates closer to the within-group mean for those groups that have larger
sample sizes (Gelman & Hill 2009, 254).5
The multilevel models are estimated using restricted maximum likelihood estimation
(REML) and are shown in Table 5.10. In these models, we see a somewhat more robust
orientation toward low taxes emerge among recipients of the Bolsa de Mãe, who are sig-
nificantly less likely to support greater taxation at the community level and, at a lower
level of significance, at the individual level. They are also more likely to believe that
it is the government’s responsibility to ensure prosperity (p = 0.1). Disability and old
age pension recipients are also less likely to support taxation of the community and less
concerned with Timor-Leste’s reliance on petroleum revenues at either the 5% or 10%
significance level. Once again, we see no such attitudes emerge among the subsample of
respondents who receive veterans’ or survivors’ pensions, lending further evidence to the
assertion that this benefit, or this class of benefit recipients, is distinct from other benefit
recipients.
The intercept shows the estimate of the constant term in the second level of the re-
gression (α̂). To examine differences across regions, I plot the region-specific intercepts
(α̂j) for each of the four regions for each of the four dependent variables. I find that both
the eastern and western districts have lower baseline levels of support for taxes on the
community than the central region and the capital district (see Figure 5.1). However, on
support for individual taxation (column 2 of Table 5.10) and belief that the government
is responsible for economic prosperity (column 3 of Table 5.10), the estimated intercept
for those from the east stands out as particularly low (see Figures 5.1 and 5.2). Consistent
with the ordered probit results, those from the central region are most likely to believe
that it is the government’s responsibility to ensure prosperity. This is an interesting result
that is supported across both types of models, and is perhaps suggestive of the specific
experiences and attitudes of those that are in the immediate urban periphery – those dis-
tricts are also largely rural, like their more peripheral counterparts, however they are in
closer geographic proximity to the capital city. The baseline opinions on oil and gas are
not highly variable by region.
5For the current study, we estimate linear multilevel models. For multilevel modeling with an ordered
dependent variable, Gelman and Hill (2009) recommend allowing the cutpoints for the latent, continuous
response variable to also vary by region. For ease of interpretation in these exploratory regressions, we
estimate linear models below.
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Table 5.10:
Varying-Intercept Models of Support for Taxation and Views Toward Govern-
ment
communitytax individtax govresp lesspetro
α̂ 2.29∗∗∗ 3.05∗∗∗ 4.02∗∗∗ 2.36∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.22) (0.14) (0.09)
pay_vet 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.10
(0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06)
pay_bolsa −0.12∗ −0.15+ 0.09+ −0.02
(0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06)
pay_disab −0.21+ −0.01 0.27∗ −0.24∗
(0.11) (0.17) (0.11) (0.12)
pay_govpen 0.07 −0.10 −0.55∗∗∗ −0.07
(0.12) (0.19) (0.12) (0.12)
pay_old −0.15∗∗ −0.11 0.05 −0.11+
(0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06)
age 0.03+ 0.04 0.01 0.02
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
f emale −0.05 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
income 0.04+ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ −0.02
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
educ −0.00 0.05∗ −0.00 −0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
AIC 2674.07 3893.88 2876.09 2668.11
BIC 2734.18 3954.77 2936.87 2727.92
Log Likelihood -1325.04 -1934.94 -1426.04 -1322.06
Num. obs. 1107 1181 1171 1079
Num. groups: reg 4 4 4 4
Var: reg (Intercept) 0.02 0.14 0.06 0.01
Var: Residual 0.62 1.50 0.64 0.65
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This study sheds light on attitudes toward taxation in a setting where experiences
with fiscal exchange are relatively new. One question guiding this inquiry was whether
Timor-Leste would exhibit similar patterns to what was observed in Palestine. Are the
foundations of fiscal capacity stronger in those areas where the government has a greater
coercive monopoly?
In the larger survey, we observe that those from the eastern parts of Timor-Leste ex-
hibit a set of traits that could be described as self-sufficiency – namely, they are opposed
to higher taxes and they are less likely to believe that individual prosperity is the respon-
sibility of the government. Incidentally, the regional identity associated with lorosa’e –
or those from the east – is also tied to Timor-Leste’s history and its conflict legacies in
interesting ways. Some from the east viewed themselves as contributing disproportion-
ately to the independence struggle and not appropriately recognized or compensated. If
this translated into broader feelings of abandonment or neglect by the government, it is
understandable that those feelings would also be correlated with lower support for tax-
ation. Further, even after the 2006 crisis, one of the central government’s main security
challenges has emerged in the east, and in Baucau in particular. In 2015 – during the
period in between when the pilot survey and the larger, Asia Foundation survey were
conducted – the government apprehended and killed rebel militia leader "Mauk Moruk".
State policing and security presence in Baucau has been controversial. Because of the
presence of such groups, it would be reasonable to infer state coercive capacity is lower
in the east, and we are also witnessing lower tax morale and expectations of government
in these areas.
However, we also saw that those in the West and Central districts also differed from
Dili residents in important ways. In particular, those that live in the more rural and
smaller villages in the central region can be considered those in the periphery that are
nonetheless close to Dili. It is these respondents that seem to believe most strongly in the
government’s responsibility to ensure prosperity. This suggests that the center-periphery
cleavage may indeed be salient in driving expectations of government, but not necessarily
in generating the micro-level foundations for fiscal capacity, namely: tax morale. Crit-
ically, when asked directly about their views toward taxation, respondents living in the
eastern region seem to be most noticeably distinct. This suggests that Timor-Leste may
exhibit the expected correlations between the various forms of state capacity. State pres-
ence and capacity is certainly higher in the capital city of Dili than anywhere else in
the country, thus we would predict higher fiscal capacity in those areas as well. In ar-
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eas where the state has lower coercive capacity, or where this capacity is less effective,
support for taxation is also lower.
While our pilot results left us with little idea as to how receiving social benefits might
shape attitudes toward taxation differently depending on the benefit, our findings in the
larger survey suggest one of two things: Either receiving a pension for being a veteran or
surviving family member of the resistance has a different effect on tax morale than other
types of benefits, or those that receive these benefits are categorically different from those
who receive other types of benefits in a way that has not been observed or measured and
this is driving differences in attitudes toward taxation, not the receipt of the benefit itself.
One possibility is that being a veteran may make one predisposed to exhibit greater pro-
social norms and higher tax morale, and thus receiving the benefit might dampen this,
but not enough to make it statistically distinguishable from the general population. On
the other hand, other benefits (i.e. conditional cash transfers, old age, and disability
benefits) may be associated with lower support for taxation of one’s community, but not
lower willingness to pay taxation as an individual.
This study represents a work-in-progress to analyze how conflict legacies and state
presence shape attitudes toward taxation. It also motivates a future research agenda to
better understand how individual-level experiences with conflict and the post-conflict
state might shape compliance norms. Further, as Timor-Leste aims to increase its domes-
tic tax capacity as oil and gas revenues are likely to dwindle in the coming decades, now
is an important time to understand how conflict legacies and policies may shape baseline




I conclude here by contextualizing the findings in the preceding chapters and laying
out an agenda for future research. First, I briefly review our main findings.
The preceding chapters found that complex constraints on state capacity are likely to
emerge from settings of exclusive annexation, ultimately challenging some of the precon-
ceived ideals in the classic literature on states. While the partial autonomy that nationalist
organizations develop in such settings may sound like the first step toward self-rule, in
fact, this constrained form of autonomy may pervert and undermine relationships of ex-
change between the organization and its population. Generalizing from the results in
the Palestinian context: The relationship between state productive capacity and state ex-
tractive capacity cannot proceed unfettered if the state’s authority in producing a certain
public or club good is curtailed. Protection through the use of coercive force is one ex-
ample of such a good, and it is the good that is most fundamentally associated with the
state.
Thus, under inclusive annexation by the incumbent state, I have argued that the na-
tional movement is more likely to obtain no self-rule under occupation. However, if and
when the strategy suddenly switches – as we might expect with an inclusive annexation
project that has become too costly – the national movement may have the ability to build
its state from the ground up. In this case, the national movement has a path toward state-
hood that is relatively unfettered by ongoing ambiguities over sovereignty. In this case,
the nationalist movement’s new state-builders are in a similar position to those described
in the earlier state formation literature. Of course, the legacies of previous colonial and
post-colonial powers are still likely to shape the process, but the newly emerging state is
now relatively unconstrained by the incumbent state and its preferences. To the extent
that the relationship between the productive capacities of the state – i.e. the production
of coercion, public goods, law, and order – and the extractive, or fiscal, capacity of the
state are not perverted by some of the familiar distortionary influences such as resource
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rents or external guarantors of national security, we may expect state capacity to develop
evenly and in the usual ways. In these cases, it may make sense to speak of state capacity
as an aggregate concept.
The relationship between incumbent state’s goals, the level of autonomy granted to
the national movement, and state capacity development among the national movement
are summarized in Table 6.1.
Annexation Strategy (Type) Autonomy State Capacity
Inclusive None Correlations between different types of
state capacity generally positive, following
existing literature
Exclusive Partial* Fiscal capacity may not be positively cor-
related with other types of state capacity
*autonomy that is functionally restricted
Table 6.1: Incumbent State Types, National Movement Autonomy, and State Capacity
6.1 Self-Rule, Statehood, and Development
This manuscript focused on two particular pathways to self-rule. One question that
emerges – particularly in the case of Palestine, but also in Timor-Leste’s experience before
independence – is whether our expectations for sovereign states do, and should, resemble
our expectations for organizations that are not fully sovereign states. Autonomy, in the
preceding chapters, has been used synonymously with self-rule, or the ability to govern
without interference from outside actors. According to one interpretation of chapter 2’s
findings, our predictions regarding how states develop simply should not apply to or-
ganizations that are subject to de facto restrictions on that autonomy. This perspective
would suggest that our existing understanding of the extent to which states fulfill their
productive, extractive, and distributive roles – and where they do so, and for whom – is no
longer applicable in such cases. However, the analysis of the Palestinian Authority (PA)
in the West Bank suggests that we should not be content to stop there. The form of par-
tial autonomy that the PA exercises in the context of ongoing occupation is not merely
symbolic. The creation of the PA placed Palestinian policemen and policewomen on the
streets; it allowed for Palestinians, at least intermittently, to elect their own leaders; and
it created a bureaucracy of government offices that were not only staffed by Palestinians
at the lower and middle levels, but were headed by Palestinian managers, directors, and
ultimately, cabinet ministers. It created an environment where Palestinian nationalism
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could be expressed and embraced within the occupied territories. Organizations may still
fulfill certain state-like functions in such settings.
More scholarly research on such "partially autonomous" organizations will contribute
to developing more refined, context-specific, and conceptually and empirically disaggre-
gated concepts of state, or state-like, capacity. Advancing our understanding of gover-
nance and institutional development within all types of organizations that seek to rule
is a worthwhile goal. The expanding field of rebel governance is a promising indication
that political science scholars are ready to extend our theories of the internal dynamics
of states to other types of organizations and, ultimately, challenge and update these the-
ories. The current study has focused on two nationalist movements that explicitly sought
independent statehood, but contributions by Mampilly (2011), Arjona (2016), Weinstein
(2007) and others suggest that other movements act on incentives to develop state-like
capacity in territories they control.
The present study has stopped at state capacity, but perhaps that is not the final out-
come that we are interested in. While there is a now burgeoning body of scholarship
on when not-fully-sovereign states may nonetheless develop state-like capacities, we lack
a broader understanding of some of the long-term effects of this capacity on develop-
ment. There is relatively broad agreement in the political economy literature that state
capacity has a positive effect on development (see, e.g., Acemoglu, Robinson, & Torvik
2016; Besley & Persson 2009, 2011; Dincecco & Katz 2016), but is this necessarily the
case when that capacity is held, and developed, by a non-state entity? Because such orga-
nizations are so often in direct conflict with an existing state, there are reasons to suspect
that greater capacity development within such organizations will not generate Pareto im-
provements – for example, as the capacity of a non-state organization rises, does the
capacity of the incumbent state fall? Further, the effects of any capacity improvements
in the non-state organization may be swamped by the negative effects of the overarching
conflict environment. Additional research may seek to understand these complex situa-
tions. So-called "frozen" conflicts may provide a particularly appropriate venue for such
research. Because settings such as South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karobakh, Kosovo, or even the
semi-independent republic of Somaliland have reached what appear to be relatively sta-
ble institutional equilibria, they may constitute a set of "most likely" cases for discovering
a positive correlation between state-like capacity and development.
Finally, the findings in the West Bank revealed an interesting relationship that could
also be tested in sovereign state settings: How does the party in power interact with insti-
tutions to shape state capacity? To my knowledge, there is not any research that explicitly
links the existing findings on state capacity and state development to partisan character-
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istics. This is consistent with the demonstrated need for the state capacity literature to
not only situate the state in a context of other strategic political actors and non-state in-
stitutions, but also to disaggregate the state itself and dedicate theoretical attention to
who, exactly, is performing its various functions. As suggested in the hypothesis section
of chapter 2, some of the fundamental theories of fiscal exchange that undergird our un-
derstanding of the state rest on a coherent conception of the state, wherein the same actor,
or set of actors, is responsible for its coercive, fiscal, and productive arms. A less coherent
view that allows for a multiplicity of actors within the state might undermine the ability
of taxpayers or constituents to think of this as a relationship of direct exchange.
6.2 Conflict, "Distortions", and States in Transition
Comparative politics has long been fascinated with transitions. Transitions from colo-
nial rule, transitions to (and from) democracy, post-communist transitions, and post-
conflict transitions are four major strains of interest in the subfield.
The current project substantively overlaps with research on the institutions that were
developed in newly independent states following colonial rule. Naturally, the role of
colonial and pre-colonial historical legacies featured prominently in many explanations
of institutional outcomes. Studying the transitions themselves may have been a relatively
more fashionable topic of research in the years immediately following decolonization
(see, e.g., Smith 1978; Young 1965; Zolberg 1966), while much contemporary scholarship
within mainstream political science has focused on the long-term legacies of colonialism
– such as the literature on direct and indirect rule mentioned in the conclusion to chapter
4 – rather than focusing on the transitions to independence themselves as a subject of
study.1 At this point, political scientists may have concluded that this subject is better
left to historians.
Nonetheless, contemporary struggles for independence and statehood provide an op-
portunity for scholars to revisit and update postcolonial theories. As mentioned earlier,
there are similarities and differences between the process by which contemporary na-
tionalist movements seek self-rule and the process by which independence movements
sprung out of the colonial empires of the past. One important difference is that con-
temporary nationalists cannot benefit from a larger wave of self-determination move-
ments or transitions to independence, such as the sweeping trend of decolonization that
buoyed nationalist movements from the 1950s through the 1970s. An additional ques-
tion emerges when we shift the focus to more contemporary cases of self-determination:
1Lawrence (2013) is a notable exception among recent literature in comparative politics.
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namely, how similar are today’s incumbent states to the colonist states of the past? The
calculus of political leaders in a colonial metropole about their far-off colonies may have
been substantially different than that of an incumbent state vis-a-vis contested territory
that is adjacent or contiguous to the existing state. Political leaders and populations
may approach territory that is geographically proximate to – or, some may say, contained
within – a pre-existing state differently. Those differences may not be confined to the
norms of sovereignty that often accompany such territories when they have been sub-
sumed into an existing state, but may also influence the strategies of rule and the methods
of resistance that make sense in such proximate geographies. Further, closer proximity
between the incumbent state and contested territory may entail greater integration of
labor and capital markets, and may shape how nationalists or incumbent state loyalists
perceive of "the other". At the same time, the preceding chapters have demonstrated that
some of the practices of control used by incumbent states – the resort to strategies that
often resemble direct or indirect rule, for example – may not be too far removed from
their colonial predecessors. Future research can seek to tease apart these similarities and
differences.
Given current trends in the Middle East and North Africa, it is also worth asking
whether post-revolutionary governments or new democracies might face a similar set of
challenges as new state-builders do. For example, what are the effects of revolution and
counter-revolution in Egypt on state capacity development? In Tunisia, how have the
coercive, fiscal, or productive institutions of the state been affected by democratic transi-
tion? How will Yemen, Libya, and Syria construct post-conflict institutions that rebuild
trust and facilitate relationships of exchange with their populations? Understandably,
there is not yet much research addressing these questions, as we are still observing these
processes unfold across the region, and practical and ethical limitations have appropri-
ately constrained research on some of the most conflict-affected areas. However, if we, as
scholars, are careful to avoid the familiar pitfalls of imposing a teleology or predicting
"final" outcomes for such institutions and states in transition, we may be well-equipped
to examine these processes for what they are – as outcomes to be explained in their own
right – and leave their long-term effects for future analyses.
Clearly, this project also intersects with a vast array of work on the construction of
effective state institutions following conflict, a literature which spans both the policy
and more academic spheres and is too vast to summarize here (see, e.g., P. Collier 2009;
P. Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Fjelde & Soysa 2009; Taydas & Peksen 2012; Wong 2016). One
question that the current project has not answered due to its exclusive focus is whether
conflicts over the state – of which the Israeli-Palestinian and Indonesian-Timorese are
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just two examples – are categorically different from other forms of civil conflict in terms
of the legacies they produce for post-conflict state capacity development. It is not easy
to determine whether and how the substantive demands of groups in conflict settings
– for example, whether groups merely demand greater political representation or call
for a wholesale redefinition of the state – shape the post-conflict institutions that emerge.
First, these demands can shift within the same conflict over time. Second, the demands of
elites within a rebel movement or organization may not adequately capture the demands
of society. Third, post-conflict settlements are often externally imposed, so it is difficult
to disentangle the effects of the settlement from any pre-existing political grievances or
demands. Still, it seeems quite possible that organizations or movements which demand
independent statehood may invest in different governance strategies during conflict and,
if given the opportunity, may have different approaches and objectives vis-a-vis post-
conflict state institutions.
More generally, the preceding analysis also opens up an area of inquiry on the role
of conflict in state development. In a way, partial autonomy destabilizes the incentives
of state-formers in a similar way that natural resource rents or foreign aid might. It di-
minishes the relationship of exchange between rulers and their populations. A larger re-
search agenda might explore the relationships and intersections between different forms
of distortions on state development. In the Palestinian case, we saw conflict-induced re-
strictions on Palestinian coercive autonomy generated distorted forms of fiscal capacity
development. In the Timorese case, our findings from the national survey suggest that
conflict might affect the micro-foundations of tax capacity in distinct ways for different
people. For example, regional feelings of exclusion and sacrifice may have contributed to
the eastern region of Timor-Leste exhibiting lower tax morale. On the other hand, a com-
parison of veteran benefit recipients to other benefit recipients suggests that those who
actively participated in the resistance movement may have higher levels of tax morale.
There are two selection processes that complicate this story – selection into serving the
resistance and then selection for receiving benefits, neither of were are we able to ob-
serve with current data – however it remains a possibility that their experiences during
conflict shaped their attitudes toward the new state, and thus, taxation. This suggests
future research to pin down conflict’s individual-level effects, and this line of work is not
irrelevant for those with more "macro-level" interests in state capacity.
Finally, while the links between coercive and fiscal capacity were examined in both
Palestine and Timor-Leste, this overlooks the factors that shape coercive capacity devel-
opment in new and emerging states. In the case of the West Bank, policing authority was
artificially restricted, whereas in the Timorese case, it was speculated, but not formally
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tested, that the state’s extension of coercive authority was informed by the legacies of
conflict. Of course, coercive capacity itself can be the dependent variable, and the prob-
lems facing states in conflict or unconsolidated states suggest that we should pay more
attention to the origins of state coercive capacity itself. International donors have been
establishing a plethora of programs to develop state military, policing, and security ser-
vices in fragile settings. One of the trendy concepts in the field – "community policing" –
indicates that the international development community is interested in making coercive
institutions more representative of, and responsive to, the communities they are aim-
ing to serve. Stakeholders are attentive to how imposing coercive institutions from the
top down without popular involvement may, ultimately, generate vulnerabilities in these
institutions and lead to a breakdown in order. The implications of the Palestinian ex-
perience suggest that top-down interventions in coercive institutional development may
distort other forms of state capacity development, and these effects might last for some
time. Thus, we need more endogenous theories of how violence is institutionalized, con-
trolled, and ideally monopolized in such settings, and what makes these outcomes stable





Language from the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement
on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip
Source: Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement."
Accessed: 20 February 2015.
ARTICLE XIII
Security
l. The Council [the Palestinian Authority] will, upon completion of the redeployment
of Israeli military forces in each district, as set out in Appendix 1 to Annex I, assume
the powers and responsibilities for internal security and public order in Area A in that
district.
2. a. There will be a complete redeployment of Israeli military forces from Area B.
Israel will transfer to the Council and the Council will assume responsibility for public
order for Palestinians. Israel shall have the overriding responsibility for security for the
purpose of protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism.
b. In Area B the Palestinian Police shall assume the responsibility for public order for
Palestinians and shall be deployed in order to accommodate the Palestinian needs and
requirements in the following manner:
(l) The Palestinian Police shall establish 25 police stations and posts in towns, villages,
and other places listed in Appendix 2 to Annex I and as delineated on map No. 3. The
West Bank RSC [Joint Regional Security Committee] may agree on the establishment of
additional police stations and posts, if required.
(2) The Palestinian Police shall be responsible for handling public order incidents in
which only Palestinians are involved.
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(3) The Palestinian Police shall operate freely in populated places where police sta-
tions and posts are located, as set out in paragraph b(1) above.
(4) While the movement of uniformed Palestinian policemen in Area B outside places
where there is a Palestinian police station or post will be carried out after coordination
and confirmation through the relevant DCO [Joint District Coordination Office], three
months after the completion of redeployment from Area B, the DCOs may decide that
movement of Palestinian policemen from the police stations in Area B to Palestinian
towns and villages in Area B on roads that are used only by Palestinian traffic will take
place after notifying the DCO.
(5) The coordination of such planned movement prior to confirmation through the rel-
evant DCO shall include a scheduled plan, including the number of policemen, as well as
the type and number of weapons and vehicles intended to take part. It shall also include
details of arrangements for ensuring continued coordination through appropriate com-
munication links, the exact schedule of movement to the area of the planned operation,
including the destination and routes thereto, its proposed duration and the schedule for
returning to the police station or post.
The Israeli side of the DCO will provide the Palestinian side with its response, follow-
ing a request for movement of policemen in accordance with this paragraph, in normal
or routine cases within one day and in emergency cases no later than 2 hours.
(6) The Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces will conduct joint security
activities on the main roads as set out in Annex I.
(7) The Palestinian Police will notify the West Bank RSC of the names of the police-
men, number plates of police vehicles and serial numbers of weapons, with respect to
each police station and post in Area B.
(8) Further redeployments from Area C and transfer of internal security responsibility
to the Palestinian Police in Areas B and C will be carried out in three phases, each to take
place after an interval of six months, to be completed 18 months after the inauguration of
the Council, except for the issues of permanent status negotiations and of Israel’s overall
responsibility for Israelis and borders.
(9) The procedures detailed in this paragraph will be reviewed within six months of
the completion of the first phase of redeployment...
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ANNEX I: Protocol Concerning Redeployment and Security Arrangements
Article V
Security Arrangements in the West Bank
1. Coordination and Cooperation in the West Bank
As shown on map No. 4, eight DCOs will function in the West Bank, as follows:
a. a DCO for the Jenin District, located at the Quabatiya junction or in its vicinity;
b. a DCO for the Nablus District, located at the Hawara Junction;
c. a DCO for the Tulkarm District, located at the Kaddouri Junction;
d. a DCO for the Qalqilya District located at Tsufin Junction;
e. a DCO for the Ramallah District, located at the Beth El junction or in its vicinity;
f. a DCO for the Bethlehem District, located at the Panorama Hills in Beit Jala;
g. a DCO for the Hebron District, located at Har Manoakh (Jabal Manoah); and
h. a DCO for the Jericho District, located at Vered Yericho, that will maintain a subor-
dinate Joint Liaison Bureau in the Allenby Terminal.
2. Area A
a. The Council will, upon completion of the redeployment of Israeli military forces it
each district, as set out in Appendix 1 to this Annex, assume the powers and responsibil-
ities for internal security and public order in Area A in that district.
b. Jewish Holy Sites
(1) The following provisions will apply with respect to the security arrangements in
Jewish holy sites in Area A which are listed in Appendix 4 to this Annex:
(a) While the protection of these sites, as well as of persons visiting them, will be
under the responsibility of the Palestinian Police, a JMU shall function in the vicinity of,
and on the access routes to, each such site, as directed by the relevant DCO.
(b) The functions of each such JMU shall be as follows:
(i) to ensure free, unimpeded and secure access to the relevant Jewish holy site; and
(ii) to ensure the peaceful use of such site, to prevent any potential instances of disor-
der and to respond to any incident.
(c) Given the Jewish religious nature of such sites, Israeli plainclothes guards may be
present inside such sites.
(2) The present situation and the existing religious practices shall be preserved.
c. Clarifications Concerning the Jericho Area
With regard to the definition of the Jericho Area, as delineated on attached map No.
1, it is hereby clarified that Route No. 90 crossing Auja from South to North and the East-
West road connecting Route No. 90 with Yitav, and their adjacent sides, shall remain
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under Israeli authority. For the purpose of this Article, the width of each such road and
its adjacent sides, as shown on attached map No. 1, shall extend at least 12 meters on
each side measured from its center.
3. Areas B and C
a. There will be a complete redeployment of Israeli military forces from Area B. Israel
will transfer to the Council and the Council will assume responsibility for public order for
Palestinians. Israel shall have the overriding responsibility for security for the purpose of
protecting Israelis and confronting the threat of terrorism.
b. In Area B the Palestinian Police shall assume the responsibility for public order for
Palestinians and shall be deployed in order to accommodate the Palestinian needs and
requirements in the following manner:
(l) The Palestinian Police shall establish 25 police stations and posts in towns, villages,
and other places listed in Appendix 3 to this Annex and as delineated on map No. 3. The
West Bank RSC may agree on the establishment of additional police stations and posts, if
required.
(2) The Palestinian Police shall be responsible for handling public order incidents in
which only Palestinians are involved.
(3) The Palestinian Police shall operate freely in populated places where police sta-
tions and posts are located, as set out in paragraph b.l above.
(4) While the movement of uniformed Palestinian policemen in Area B outside places
where there is a Palestinian police station or post will be carried out after coordination
and confirmation through the relevant DCO, three months after the completion of rede-
ployment from Area B, the DCOs may decide that movement of Palestinian policemen
from the police stations in Area B to Palestinian towns and villages in Area B on roads
that are used only by Palestinian traffic will take place after notifying the DCO.
(5) The coordination of such planned movement prior to confirmation through the rel-
evant DCO shall include a scheduled plan, including the number of policemen, as well as
the type and number of weapons and vehicles intended to take part. It shall also include
details of arrangements for ensuring continued coordination through appropriate com-
munication links, the exact schedule of movement to the area of the planned operation,
including the destination and routes thereto, its proposed duration and the schedule for
returning to the police station or post. The Israeli side of the DCO will provide the Pales-
tinian side with its response, following a request for movement of policemen in accor-
dance with this paragraph, in normal or routine cases within one day and in emergency
cases no later than 2 hours.
(6) The Palestinian Police and the Israeli military forces will conduct joint security
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activities on the main roads as set out in this Annex.
(7) The Palestinian Police will notify the West Bank RSC of the names of the police-
men, number plates of police vehicles and serial numbers of weapons, with respect to
each police station and post in Area B.
(8) Further redeployments from Area C and transfer of internal security responsibility
to the Palestinian Police in Areas B and C will be carried out in three phases, each to take
place after an interval of six months, to be completed 18 months after the inauguration of
the Council, except for the issues of permanent status negotiations and of Israel’s overall
responsibility for Israelis and borders.
(9) The procedures detailed in this paragraph will be reviewed within six months of
the completion of the first phase of redeployment...
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APPENDIX B
Municipal Revenue Collection Before the Creation of the
Palestinian Authority
One question we might have is whether there are other underlying differences be-
tween Area A (high coercive capacity) and Area B (low coercive capacity) municipalities
that predate the 1994 intervention. There was a large proliferation of municipal units
with the creation of the PA, and many of these towns had previously functioned as vil-
lage councils in the Israeli period before 1994. For this reason, we do not have pre-Oslo
data for many towns which eventually fell Area B (low capacity) areas, because these vil-
lage councils were generally quite small and budget data for them is unavailable. For
an initial comparative exercise, I create a matched subsample of 11 municipalities – 7 of
which became Area A, and 4 of which became Area B – and look at revenue mobilization
patterns across these two groups.
Since the dependent variable in the analysis in this chapter is revenue per capita, I
examine whether there are any differences in revenue collection among those towns in
this restricted sample that were later designated Area A versus those that were later des-
ignated Area B. For data on local governments prior to the PA period, I consult the Israel
Central Bureau of Statistics’ Judea, Samaria and Gaza Area Statistics (JSGAS) publications
which provide revenue data from 1982 to 1994 – the period immediately prior to the
creation of the Palestinian Authority, when the West Bank was still under direct Israeli
occupation. The JSGAS publications were released either annually or biannually, and
each year one volume contains an appendix titled "Financing of local authorities," that
provided detailed budget data for 25 West Bank municipalities including total revenues
and revenues by source.1
1Hard copies of the JSGAS publications were acquired from the CBS office in Jerusalem. The tables on
local government financing are in Hebrew and were translated with the help of a native speaker.
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While JSGAS provides the revenue figures, some very approximate estimation is re-
quired to get the population figures for municipalities. I use two sources – the 1967 Cen-
sus of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, conducted by the Israeli Statistics Bureau (Perlmann
2012), and the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) 1997 census (Palestinian
Central Bureau of Statistics 1999) – and take an average of one set of population esti-
mates that extrapolates forward from 1967, and another set of estimates that interpolates
backward from 1997.2
From the 25 municipalities represented in JSGAS, four municipalities that can be des-
ignated as falling mostly within "Area B" after 1994: Birzeit, Deir Dibwan, and Silwad
in the Ramallah governorate and Ya’bad in the Jenin governorate.3 Using the population
estimates described above, I match these four municipalities to a group of 7 municipali-
ties of roughly the same size. These 7 municipalities were later designated high-capacity
areas (Area A) after 1994. Table B.1 shows the matched subsample of municipalities with
their estimated average population over the 13-year period (1982-1994).
Table B.1: Subsample of pre-Oslo municipalities, matched by population.
High Capacity Low Capacity
(Area A) (Area B)
Mun Governorate Pop Mun Governorate Pop
Bani Zeid Ramallah 2,967 Birzeit Ramallah 3,244
Anabta Tulkarem 4,453 Silwad Ramallah 3,678
Beitunia Ramallah 4,694 Deir Dibwan Ramallah 3,861
Salfit Tulkarem 4,825 Ya’bad Jenin 7,344
Beit Sahour Bethlehem 7,901
Tubas Jenin 7,992
Dura Hebron 9,028
27.9 NIS 25.9 NIS
The JSGAS data provides an estimate of ordinary revenue per capita, and the subset
of that which is transferred from the Israeli Civil Administration to the municipalities.
2First, I use the 1967 census estimates of population by municipality and assume a constant growth rate
of 0.91% – based on one author’s estimates of the growth rate in the West Bank from 1962-1967 (Ennab
1994) – between 1967 to 1982 to comprise the initial 1982 figures. From 1982 onward, I assume a constant
4.5% rate through 1994. This is the estimated annual population growth rate provided in the World Bank
World Development Indicators for the West Bank and Gaza for 1991 to 1997. Since the estimated population
growth rates we have do not cover the period of interest, this strategy is likely prone to much error. The
second strategy I use is the interpolate municipal populations back in time using the 1997 PCBS figures
and assuming a constant 4.5% annual population growth rate going back to 1982.
3Using an alternative definition of "area" based on the area2 variable described in the text, one additional
municipality became "Area B": Halhoul in the Hebron governorate. The results reported below do not
substantially change when Halhoul is included in the Area B group.
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Thus, by taking ordinary revenue per capita and subtracting that portion that is trans-
ferred, we have a measure of the direct revenue per capita raised by the municipality
itself. Comparing across the four future Area B towns and the seven future Area A towns
in our sample, a Welch two-sample t-test shows no statistically distinguishable differ-
ence between the average municipal revenue per capita mobilized in the Area A (27.9
NIS/capita) versus Area B (25.9 NIS/capita) towns (p=0.78).
Thus, when examining this restricted subset of existing municipalities, we see that
those that were eventually designated as "high capacity" did not differ considerably in
their revenue-generating capacity from those that were designated as "low capacity" be-
fore the intervention of the Oslo Accords. It is important to note that this earlier data
comes from the years following the surprising 1976 elections and subsequent Israeli
crackdown on Palestinian nationalist candidates; the return of relatively loyal, non-nationalist
leaders to power in municipal councils; increased oversight and monitoring by the Israeli
Civil Administration; and finally, the lead-up and outbreak of the First Intifada. If noth-
ing else, this analysis suggests that the subsequent assignment of these 11 municipalities
to "low" or "high" Palestinian coercive capacity does not appear to have been correlated
with their existing fiscal capacity when they were functioning under Israeli occupation.
Further, especially during the Intifada, amidst an environment of economic decline and
protest, it is fair to assume that the capacity of all municipal governments to mobilize
revenue from their populations was severely constrained. However, this analysis should
increase our confidence in ruling out relative static features of these local economies that
may have jointly determined their selection into Area A or Area B and their subsequent
fiscal capacity in the post-PA period.
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